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1. Synopsis: Microfoundations of aggressive commenting on 
social media within a sociological multilevel perspective 
1.1. Summary  
Social media have democratized the public expression of opinions not only for those who debate 
constructively but also for those who vent their anger and attack and silence others. In recent 
years, aggressive online commenting in social media has become highly visible, common, and 
socially relevant. Politicians are threatened on Facebook, organizations are showered in 
collective outrage, and journalists are defamed by their audiences. This form of online 
aggression occurs predominantly in social-political settings, is highly public, is collective, and 
targets public actors. Explaining and empirically exploring it is the focus of this dissertation. 
Compared to the three studies incorporated in this dissertation, the value added by this synopsis 
is generated by embedding the three studies in an overarching metatheoretical framework and 
discussing their contributions to it. 
The first section outlines the current state of scientific knowledge about aggressive online 
commenting. It shortly reviews this concept and its historical development and then outlines 
the multidisciplinary explanations so far proposed for it. This section closes by identifying one 
major theoretical and one methodological gap in the literature.  
The second section outlines the sociological multilevel perspective as a metatheoretical 
framework that connects all three studies. In addition, it introduces the subtheoretical 
approaches of social norms, legitimacy, and social identity applied in the studies, and how they 
can be located within this meta-theoretical framework.  
The third section provides an overview of the three studies and outlines their broader scientific 
contributions. The first study (Rost, Stahel and Frey 2016) introduces a social norm explanation 
of online aggression. It explains why non-anonymous individuals in norm-enforcing settings 
are more aggressive than anonymous individuals. This is explored in 532,197 comments of 
1,612 online petitions. The second study (Stahel and Rost 2018) elucidates the 
microfoundations of legitimacy construction. It predicts that online users who judge 
organizational character, procedures, structures, and outcomes as morally illegitimate are 
motivated to attack organizations on social media. This is confirmed through manual and 
automated content analysis of 45,997 firestorm comments. The third study (Stahel 2018) asks 
which journalists are particularly frequently attacked by their audiences and why. A survey of 
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530 journalists in Switzerland finds that journalists with higher potential to threaten the social 
identity and power of social groups are more frequently attacked.  
1.2. Introducing online aggression 
1.2.1. Concept and historical transformation 
Aggressive online commenting in social media (termed online aggression in the following) is 
a multifaceted concept that has no uniform definition. According to Jane (2015: 83), online 
aggression “takes countless forms in countless domains involving countless participants”. This 
makes its exploration challenging conceptually, methodologically, and epistemologically (see 
also O’Sullivan and Flanagin 2003). Not only individuals but also organizations, institutions, 
ideas, and groups can be attacked in a variety of online contexts based on numerous 
characteristics such as ethnicity, religion, gender, age, disability, political conviction, and 
status. Consequently and unsurprisingly, no universally preferred term or definition exists for 
online aggression (Jane 2015, Ksiazek, Peer and Zivic 2015). In this dissertation project, online 
aggression is defined as expressing threats, insults, hostilities, derogatory statements, and 
vulgarities through online comments via social media. Social media are all web-based means 
for individuals to connect and interact with content and other users and to generate and 
distribute content on platforms such as social network sites, blogs, news commentary sections, 
and email (see Treem, Dailey, Pierce et al. 2016). The definition of online aggression proposed 
here covers the central elements of the strongly overlapping definitions presented in the current 
literature. 
Although online aggression has been researched since the beginning of the Internet, it has risen 
to scientific and societal prominence only in recent years. The first studies on online aggression 
appeared over 30 years ago (see Kiesler, Seigel and McGuire 1984). For a long time, online 
aggression was a niche phenomenon and primarily observed within and between similar-status 
members of Internet subgroups (Kayany 1998) and adolescents in school contexts (Bauman 
2013). In recent years, though, it has changed. Today, incivility in public discourse attracts 
more concern as it “has more outlets, can be highly public, and travels and spreads faster; its 
impact can be greater, and strategies for dealing with it are still being tested” (Meltzer 2015: 
86). These concerns are also reflected in Jane’s (2015: 67) observation that online aggression 
has developed into an “acute social problem”, as it is increasingly common and even the norm 
rather than the exception in various online contexts. Although recent online aggression cannot 
be strictly distinguished from the more traditional forms, the more recent aggression seems 
more often to share the following characteristics. It occurs in highly public, social-political 
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settings rather than private niche contexts or within specific social groups. It targets public, 
often higher-status actors such as politicians, corporations, NGOs, and journalists. It is also 
collective: this means that it aims at collective outcomes, whether perpetrated alone, as is 
commonly observed in digital environments, or performed by more than one person. Publicity 
and collectivity both contrast with traditionally interpersonal interactions between same-status 
users. To the broader public, this recent online aggression is typically visible through the 
uppermost phenomena of the iceberg, for example online firestorms. They describe, large 
volatile amounts of criticism, insulting comments, and swearwords in social media, which are 
often fueled by media attention (Pfeffer, Zorbach and Carley 2014). Increasingly, scientific 
findings show how online aggression harms the targeted individuals’ well-being, social 
harmony, and cohesion. For example, victims of online aggression are more likely to become 
depressive, suicidal, and cyberbullies themselves (Dooley, Pyzalski and Cross 2009, Bauman 
2013).	In addition, exposure to online aggression can make the reading audience think and act 
in a more hostile manner (Hsueh, Yogeeswaran and Malinen 2015, Rösner, Winter and Krämer 
2016, Kwon and Gruzd 2017, Masullo Chen and Lu 2017), distrust news media, science, 
politics, and people in general (Borah 2013, Näsi, Räsänen, Hawdon et al. 2015, Nauroth, 
Gollwitzer, Bender et al. 2015, Anderson, Yeo, Brossard et al. 2016, von Sikorski and Hänelt 
2016), and harden and polarize their opinions (Anderson, Brossard, Scheufele et al. 2014, Borah 
2014). It is no surprise that effective responses to online aggression are widely sought by 
government actors, social media corporations, and civil society. Explaining what drives recent 
aggression is thus a highly relevant first step addressed in this dissertation. 
1.2.2. Existing multidisciplinary explanations 
Although recent aggression is explained here, this dissertation builds on existing theories and 
empirical evidence on online aggression to address both more traditional and more recent forms. 
The scholarly field presents a kaleidoscope of theories to explain the complex and multifaceted 
nature of online aggression (see section 1.2.1.). It is multidisciplinary with a fragmented 
scholarship, predominantly from information science, political science, psychology, education, 
communications, journalism, marketing, and business. A first stream conceptualizes and 
addresses online aggression as a more general phenomenon explored across disciplinary 
borders. This includes literature on flaming as a general term for online aggression (O’Sullivan 
and Flanagin 2003), trolling for provoking for fun (Hardaker 2010), and online firestorms 
(Pfeffer et al. 2014, Poerksen 2018). Another, more distinct stream more clearly delineates 
aggression. Typically, this includes the massive volume of psychological literature on 
cyberbullying, which is limited predominantly to minors and college-age adolescents in 
 
 
 4 
educational contexts (Slonje and Smith 2008, Smith, Mahdavi, Carvalho et al. 2008, Bauman 
2013, Mehari, Farrell and Le 2014). In addition, political and legal studies on online hate speech 
and online incivility conceptualize online aggression as predominantly democracy-threatening 
behavior (Anderson et al. 2014, Rowe 2015). Other examples include economy-related studies 
on cyber-smearing, online dysfunctional customer behavior, and corporate harassment. The 
slightly pejorative connotation of these terms indicates its conceptualization as a threat to 
economic actors (Tuzovic 2010, Workman 2012, Kim, Wang, Maslowska et al. 2016).  
This fast-growing multidisciplinary literature on online aggression has proposed a variety of 
reasons why individuals are aggressive on social media. In the following, I identify and review 
the two most established explanatory meta-approaches, since they lead us to the central gaps 
identified in this dissertation and justify the theoretical approach it proposes. I name these meta-
approaches individual-psychological explanations and immediate digital- and social-context 
explanations.  
The individual-psychological explanations root online aggression in stable psychological traits 
(i.e. aggressors as antisocial individuals) and fluid individual emotions and goals (i.e. 
aggression as a tool to vent or to instrumentalize). The theory on traits proposes that each 
individual has a unique personality and that associated traits motivate online aggression. For 
example, online aggressors score higher than non-aggressors in narcissism, psychopathy, and 
Machiavellianism (Buckels, Trapnell and Paulhus 2014, Pabian, De Backer and Vandebosch 
2015, Koban, Stein, Eckhardt et al. 2018), may lack empathy (Steffgen, König, Pfetsch et al. 
2011, Sticca, Ruggieri, Alsaker et al. 2013) and self-control (Alonzo and Aiken 2004, Peterson 
and Densley 2017), and are also more shy and prone to depression (Bauman 2013, Bonanno 
and Hymel 2013). Individuals who are aggressive on social media were also proposed to be 
driven by emotions such as negative mood (Cheng, Bernstein, Danescu-Niculescu-Mizil et al. 
2017) and anger (Johnson, Cooper and Chin 2009, Stephens, Trawley and Ohtsuka 2016). 
People also use aggression instrumentally to seek thrills and fun, to draw attention to social 
injustice (Erjavec and Kovačič 2012), and to gain social standing (e.g. Kasumovic and 
Kuznekoff 2015, Wright 2017). Overall, these explanations are individual-focused and often 
apply emotional-motivational theories. The cyberbullying literature in particular focuses on 
describing the  conceptual and typological development of online aggressors while commonly 
lacking theoretical explanation (Mehari et al. 2014: 2). 
The immediate digital and contextual explanations root online aggression in technology (i.e. 
technologies motivates aggression) and in immediate contextual factors (i.e. certain online 
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surroundings motivate aggression). In the 1980s and 1990s, social psychologists explored 
whether online aggression results from computers or from social online contexts; the final 
answer was both (Jane 2015). Advocates of the reduced-cues approach (Kiesler et al. 1984) 
argued that online environments cause people to be toxically disinhibited (Suler 2004) because 
communication lacks social-context cues and is anonymous, invisible, and asynchronous. 
However, opponents argued that aggression is not an inevitable byproduct of technology. 
Instead, online users conform to surrounding social cues on platforms. This social context 
explanation has been broadly supported (drawing e.g. on social learning theories or on the social 
identity model of deindividuation effects model by Reicher, Spears and Postmes 1995). For 
example, online users are more aggressive if they perceive aggression to be socially acceptable 
on the platform (Moor, Heuvelman and Verleur 2010, Hmielowski, Hutchens and Cicchirillo 
2014), if they are attacked by other users (Hutchens, Cicchirillo and Hmielowski 2015, Masullo 
Chen and Lu 2017, Quintana-Orts and Rey 2018) if they are not sanctioned by others (Xu, Xu 
and Li 2016, Álvarez-Benjumea and Winter 2018), if certain social identity processes are 
activated (Nauroth et al. 2015, Rains, Kenski, Coe et al. 2017), and if platforms set up 
moderation strategies that fail to prevent aggression (Ruiz, Domingo, Micó et al. 2011, Stroud, 
Scacco, Muddiman et al. 2014, Ksiazek 2015). These explanations incorporate the social 
context, though they commonly limit it to the immediate online environment.  
Both meta-explanatory approaches draw on a variety of data sources and designs. Surveys that 
collect either self-reported intended or actual aggression predominate, particularly in exploring 
adolescences' and students’ cyberbullying. Experiments are also often conducted. Common 
samples include MTurk participants, gamers, and social media users. Further, content analysis 
of reader comments on social media platforms is common, often in reference to a specific topic. 
Comment data sets commonly include a few hundred online comments. A few studies have 
drawn on several hundred thousand comments (see Stephens et al. 2016, Kwon and Cho 2017, 
Vargo and Hopp 2017). Firestorms have been discussed theoretically as prototypical examples 
of recent online aggression (Pfeffer et al. 2014) and explored in case studies (Salek 2015), 
simulations (Hauser, Hautz, Hutter et al. 2017), and experiments (Johnen, Jungblut and Ziegele 
2017). Content analyses of firestorm comments exist but are scarce (see Prinzing 2015, Franke, 
Keinz, Taudes et al. 2017). 
1.2.3. Gaps 
Based on the literature review, one major theoretical gap and one methodological gap have been 
identified. Theoretical conceptualization and explanation of more recent forms of online 
aggression are scarce, particularly in regard to their societal dimension. Today, online 
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aggression does not only involve pupils privately cyberbullying their classmates or online 
gamers mobbing fellow gamers to gain status. Instead, it incorporates a societal dimension as 
it seems to span social, geographical, and hierarchical structures and accordingly produces 
societal effects (see section 1.2.1.). Nevertheless, most current explanations of online 
aggression are limited to individual and immediate digital environment factors (section 1.1.3.) 
and ignore its embeddedness in the broader societal context, including any reciprocal links 
between aggressors and society. Scholars have begun to acknowledge this gap. Accordingly, 
Jane (2015: 66) notes that “scholarship in many disciplines has missed the growing power and 
prevalence of hostility on the internet”. Similarly, Peterson and Densley (2017: 197) call other 
scholars to address “the interaction between micro, meso, and macro levels of explanation” to 
overcome the current lack of “continuity and coherence” in online aggression research. 
Suggested broader explanations also coincide with DiMaggio, Hargittai, Neuman et al.’s (2001: 
329) more general call for “explanatory models […] of Internet use […] that tie behavior 
directly to social and institutional context”. Recently published studies have followed these 
calls and adopted broader social approaches (see Nauroth et al. 2015, Einwiller, Viererbl and 
Himmelreich 2017, Johnen et al. 2017, Rains et al. 2017, Vargo and Hopp 2017). However, 
they remain scarce. 
The rarely explored societal dimension opens associated gaps, especially the limited focus on 
adult producers of aggression and public targets. The lion’s share of research into online 
aggression has accounted for a school problem involving young people. However, “adult 
cyberbullying remains unstudied, even though it is a pressing social problem and a dark side of 
the Internet” (Simons 2015, Lowry, Zhang, Wang et al. 2016: 981). It is plausible that recent 
social-political online aggression is more likely driven by adult aggressors. Further, although 
recent aggression predominantly targets public high-status actors, it has not been explicitly 
theorized which public actors are more likely to be targeted than others or why. This gap cannot 
be systematically answered by studies of youth exposed to and targeted by online hate (Costello, 
Hawdon and Ratliff 2017, Hawdon, Oksanen and Räsänen 2017) or descriptive or case studies 
of targeted corporations (Pace, Balboni and Gistri 2017), journalists (Löfgren Nilsson and 
Örnebring 2016), or social groups generally (Silva, Mondal, Correa et al. 2016) such as female 
bloggers (Hardaker and McGlashan 2016).  
To conclude, there is a need to address recent online aggression and to embed it in a socially 
comprehensive perspective. Such an approach more effectively accommodates the nature of 
recent online aggression, works out its societal relevance, and predicts and explains aggressive 
acts and who they target. 
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Addressing the methodological gap requires behavioral data sets of recent online aggression 
that are larger, broader, comparable, and include control cases. While in the last two years a 
few studies using large sets of comments involving aggression have emerged (e.g. Hewett, 
Rand, Rust et al. 2016), they are mostly limited to specific topics and thus likely reflect 
particular social groups. To draw generalizing conclusions about why online aggression occurs, 
data is needed on more diverse groups of commentators (Hutchens et al. 2015, Runions, Bak 
and Shaw 2017, Koban et al. 2018) and on broader societal topics (Sullivan 2014, Jane 2015). 
Simultaneously, data should be comparable. This can occur if data share the same platform. 
This avoids bias arising from differing platform architectures and participation conditions such 
as moderation strategies. Also, scholars studying firestorms commonly select and study protests 
labelled as firestorms by news media and high-profile single actors that attracted firestorms 
(also criticized by Sullivan 2014). However, selecting for outcome bears the risk of ideological 
bias and decreases generalizability. Instead, selection should be guided by objective criteria that 
consider the actual content and provide non-aggressive control cases. In addition, aggressive 
comments should be comparable with each other and with non-aggressive comments. For 
instance, online protests that turn into firestorms should be compared to others that remain non-
aggressive. These methodological gaps also apply when examining who is targeted by 
aggression. Here, essay-like, qualitative, and descriptive studies currently predominate. Thus, 
entities within representative samples of professional, organizational, and other groups should 
be compared in statistical, multivariate models according to how frequently they are attacked. 
This gap reflects a broad call in literature for behavioral datasets of online aggression and of 
attacked targets that are larger and from a broader societal range but are comparable and not 
selected for outcome. Such a methodological approach increases the external validity, 
generalizability, and reproducibility of results. 
1.3. Metatheoretical approach: Sociological multilevel explanation  
To address the theoretical gap, the following section will present the metatheoretical, 
sociological multilevel approach that will link all the dissertation studies. The section also 
introduces the three themes underlying the studies: social norms, legitimacy, and social identity. 
They all traditionally underlie multilevel thinking. The idea of this dissertation has never been 
to strictly apply the meta-theoretical framework with all its analytical steps. Rather, this 
framework is used as an encompassing background perspective that guides the studies, helping 
identify research questions, selecting sub-theories and variables, and interpreting, and drawing 
conclusions (for a discussion of meta-theories, see Wagner and Berger 1985). In addition, the 
metatheory helps to locate this dissertation explicitly within the online aggression literature and 
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especially within sociology. Overall, this metatheoretical approach is suited to explaining 
aggressive behavior as it focuses on explaining micro behaviors, while acknowledging the 
social-structural macro context. 
Accordingly, the proposed sociological multilevel approach uses an explanatory logic that is 
shared most popularly by, for example, the micro-macro diagram by Coleman (1990), 
contemporary analytical sociology (Hedström and Bearman 2009, Hedström and Ylikoski 
2014), explanatory sociology (Wippler and Lindenberg 1987, Maurer and Schmid 2010), 
rational choice approaches in social science (Diekmann and Voss 2004), and behavioral and 
experimental game theory (Camerer 2011). Its roots can be traced back to Scottish moralists 
such as David Hume and Adam Smith (Raub, Buskens and Van Assen 2011) and to social 
exchange theory (Homans 1958, Blau 1964).  
This approach conceptualizes sociology as an explanatory discipline that strives to link 
individual actions to the structural level (Raub et al. 2011). The multilevel approach takes up 
sociology’s basic question of how social phenomena, regularities, and facts such as the 
preservation of social order can be explained by the reciprocal relationships between individuals 
and society. In essence, it explains macro-level facts by micro-level, individual mechanisms: 
individuals’ actions and the relations that link actors to one another (Hedström and Bearman 
2009). This enables an understanding of why the observed outcomes were produced. This idea 
commonly underlies methodological individualism (Weber 1978 [1922]) and structural 
individualism, according to which “all social facts, their structure and change, are in principle 
explicable in terms of individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to one another” 
(Hedström and Bearman 2009: 8). The linking of micro and macro levels in this approach thus 
avoids both purely micro explanations and purely structural macro holism such as that practiced 
by Durkheim and Parsons (Raub et al. 2011). In addition, it goes beyond mere sociological 
description, typologies, and hypotheses of orientation such as the risk society. Although these 
are important predecessors of explanations, they provide no information on why things are the 
way they are. Paradigmatic examples of this micro–macro thinking is the production of 
collective goods (Olson 1965), Schelling’s (2006) models of segregation, collective action, and 
the production of status hierarchies.  
The micro–macro link is a central idea in the multilevel approach. It is thus shortly described 
here. I draw on Coleman’s (1990) micro–macro diagram as it is the standard tool for 
representing micro–macro models and for its “simplicity and intuitive appeal” (Raub and Voss 
2017: 2). Coleman (1990) distinguishes the macro level, which refers to collective properties 
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of the social situation and social system such as a society, firm, and social group, from the micro 
level, which refers to cognitive properties and purposive actions of individual actors (Raub and 
Voss 2017). The model is divided into three different steps.  
The first step describes how the macro level affects the micro level. Whenever people decide 
whether to vote, to move to a new neighborhood, to buy the latest best-seller, and to express an 
opinion, they unconsciously or consciously consider macro properties (Hedström and Bearman 
2009). Macro properties include typical actions and beliefs among members of the collectivity 
and aggregate patterns that characterize the collectivity, such as distributions of inequality, 
norms, positions, networks, and institutions (Hedström and Bearman 2009). Individuals 
identify and evaluate these properties and their associated conditions, incentives, alternatives 
for action, objective restrictions for action, and consequences to be expected. This step thus 
reconstructs the social situation as perceived by the actor, including potential bias, as actors are 
not assumed to be fully informed (Wippler and Lindenberg 1987).  
The second step explains why individuals act: how individuals’ micro evaluations, goals, and 
expectations affect which action individuals select. It involves a micro theory of individual 
behavior that may be inspired by other disciplines such as psychology (Maurer and Schmid 
2010). Social sciences often assume actors to be  boundedly rational; individuals act rationally 
and are predominantly self-interested by and large, so they can be motivated by both material 
and non-material incentives (Diekmann and Voss 2008, Raub et al. 2011). For example, 
individuals may expect an action to maximize or optimize a utility value, an emotional value, 
or a degree of appropriateness (Maurer and Schmid 2010). A main task of this step is to identify 
the microfoundational social cogs and wheels that explain action (Hedström and Bearman 
2009). These may include norms when centering on others’ actions but also individual-centered 
causes such as beliefs, altruistic motives, and heuristics (Hedström and Bearman 2009, Maurer 
and Schmid 2010).  
The third step addresses how individuals’ micro-level actions generate macro-level social 
phenomena and collective outcomes. Diverse transformation rules can be applied (Wippler and 
Lindenberg 1987), ranging from the mere addition of actions such as collecting signatures to 
complex diffusion models such as threshold models. This step is a common challenge and goes 
beyond the micro theory of action (Maurer and Schmid 2010). Generally, surveys are 
particularly suited to empirically revealing multilevel models, beside other methods such as 
agent-based computer simulations. 
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The following reviews the three themes underlying the three studies. As they are traditionally 
explained by micro-macro processes, their embeddedness in multilevel thinking is discussed. 
They suit the overarching research question of this dissertation well thanks to their combination 
of macrostructural foundation with primary focus on micro processes.  
1.3.1. Social norms 
Norms is a concept that has traditionally been theorized from a micro-macro perspective. 
Fundamentally, a norm is “a statement that something ought or ought not to be the case” (Opp 
2002). In sociology, norms are commonly understood as institutionalized expectations of 
behavior, such as roles (Dahrendorf 1985/2010), or as regularity of behavior (Diekmann and 
Voss 2008, Tutić, Zschache and Voss 2015). Social norms are those shared by other people and 
sustained by sanctions: the approval and disapproval of third parties (Homans 1950, Elster 
1989, Bendor and Swistak 2001). Norms have been variously conceptualized as a macro-level 
property, as part of the collective consciousness, as a culture-specific social fact (Durkheim 
1957) or, in line with methodological individualism, as a prototypical macro-level product 
arising from individual actions (Elster 1989, Coleman 1990: 244). Norms can also exist at the 
micro level if they cause individuals to perceive norms, to follow or violate them, and to enforce 
conformity (Elster 1989, Coleman 1990). Modern society is characterized by particularist, co-
existing political, religious, and philosophical norms (Popitz 1980), each with their own 
standards of norm-conforming behavior (Weber 1904).  
Norms permeate societies. They prescribe and proscribe how and how not to dress, eat, queue, 
distribute, retaliate, and cooperate (Elster 1989). How norms emerge, affect society, and 
particularly how they are enforced is studied by philosophers, economists, legal experts, and 
sociologists, particularly those using an individualistic theory of bounded rational choice (Tutić 
et al. 2015). People who enforce norms through sanctions play a central role in how social 
behavior, social cohesion, and social order is generated (Diekmann and Voss 2008, Scherr 
2013). 
How norms can be enforced by rationally thinking actors is a classic social dilemma. Often, 
individual micro rationality,  a state in which self-interested people prefer to free-ride, leads to 
collectively suboptimal outcomes on the macro level in which the norm is not enforced (see 
second order collective good problem; Diekmann and Voss 2008). Basically, if actions have 
negative effects for other individuals, termed externalities, such as environmental pollution, 
norms to restrict and forbid such actions may be introduced (Opp 2002, Elster 2015) and 
enforced such as by naming, shaming, and blaming norm violators. Costly sanctions by many 
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effectively produce a bad reputation through gossiping, ostracizing, and adjusting exchange 
relationships with norm violators (Coleman 1990). This is facilitated by digital communication 
technologies, which enable geographically scattered individuals with narrow common interests 
to act collectively (Elster 1989). However, applying informal sanctions is costly. It takes time, 
sanctioners risk opportunity costs, and norm violators may retaliate. Simultaneously, sanctions 
benefit all members of the group, including those freeriding on anyone who volunteers as social 
police (Olson 1965). The dilemma can be solved if norm enforcement is cheap, if sanctioners 
are materially, emotionally, and socially rewarded, and if they are intrinsically motivated 
(Diekmann and Preisendörfer 1992, Fischbacher, Fehr and Gächter 2001, Opp 2002). Overall, 
norm violations and subsequent scandalizations thus perform the indispensable social function 
of strengthening or changing the macro validity of social norms (Durkheim 1977). 
1.3.2. Moral legitimacy  
Legitimacy is a second concept that has been theorized from a micro–macro perspective. 
Legitimacy is central to sociology and relates to other socially evaluative concepts such as status 
and reputation (Deephouse and Suchman 2008). Weber (1978 [1922]) and Parsons (1960) are 
commonly credited with introducing legitimacy into sociological theory. Weber analyzed the 
legitimacy of traditional, charismatic, and legal authority types that are needed to produce stable 
social orders. In addition, he argued that legitimacy occurs through a collective construction of 
social reality. Social order is legitimate and a social fact if it conforms with widely shared 
norms, values, and beliefs. Building on this, Parson viewed legitimacy as the congruence of an 
organization with social laws, norms, and values. Accordingly, organizational legitimacy, as 
researched in organizational studies and new institutional theory, has emerged as a central 
stream in legitimacy research (Deephouse and Suchman 2008).  
Suchman (1995: 574) offered a broad-based definition of legitimacy as “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. A focal interest is 
how organizations gain, maintain, and repair legitimacy (Suchman 1995); it is not enough to 
have material and technical resources to survive economically (Deephouse and Suchman 2008). 
Suchman (1995) suggested conceptual dimensions of legitimacy according to which audiences 
such as state regulators, society at large, and media assess organizational legitimacy. One 
dimension is moral legitimacy. This describes whether the consequences, procedures, persons, 
and structures of organizational activities are perceived as right or wrong by audiences. 
Audience judgements influence legitimation and delegitimation, the processes by which the 
legitimacy of an entity changes over time (Deephouse and Suchman 2008).  
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Legitimacy construction has been conceptualized as a micro–macro issue. Following 
Deephouse and Suchman’s (2008) suggestion that legitimation should be examined at multiple 
levels, Bitektine and Haack (2015) proposed a multilevel theory of legitimacy construction 
focused on microfoundations. This was further developed in the legitimacy-as-perception 
approach by Suddaby, Bitektine and Haack (2017). It conceives legitimacy as a collective 
process that is mediated by individual perceptions and their associated socio-cognitive 
processes, which guide behaviors. On the macro level, legitimacy is a socially shared opinion 
about the appropriateness of an organization, termed its validity. On the micro level, individuals 
have certain beliefs about their own and others’ perceptions of the legitimacy of an 
organization, termed validity and propriety beliefs. To form judgements, which guide actions, 
individuals often use socio-cognitive heuristics (Kahneman and Frederick 2002, Gigerenzer 
2008). Aggregating micro perceptions and actions can support or challenge organizational 
legitimacy at the macro level. 
1.3.3. Social identity 
Social identity is a concept that has been traditionally theorized from a micro-macro 
perspective. The concept of identity spans many social science disciplines (Stryker and Burke 
2000). In the sociological and social psychological traditions, identity theory and social identity 
theory are most central. Both theorize the social nature of self as constituted by society and 
social structures. The focal interest lies in how identities are internalized, become part of the 
self, and influence social behavior. Identity theory can be traced back to Mead (1934) and 
Blumer (1969) and stems from the associated micro-sociological approach of symbolic 
interactionism (Stryker 1980). Identity theory posits that the impact of society on behaviors is 
mediated by role identities. The self reflects the wider social structure insofar as it is constituted 
by multiple identities derived from role positions, the expectations attached to positions that 
individuals hold in social networks. If people internalize role expectations, they identify. 
Society and social order is thus enabled through people communicating through their roles 
(Mead 1934). 
The subsequent social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979, Tajfel and Turner 1986) 
originated in social psychology. It bears various similarities to identity theory (Hogg, Terry and 
White 1995, Stets and Burke 2000) but primarily explains group processes and intergroup 
relations such as collective action and discrimination. Social identity describes individuals’ 
awareness of their membership in a social group or groups, including the value and emotions 
attached to being members (Tajfel and Turner 1986). If individuals self-categorize into groups, 
their perception, feelings, and actions become depersonalized, and they conform to the self-
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defining in-group prototype. If social identities are threatened, self-defense mechanisms may 
motivate members to disparage the threatening source. As with identity theory, society is here 
assumed to influence behavior via the mediation of social identity and associated self-
categorization processes. The concomitant advantage of social identity lies in its systematic 
elaboration of the psychological socio-cognitive processes underlying the operation of identity, 
with the sociological level acknowledged by socio-historical intergroup relations (Hogg et al. 
1995). The politicized social identity perspective (see Simon and Klandermans 2001) reflects 
this multilevel idea particularly well.  
This, social identity theory attends to both macro and micro processes (Stets and Burke 2000). 
As a social-psychological identity theory, it forms part of the structural social psychology 
approach. This approach was proposed by Lawler, Ridgeway and Markovsky (1993) in 
response to Coleman’s (1990) emphasis of micro-processes in micro–macro analysis. Lawler 
et al. (1993: 269) argued that social psychological aspects connecting individuals to social 
structures should be considered in multilevel theories. These may be few and simple aspects, 
as in rational choice theories, or more complex, as in theories of the self and identity. Social-
psychological work on power, status, roles, and identity offered itself to such multilevel 
theorizing due to its concern with the emergence and effects of social structure (Lawler et al. 
1993). 
1.4. Overview of studies 
The following section provides a short overview of the three studies. 
The first study, titled “Digital Social Norm Enforcement: Online Firestorms in Social Media”  
(Rost et al. 2016), has two goals. First, it introduces social norm theory to conceptualize online 
aggression in social-political online settings. Second, it uses this social norm explanation of 
online aggression to  challenge the popular assumption that online aggression can be 
predominantly explained by anonymity. The study predicts that non-anonymous individuals are 
more aggressive than anonymous individuals, particularly if selective incentives are present and 
if aggressors are intrinsically motivated. Predictions are confirmed in a multivariate analysis of 
532,197 comments on 1,612 online petitions.  
The second study, titled “Legitimacy perceptions in online firestorms” (Stahel and Rost 2018), 
focuses on aggressive acts in online firestorms against organizations. The study integrates the 
concept of moral heuristics (Sunstein 2005) into the legitimacy-as-perception approach to 
elucidate the micro-level cognitive processes leading to aggressive actions. It predicts that 
judging organizational character, procedures, structures, and outcomes as morally illegitimate 
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motivates commentators to attack organizations in social media. This is empirically confirmed 
in a lexicon-based, manual, and automated content analysis and subsequent multivariate 
regression of 45,997 comments in a firestorm against a German music rights organization. 
The third study, titled “Dirty journalists, all liars! - A social identity explanation for why 
journalists are attacked by audiences” (Stahel 2018), focuses on why some journalists seem to 
be more frequently aggressively targeted by their audience through digital and analogue 
channels. It draws on five central conditions that a politicized social identity approach suggests 
increase threats to groups’ social identity and power. Journalists should be more frequently 
attacked if they are evaluative, publish on political topics, have a local focus, are powerful, and 
belong to similar outgroups: other groups that are hard to distinguish from the ingroup.  This is 
because their potential to threaten the social identity and power of groups is greater under these 
conditions; they are more likely to mobilize group members with a pre-existing tendency to feel 
threatened. A Swiss online survey and multivariate analysis of 530 journalists confirms all 
hypotheses. 
1.5. Contributions  
This section points out the major contributions of the studies and the overall dissertation based 
on the research gaps, the proposed meta-theoretical framework and its sub-themes (section 
1.2.3.). 
1.5.1. Theorizing recent forms of online aggression 
By exploring more recent online aggression (see section 1.2.1.), all studies contribute 
knowledge to this scarcely explored phenomenon. All studies thus enlighten aggressive 
commenting in societally relevant, social-political contexts. This includes online protests about 
public issues such as internet security, misbehavior of politicians, public spending, and animal 
protection (Rost et al. 2016), against organizational reforms (Stahel and Rost 2018), and the 
news media context (Stahel 2018). The aggression explored is collective even if it occurs alone, 
since the aggressors act on behalf of their own or of other social groups (Rost et al. 2016, Stahel 
2018) or in numerically large firestorms (Stahel and Rost 2018). Aggressive commentators in 
all studies reflect a digital civil society in which particular interest groups become situationally 
mobilized, such as those concerned with the music service in Stahel and Rost (2018). 
Aggression occurs mostly on highly public social media, such as on comment sections of online 
petitions (Rost et al. 2016, Stahel and Rost 2018) and on comment sections of news reported 
by journalists (Stahel 2018). Finally, targets are primarily public actors and mainly of higher 
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status, such as authorities, persons, and institutions (Rost et al. 2016), organizations (Stahel and 
Rost 2018), and journalists as the highly public “fourth estate” (Stahel 2018).  
This more recent aggression differs from traditionally occurring and explored aggression in 
more private, interpersonal contexts between individuals of similar status or known personally 
to each other (see section 1.2.1.). Naturally, the proposed distinction between older and recent 
forms should not obscure the fact that much aggression occurs somewhere between or can 
mutate from one form to another. For example, private cybermobbing may turn into country-
wide witch hunts with news media involved.  
1.5.2. Microfoundations within a sociological multilevel explanation 
All three studies implicitly use a metatheoretical, sociologically multilevel framework in their 
conceptualization and explanation of online aggression. This framework basically assumes that 
individuals’ embeddedness in society and macro structures contributes to explaining why 
individuals comment aggressively on social media. This broader sociological perspective 
focused on microfoundations (Coleman 1990, Diekmann and Voss 2004, Maurer and Schmid 
2010, Hedström and Ylikoski 2014) goes beyond most former, narrower approaches to 
explaining online aggression. Those mainly ignore the macro context and explain online 
aggression through the individual’s psychology or by the immediate digital environment and 
the presence of social cues on platforms (see section 1.2.1.). The proposed perspective, thereby, 
is in line with the more general idea of a sousveillance society in which everybody watches 
everybody through monitoring, capturing, and disseminating information, allowing the 
denunciation of abuse by the powerful but also enabling intrusive mob vigilantism (Dennis 
2008, Ganascia 2010). To draw the proposed, more complete, and socially integrative picture 
of online aggression, this dissertation project required on the collation and development of the 
scattered academic literature on online aggression and social behavior. This interdisciplinary 
integration is reflected by the diverse theoretical approaches selected in the three studies.  
The following section discusses how each of the three studies contributes an empirical 
application of the meta-theoretical framework to online aggression. Aggression is motivated by 
considerations associated with social norms (Rost et al. 2016), moral legitimacy (Stahel and 
Rost 2018), and social identities (Stahel 2018). Although the studies neither theoretically nor 
empirically reflect all aspects of the micro-macro model, they together represent an initial 
coordinated attempt to open up broader sociological thinking about online aggression. 
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Study 1 
The first study (Rost et al. 2016) establishes the micro–macro link by conceptualizing micro 
online aggression as an act to enforce macro social norms. In cases of norm violations, online 
aggressors publicly express disapproval to secure public goods, such as the honesty of 
politicians. Incremental sanctions (Coleman 1990) in online firestorms are a typical example of 
such sanctioning behavior. The predominant macro-level properties in this study are thus social 
norms produced by micro actors, in line with Coleman (1990). The study applies the public 
good dilemma: rational users will not attack to secure the public good, so the norm is unlikely 
to be enforced. However, micro aggression can be motivated by low costs through 
communication technologies, selective incentives made salient by a scandal or a controversy (a 
macro-level property), and intrinsic motivation (a micro-level property). Micro aggressions 
ultimately help to secure the public good on the macro level. Most importantly, the results show 
that non-anonymity (also a macro-level property in the strict sense) motivates aggression 
because, in this norm-enforcing context, individuals stand up for higher-order moral ideals and 
principles. Here, anonymous commenting would be a costly, wasteful behavior, as aggressive 
sanctions are less credible, create less awareness and less support, and offer few benefits from 
ideologically like-minded networks.  
This study enriches literature on online aggression by introducing a novel theoretical approach. 
In addition, it contributes to the fundamental, widely debated question at the interface of 
economic and sociological literature about how norms are enforced (Homans 1950, Elster 1989, 
Bendor and Swistak 2001), and, specifically, how the classic public goods dilemma can be 
resolved (Olson 1965, Diekmann and Preisendörfer 1992, Opp 2002, Diekmann and Voss 
2008). Addressing this question by applying it to aggressive sanctions through digital 
technologies is innovative as it provides initial knowledge on norm-shaping processes and the 
societal function (Durkheim 1977) of online aggression in increasingly digitalized societies. 
More specifically, the social norm perspective on online aggression entails novel variables - 
selective incentives and intrinsic motivation - and novel predictions, about non-anonymity. It 
thus challenges popular assumptions about online anonymity as the main cause of aggression, 
helps resolve former inconsistent empirical findings on the effect of anonymity on aggression, 
and provides the argument underlying why non-anonymity motivates aggression in recent 
online aggression. Thereby, the resulting micro-level evidence disconfirms the popular macro-
level assumption that abolition of online anonymity could prevent online firestorms.  
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Study 2 
The second study (Stahel and Rost 2018) connects micro to macro by conceptualizing micro 
aggressive acts in firestorms as a tool for shaping macro organizational legitimacy. The 
legitimacy of organizations is constructed, among other things, by online users in social media. 
The macro level is acknowledged by assuming a socially shared macro opinion about the 
appropriateness, or legitimacy, of an organization; it affects individuals but is also affected by 
them. At the micro level, individuals have certain beliefs about whether they think of the 
organization as legitimate. In construing beliefs, they may use moral heuristics. The resulting 
beliefs determine whether online users comment aggressively or not. Results show that 
individuals comment more aggressively if they judge the organization’s characters, procedures, 
structures, and outcomes to be morally illegitimate. This is because moral heuristics introduce 
ideological justifications and associated emotions that reduce individuals’ external and internal 
costs associated with aggressive acts.  
This study thus relates to the well-known concept of legitimacy in sociological and 
organizational tradition and how organizations gain and maintain legitimacy (Parsons 1960, 
Weber 1978 [1922], Suchman 1995, Deephouse and Suchman 2008). Specifically, it 
contributes to understanding the cognitive microprocesses underlying organizational legitimacy 
construction, an understanding that is still in its infancy (Bitektine and Haack 2015, Etter, 
Colleoni, Illia et al. 2017). It does so by focusing on social media audiences that challenge 
organizational legitimacy. It contributes a broader, multi-level perspective by analyzing online 
aggression innovatively from the explicit multilevel legitimacy-as-perception perspective 
(Suddaby et al. 2017). The proposed integration of moral heuristics (Sunstein 2005) into the 
legitimacy-as-perception approach and its effect on online aggression in social media extends 
and innovatively connects online aggression literature, sociological-organizational, and 
cognitive psychological literature. Overall, it improves understanding of how legitimacy is 
constructed in a society in which social media audiences increasingly visibly and powerfully 
shape organizational legitimacy. 
Study 3 
The third study (Stahel 2018) links micro to macro by conceptualizing aggressive acts as a tool 
used by members of social groups to silence journalists and thereby to protect the social identity 
and power of their own groups. The study is motivated by the assumption of amplified visibility 
and accessibility of journalists in the social media age. Potentially increasing online aggression 
against journalists might bias public media discourse in the long run, as it might silence 
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particular journalists. The study asks why some journalists seem to be more frequently attacked 
by their audiences than others. The macro level is acknowledged by assuming social groups 
with common norms and beliefs that strive for positive identities and power. On the micro level, 
group members may feel their social identity within a group to be threatened under particular 
conditions, such as if media coverage attacks their group. Once they perceive the image of their 
group as threatened by negative coverage, they may feel their social identity to be threatened. 
This motivates them to attack journalists so as to influence their behavior and ultimately protect 
the social identity and power of their group on the macro level. For group members, threats 
coming from journalists might include both macro-level properties such as journalists’ ethnic 
groups and the power of their professional position and field of publishing and micro-level 
properties such as journalistic writing style. These properties connect to five central conditions 
that a politicized social identity approach (Tajfel and Turner 1979, Simon and Klandermans 
2001) suggests increase threats to groups’ social identity and power: evaluative settings, the 
salience of politicized identities, disruptions of strong place identity, evaluators that are 
powerful, and evaluators that belong to outgroups too similar to the ingroups. The journalists 
that are more frequently attacked are evaluative, publish on political topics, have a local focus, 
are powerful, and belong to similar outgroups. 
This multilevel explanation of which journalists are attacked and why not only enlightens a 
practical problem, but also connects it theoretically to the sociological idea of society affecting 
individuals through social identities (Mead 1934, Tajfel and Turner 1979, Stryker and Burke 
2000, Simon and Klandermans 2001). It contributes to literature on online aggression as it 
relates to more recent social identity explanations of online aggression (Coe, Kenski and Rains 
2014, Nauroth et al. 2015, Rains et al. 2017). In contrast to them, it does not focus on processes 
among users of online platforms but the unequal targeting of actors within a highly public 
profession. The study also contributes to sociological and social psychology literature (Lawler 
et al. 1993, Stets and Burke 2000) by illustrating their explanatory potential for technology-
mediated, aggressive behavior. Specifically, the proposed mutual contingency of social groups 
and online aggression suggests that aggression against journalists is a problem that emerges 
social-structurally rather than simply through people randomly and angrily targeting journalists. 
1.5.3. Methodological contributions 
In addition, the studies contribute behavioral data that are larger, broader, comparable, and 
include control cases, in contrast to most research on recent online aggression so far. The need 
for this has been stated by diverse scholars (Hutchens et al. 2015, Jane 2015, Runions et al. 
2017, Koban et al. 2018). The methodological approach used in this dissertation increases the 
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external validity, generalizability, and reproducibility of results. The following section 
illustrates how this contribution is realized in each study. 
Study 1 
The first study (Rost et al. 2016) involves a data set that is so far, to my best knowledge, 
exceptional in the online aggression literature due to its richness (for one exception, see Vargo 
and Hopp 2017). The data set of 532,197 comments on 1,612 online petitions is much larger 
than most data sets of aggressive online comments, although very large data sets have been 
compiled recently (see section 1.2.2). The main contribution is that the data is both broader and 
comparable. Comments are drawn from only one online petition platform but includes a variety 
of topics from diverse societal fields such as politics, economy, and technology that have been 
submitted by online users all over Germany. Despite its topical and social-geographical breadth, 
comments are comparable because they share the same platform architecture. Commentators 
are thus assumed to be representative of a digital civil society: online users who actively 
contribute to a wide range of social-political issues. Aggressive comments can be compared to 
nonaggressive comments, and the online protests they are embedded in show a large spectrum 
of aggressiveness, from non-aggressive protests to highly aggressive firestorms. The 
availability of control cases for both comment and protest thus allows comparative conclusions. 
This also avoids the problem of selection for outcome (Sullivan 2014).  
Study 2 
The second study (Stahel and Rost 2018) contributes a rich data set and the measurement of 
relatively challenging moral legitimacy concepts to the online firestorm literature. It is, to my 
best knowledge, the first study that did not select a firestorm based on its labelling as a high-
profile case by the media. The case was selected by choosing the largest and most aggressive 
online protest from the data set of online petitions used in the first study (Rost et al. 2016). This 
avoids selecting for outcome in that it is independent of labelling as a firestorm by news media 
(Sullivan 2014). The full data set of 45,997 aggressive and non-aggressive comments from a 
real-world firestorm is larger than those used in most former firestorm explorations. It provides 
external validity and allows systematic conclusions; this contrasts with most former studies on 
firestorms, which are either merely theoretical or use non-behavioral data. Comments were 
submitted from all over Germany. This renders its social significance greater than that of data 
for firestorms that are locally restricted. Further, the lexicon-based, content-analysis approach 
used is not only automated but also incorporates manual work. This allows the measurement of 
the complex concept of moral legitimacy among the comments. Such an approach goes beyond 
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former studies, whose automated text analyses allow only the simpler outcome variable of 
aggressive expressions to be measured.  
Study 3 
The third study’s (Stahel 2018) major methodological contribution is the multivariate 
regression analysis of how often a representative sample of a public profession was attacked. 
Using inferential statistics on 530 journalistic survey participants goes beyond present online 
aggression studies, which so far have been limited to qualitative and descriptive approaches to 
exploring public targets of online aggression such as bloggers and journalists. In addition, it 
extends the few former studies that systematically explored who is exposed to online 
aggression, which have been largely limited to minors and adolescents. The data set is thus 
larger, comparable, includes control cases, and an adult population, in contrast to former related 
studies. The multilevel analysis of a large and representative sample of journalists thus 
contributes more sophisticated and generalizing conclusions about which representatives within 
groups are particularly frequently attacked.  
1.6. In a nutshell: What did we learn and where to go from here? 
Beyond the specific contributions of each study to research into why people comment 
aggressively through digital technologies, the overall dissertation provides a comprehensive 
and innovative approach to understanding and explaining online aggression. The proposed 
multilevel approach emphasizes its embeddedness in society. This socially broader approach 
effectively tackles the nature of online aggression as observed in more recent years. It thus adds 
knowledge to this complex, historically transforming yet highly topical phenomenon (see 
section 1.2.1.). It ultimately allows more valid predictions of what makes individuals and social 
groups comment aggressively as well as who is targeted most and why. The data-wise and 
methodological approaches presented here ensure valid empirical evidence to inspire future 
research. 
Even more advanced and informative insights may be expected by extending this dissertation 
project in two directions. A first suggestion is to more explicitly and consistently apply and 
extend the multilevel approach, which is largely implicit in this dissertation, to study online 
aggression. For example, social-structural variables such as online aggressors’ socio-economic 
status, education, and geographical region could be more systematically considered. Further, 
deducing and empirically testing links from micro to macro could be a complex but worthwhile 
undertaking. It could answer whether and how individual online aggressions indeed impact 
macro social structures and actors, notably norms, organizations, and public media discourse. 
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A second suggestion is to link online behavioral data such as hate comments with survey data 
of aggressors to even better apply multilevel explanations. This empirical approach is so far 
extremely rare, although surveys are optimal in exploring macro-level structural and associated 
beliefs (Maurer and Schmid 2010) and online comments represent valid micro behavior. Such 
designs pose practical and ethical challenges such as issues of privacy. However, it seems 
worthwhile to engage with these challenges, as they may provide a wealth of interesting insights 
into the as yet relatively uncharted territory of micro–macro interactions in online aggression. 
Finally, they would contribute to the more general question of how social behavior can be 
regulated in a digital future. 
1.7. Personal contributions to co-publications 
In the third study (Stahel 2018), the sole author, Lea Stahel, takes full responsibility for the 
content. The first study (Rost et al. 2016) and the second (Stahel and Rost 2018) were developed 
in co-authorship. Both the first and second study benefited from constant and mutual exchange 
between the doctoral student and her co-authors as well as other colleagues. Nevertheless, this 
section provides a rough orientation about the separate contributions of each author. 
In the first study (Rost et al. 2016), Lea Stahel is the second author and Katja Rost and Bruno 
S. Frey are first and third authors respectively. As reported in the published paper (Rost et al. 
2016), all authors cooperated in conceiving and designing the study and writing the paper. Lea 
Stahel and Katja Rost additionally collected, edited, analyzed, and interpreted the data, with 
Katja Rost contributing most. 
In the second study (Stahel and Rost 2018), Lea Stahel is the first author and Katja Rost the 
second author. Lea Stahel is responsible for the majority of the development of the research 
question, theory, data collection, and analysis. She wrote the majority of the theory, analysis, 
and interpretation and collected and coded all variables of interest and all the control variables, 
including data from other sources such as news media coverage. Katja Rost collected and 
prepared the initial data set. In addition, she provided important inputs for the theoretical 
direction and data analysis. Finally, Katja Rost contributed in writing the paper, including 
restructuring, editing, and overall improving. Revisions were carried out in cooperation, to 
which Lea Stahel contributed the larger part.  
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2. Digital social norm enforcement: Online firestorms in social 
media1 
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Abstract 
 
Actors of public interest today have to fear the adverse impact that stems from social media 
platforms. Any controversial behavior may promptly trigger temporal, but potentially 
devastating storms of emotional and aggressive outrage, so called online firestorms. Popular 
targets of online firestorms are companies, politicians, celebrities, media, academics and many 
more. This article introduces social norm theory to understand online aggression in a social-
political online setting, challenging the popular assumption that online anonymity is one of the 
principle factors that promotes aggression. We underpin this social norm view by analyzing a 
major social media platform concerned with public affairs over a period of three years entailing 
532,197 comments on 1,612 online petitions. Results show that in the context of online 
firestorms, non-anonymous individuals are more aggressive compared to anonymous 
individuals. This effect is reinforced if selective incentives are present and if aggressors are 
intrinsically motivated. 
  
                                               
1 This study is published under the same title in PLoS one (2016), 11(6). DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0155923 
2 Prof. Dr. Katja Rost, University of Zurich, Andreasstrasse 15, 8050 Zurich, Switzerland,  
E-Mail: katja.rost@uzh.ch 
3 Lea Stahel, University of Zurich, Andreasstrasse 15, 8050 Zurich, Switzerland. E-Mail: lea.stahel@uzh.ch 
4 Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. mult. Bruno S. Frey, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Südstrasse 
11, 8008 Zurich, Switzerland. E-Mail: bruno.frey@bsfrey.ch 
 
 
 24 
2.1. Introduction 
Collective online aggression directed towards actors of public interest is an increasing 
phenomenon. While various types of social media have been involved in such online firestorms 
(e.g. content communities such as YouTube), blogs and social networking sites such as 
Facebook are outstanding triggers c. In 2011, Christian Wulff, the former federal president of 
Germany, was accused of corruption – claims that afterwards were rejected as unfounded 
although they promptly led to his resignation. The Wulff-affair was massively amplified by the 
negative word-of-mouth dynamics in social media. In 2013, the company Amazon was accused 
of the ill treatment of temporary workers. The Amazon-affair led to floods of negative 
comments on Amazon’s Facebook profile. Firestorms also shake academia: In 2011, the former 
minister of defense of Germany, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, was accused of plagiarism. 
These accusations triggered widespread online debates and ultimately led to the denial of his 
PhD and to his resignation.  
The examples illustrate how online aggression has emerged from the private niche of limited 
email bullying to a publicly visible and relevant phenomenon. Dependent on the focus of the 
underlying research, the phenomenon of aggressive, offensive and emotional commenting in 
social media has been labeled flaming, cyberbullying, online harassment, cyber aggression, 
electronic aggression, toxic online disinhibition, trolling or, if the aggression resembles crowd-
based outrage, online firestorms (Alonzo and Aiken 2004, Suler 2004, Buckels et al. 2014, 
Mehari et al. 2014, Pfeffer et al. 2014). In online firestorms, large amounts of critique, insulting 
comments, and swearwords against a person, organization, or group may be formed by, and 
propagated via, thousands or millions of people within hours (Pfeffer et al. 2014). Social media 
enable these unleashed phenomena (Suler 2004, Mishna, Saini and Solomon 2009, Mehari et 
al. 2014). They allow attacking everywhere at anytime with the potential for an unlimited 
audience. They raise the likelihood for hostile misinterpretations due to limited discursive 
action and social media’s absence of nonverbal cues. They reduce the risk for feedback 
reactions because users can “sneak off” after the aggressive act.  
The phenomenon of online aggression is not well understood despite the great deal of attention 
on hostile behavior in social media in both the mainstream media and the empirical literature 
(Ybarra and Mitchell 2004, Ybarra and Mitchell 2007, Mason 2008, Slonje and Smith 2008, 
Smith et al. 2008, Vandebosch and Van Cleemput 2008, Wolak, Finkelhor, Mitchell et al. 2008, 
Vandebosch and Van Cleemput 2009, Nocentini, Calmaestra, Schultze-Krumbholz et al. 2010, 
Kokkinos, Antoniadou and Markos 2014, Mehari et al. 2014). Most contributions are 
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descriptive and are conducted largely in the absence of theories (Kokkinos et al. 2014, Mehari 
et al. 2014). If contributions refer to theories they are mainly guided by traditional bullying 
research theory, more precisely by the massive amout of existing research concerned with 
cyberbullying among adolescents. Within this view, online aggression is understood as an 
irrational and illegitimate behavior that is caused by underlying personality characteristics, such 
as a lack of empathy and social skills, narcissism, impulsivity, sensation seeking, emotional 
regulation problems or psychological symptoms such as loneliness, depression, and anxiety 
(Sontag, Clemans, Graber et al. 2011, Kokkinos et al. 2014). Traditional bullying research 
theory, however, misses the point that in online firestorms, aggression happens in public, and 
not in private, social networks.  
It therefore seems questionable whether bullying research theory is transferable to online 
firestorms. For example, a strong and commonly shared assumption within bullying research 
theory is that anonymity, understood as the degree to which a communicator perceives the 
message source as unknown and unspecified, promotes aggression through decreased 
inhibitions (Suler 2004, Ybarra and Mitchell 2004, Li 2007, Moore, Nakano, Enomoto et al. 
2012, Hollenbaugh and Everett 2013). For online firestorms it suggests that negative, and 
particularly aggressive, word-of-mouth propagation in social media will weaken if real-name 
policies are introduced. In this article we show that this assumption is not necessarily true 
because the reverse effect can be obtained: Individuals have a strong motivation for being non-
anonymous when being aggressive in social media. We explain this behavior pattern by social 
norm theory. Social norm theory may be a more appropriate theory to understand 
communication behavior in social media and to draw conclusions, for example, that real-name 
policies will not weaken online firestorms.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next section introduces social norm 
theory to understand aggressive behavior in a social-political online setting, and develops 
hypotheses. The subsequent sections explain the dataset, the measurements and the method, 
and present the empirical findings. We conclude with a discussion of the findings, research 
limitations and suggestions for further research.  
2.2. A social norm theory on online firestorms 
Social norms are fundamental to human behavior (Elster 1989, Guth and Napel 2006). Former 
literature defines norms as statements “that something ought or ought not to be the case” (Opp 
2002, page 132), as institutionalized role expectations (Parsons 1964), or as becoming apparent 
if behavior attracts punishments (Homans 1950). In general, norms are mental representations 
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of appropriate behavior in society and smaller groups and, consequently, guide the behavior of 
individuals. Norms that are characterized as social “must be shared by other people and partly 
sustained by their approval and disapproval” (Elster 1989, page 99). Social norms are created 
intentionally because they promote the provision of a public good that benefits a collective, for 
example less pollution in a neighborhood due to less burning of leaves (Diekmann and 
Preisendörfer 1992), less harm to health through cessation of smoking (Opp 2002), or more 
fairness through income differentials (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Rost and Weibel 2013). The 
public good view does not automatically imply that social norms are always beneficial for all 
persons concerned. In fact, many social norms exclude certain groups from public goods 
because they promote the interest of one subgroup, i.e., they serve “functions of inclusion and 
exclusion” (Elster 1989, page 108). For example, peer-group norms aim to strengthen cohesion 
within the group by offering group privileges (Elster 1989, Gunther, Bolt, Borzekowski et al. 
2006). 
To be sustainable, social norms need to be enforced, otherwise Olson’s (1965) zero contribution 
holds: “if all rational and self-interested individuals in a large group would gain as a group if 
they acted to achieve their common interest or objective, they will still not voluntarily act to 
achieve that common or group interest” (Olson 1965: 2). Social norms are enforced by simple 
sanctions which trigger feelings of guilt and shame in the case of internalized social norms. 
Consequently, the mere expectation of sanctions, in turn, supports the enforcement (Elster 
1989). Enforcement also happens through actual bilateral and multilateral costly sanctions 
where those who cause negative externalities are confronted with punishments and normative 
demands (Posner and Rasmussen 1999, Opp 2002). Linked to Olson’s (1965) zero contribution, 
norm enforcement itself is a second-order public good: self-interested and utility-maximizing 
individuals do not naturally contribute to norm enforcement and may prefer free riding (Posner 
and Rasmussen 1999, Opp 2002). Ostrom (2000) however stresses how, in practice, contextual 
variables and the engagement of certain types of individuals determine whether collective 
action and cooperation is enhanced or discouraged. Similarly, Ellickson (Ellickson July 1999) 
emphasizes how norms may emerge or shift dependent on cost-benefit conditions or group 
composition. Also the presence, salience, or strength of social ties can explain individual 
variation in social-political engagement (McAdam 1986, McAdam and Paulsen 1993). For 
example, diffuse networks of weak bridging ties encourage mobilization through 
communicative advantage (Granovetter 1973). Specifically, research shows that Olson’s (1965) 
second-order public good dilemma can be overcome if (1) norm enforcement is cheap, i.e., it 
occurs in low cost situations (Diekmann and Preisendörfer 1992, Rauhut and Krumpal 2008), 
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(2) additional benefits are provided to the norm enforcers that disproportionately motivate them 
compared to non-enforcers, i.e., selective incentives are present (Olson 1965, Opp 2002) and/or 
(3) if some individuals are present that are intrinsically motivated to enforce norms, i.e., some 
amount of altruistic punishment occurs (Bendor and Swistak 2001, Fischbacher et al. 2001, 
Fehr and Gächter 2002). In the following we elaborate these three conditions for social media 
to explain the phenomenon of online firestorms. 
2.3. Online firestorms within a social norm theory 
Aggressive word-of-mouth propagation in social media is the response to (perceived) violating 
behaviors of public actors. Public actors include, for example, politicians who disregard 
political correctness norms, corporations that violate human rights, or academics who violate 
scientific norms by engaging in plagiarism. In this view, online firestorms enforce social norms 
by expressing public disapproval with the aim of securing public goods, for example, honesty 
of politicians, companies or academics. The stunning waves of aggression typical for online 
firestorms can be explained by the characteristic features of social media that ideally contribute 
to the solution of the second-order public good dilemma of norm enforcement. Digital norm 
enforcement in social media is cheap, and selective incentives and intrinsically motivated 
individuals are present.  
In social media, sanctioning norm violations occurs in low-cost situations. The basic idea of the 
low-cost hypothesis is that attitudes or preferences are more likely to guide individual behaviors 
when norm enforcement behavior is relatively cheap (Diekmann and Preisendörfer 1992, 
Rauhut and Krumpal 2008, Best and Kroneberg 2012). Evidence in various research fields 
supports this basic tenet (for an overview see Best and Kroneberg (2012)). For example, the 
voting paradox (Olson 1965), i.e., the fact that citizens participate in elections even though they 
are aware of the marginal influence of their vote, is often explained by referring to the low-cost 
hypothesis (Opp 2001). In social media, a number of factors contribute to such low-cost 
situations. First, social media mobilize former free riders because online criticism is monetarily 
inexpensive, hardly time-consuming and can be performed anywhere and anytime, compared, 
for example, to elaborate street protests (Mehari et al. 2014, Pfeffer et al. 2014). One example 
is the limited message length in the social media platform Twitter, which obliges 
communication to be short and quick. It is less astonishing that Twitter has been involved in 
most of the recent cases of online firestorms (Pfeffer et al. 2014). Second, in social media, 
people who are geographically completely removed from each other can assault each other 
verbally without fear of bodily harm. Nonverbal cues such as facial expression and physical 
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size are lacking, thus reducing the empathy of the aggressor and the impact of authority of the 
victims typically expressed by dress, body langugage, and social setting (Kiesler et al. 1984, 
Suler 2004, Mehari et al. 2014). Third, social media give ordinary people the power to 
communicate (perceived) norm violations to a very large audience (Harrington and Bielby 
1995, Dennis 2008). The internet re-creates village-like interconnectedness within a global, 
pluralistic society by crossing local, or even national, boundaries due to unrestrained 
information flow (Castells 2012). To compare, while aggressive norm enforcement is a rare 
behavior in the non-digital context (Brauer and Chekroun (Brauer and Chekroun 2005) found 
that max. 4% of bystanders aggressively sanction daily deviant behavior by insulting or 
aggressive shouting), we should observe it more frequently in the digital social media context 
for the reasons given above.  
Hypothesis 1: Provided that a social-political issue finds its way into social media 
platforms, online aggression takes place more frequently than in the non-digital context 
because sanctioning of (perceived) norm violations occurs in low-cost situations.  
In social media, selective incentives that benefit a latent group of norm enforcers are 
disproportionally present (Olson 1965, Opp 2002). Individuals only bear the costs of norm 
enforcement if the potential benefits of their actions exceed the costs (Fehr and Fischbacher 
2004). Selective incentives translate resentment for norm breaching into action in situations 
where it is unclear whether a necessary critical mass of other norm enforcers will join the action. 
In such situations, cost sharing cannot be expected, nor can clear benefits from norm 
enforcement, such as an actual behavioral change by the accused person or organization, be 
predicted. In the case of selective incentives, individuals participate in collective action in 
response to salient private benefits (Ginges and Atran 2009). Whether individuals are able to 
reap selective incentives is dependent on the issue at stake and on certain individual or group 
characteristics. Social media contribute to the presence of selective incentives by enhancing the 
salience of private benefits. In social media, for example, highly controversial topics are 
debated. Social media are, in addition, highly influenced by the multiplication of cross-media 
dynamics, for example by public scandals taken up or created by news media leading to 
comments in social media. Broad public discussions and connections to public scandals give 
credible signals that a norm infringement at the expense of a latent interest group – be it the 
group an individual belongs to or identifies with – has occurred (Myers 2000). 
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Hypothesis 2: Online aggression in social media is encouraged by salient selective 
incentives, for example, in highly controversial topics or in topics connected with public 
scandals.   
Social media ensure that a high amount of intrinsically motivated actors are present. Individuals 
engage in costly norm enforcement if they have an intrinsic desire to “make the world a better 
place” (Lee and Tedeschi 1996, Salmivalli, Lagerspetz, Bjorkqvist et al. 1996, van 
Stekelenburg, Klandermans and van Dijk 2011). This type of norm enforcement has been 
intensively discussed as “altruistic punishment”, i.e., individuals punish, although the 
punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain (Bendor and Swistak 2001). Altruistic 
punishment is driven by strong negative emotions towards the norm defector (Fischbacher et 
al. 2001, Henrich, Boyd, Bowles et al. 2001, Fehr and Gächter 2002) and by people’s perception 
of a state of affairs as illegitimate (Tajfel and Turner 1979, Feather and Newton 1982, Weiss, 
Suckow and Cropanzano 1999, Klandermans 2003, Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer et al. 2004). 
Strong intrinsic motivation, however, is only likely to encourage participation if it is reinforced 
by organizational or individual ties (McAdam and Paulsen 1993). This requirement is given in 
the infrastructural setting surrounding online firestorms. The technical mechanisms of social 
media such as newsletters, newsgroups, followers, or social media sharing ensure that 
intrinsically motivated individuals are optimally informed about cases that, in their view, 
represent offenses against existing social norms. Beyond this, they provide opportunities to 
tackle these norm violations by commenting on them. 
Hypothesis 3: Intrinsically motivated actors encourage online aggression in social 
media.   
2.4. The non-anonymity of negative word-of-mouth dynamics in social media 
In social media, people can hide or alter their identity. They may either comment by providing 
no name or at least not their real name, i.e., a (random or stable) pseudonym. Existing literature 
on online behavior hypothesizes that such online anonymity is one of the principle factors that 
decreases inhibitions, increases self-disclosures and therefore promotes online aggression 
(Suler 2004, Ybarra and Mitchell 2004, Li 2007, Moore et al. 2012, Hollenbaugh and Everett 
2013). This causal mechanism is also assumed by social media consultants who attempt to 
explain online firestorms (Bishop 2014).  
In general, anonymity produces the “stranger on a train” phenomenon, wherein people share 
intimate self-disclosures with strangers as they do not expect a reunion and hence do not fear 
any risks and constraints (Bargh, McKenna and Fitzsimons 2002). To that effect, “when people 
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have the opportunity to separate their actions online from their in-person lifestyle and identity, 
they feel less vulnerable about self-disclosing and acting out” (Suler 2004, page 322). With 
regard to heightened aggression and inappropriate behavior, psychosocial motives exist for 
being anonymous (Moore et al. 2012). Anonymity first detaches from normative and social 
behavioral constraints (Patchin and Hinduja 2006). Second, it allows to bypass moral 
responsibility for deviant actions (Suler 2004). Third, it reduces the probability of social 
punishments through law and other authorities (Li 2007). Fourth, it triggers an imbalance of 
power which limits the ability of the victim to apply ordinary techniques for punishing 
aggressive behavior (David-Ferdon and Hertz 2007). Fifth, it gives people the courage to ignore 
social desirability issues (Suler 2004) and finally, it encourages the presentation of minority 
viewpoints or viewpoints subjectively perceived as such (DeSanctis and Gallupe 1987, Dennis 
1996, Gopal and Prasad 2000, McLeod 2000, Dennis and Garfield 2003).  
Former research has concluded that the possibility for anonymity in the internet fosters 
aggressive comments. It is assumed that online aggression is driven by lower-order moral ideals 
and principles and, consequently, people feel ashamed to aggress under their real names. 
However, the empirical evidence for such a link is scarce and no definitive cause-effect 
relationship has evolved. Studies suggest that anonymity only increases online aggression in 
competitive situations (Hughes and Louw 2013), that anonymity does not increase online 
aggression but does increase critical comments (Reinig and Mejias 2004), or that the effect of 
forced non-anonymity on the amount of online aggression is a function of certain characteristics 
of user groups, e.g. their general frequency of commenting behavior (Cho and Kim 2012). 
The former conceptualization of online aggression is rather narrow, in particular for aggression 
in social media. According to social norm theory, in social media, individuals mostly use 
aggressive word-of-mouth propagation to criticize the behavior of public actors. As people 
enforce social norms and promote public goods, it is most likely that they perceive the behavior 
of the accused public actors as driven by lower-order moral ideals and principles while that they 
perceive their own behavior as driven by higher-order moral ideals and principles. From this 
point of view there is no need to hide their identity.  
Furthermore, aggressive word-of-mouth propagation in a social-political online setting is much 
more effective if criticism is brought forward non-anonymously. This is due to the fact that 
non-anonymity inceases the trustworthiness of the masses of weak social ties to which we are 
linked, but not necessarily familiar with, in our digital social networks. Trustworthiness of 
former firestorm commenters encourage us to contribute ourselves. First, non-anonymity is 
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more effective as the credibility of sanctions increases if individuals use their real name (Dennis 
1996, Haines, Hough, Cao et al. 2014). Anonymity makes “information more suspect because 
it [is] difficult to verify the source’s credibility” (Dennis 1996, page 450). This removes 
accountability cues and lets one assume that individuals present socially undesirable arguments 
(Prentice-Dunn and Rogers 1982, Haines et al. 2014). Second, the views of non-anonymous 
individuals are given more weight: “Just as people are unattached to their own statements when 
they communicate anonymously, they are analogously unaffected by the anonymous statements 
of others” (McLeod 2000, page 197). Anonymous comments have less impact on the formation 
of personal opinions (McLeod 2000, Sassenberg and Postmes 2002), on the formation of group 
opinions (Haines et al. 2014), and on final decision making (Stanley and Weare 2004). Third, 
anonymity lowers the identification with, support of, and recognition by, kindred spirit 
(Douglas and McGarty 2001). In anonymous settings, individuals cannot determine who made 
a particular argument, how many different people expressed similar arguments, whether a series 
of arguments are all coming from the same person, or the degree to which other commenting 
individuals are similar to oneself (Gutwin and Greenberg 2002, Hayne, Pollard and Rice 2003, 
Lee 2007, Haines et al. 2014). Anonymity filters out cues that communicate social identity, 
cues that are necessary to characterize comments by others (Cooper and Haines 2008, Haines 
et al. 2014), to identify with individuals in social comparison processes (Haines et al. 2014) and 
to coordinate group interactions (Gutwin and Greenberg 2002). Finally, anonymity reduces the 
benefit to be positively evaluated by others (Valacich, Jessup, Dennis et al. 1992, Pinsonneault 
and Heppel 1998). Studies show that exclusively anonymous conditions induce little 
mobilization because anonymity excludes the benefit of recognition by others (Andreoni and 
Petrie 2004). 
From a social norm point of view, the arguments suggest that aggressive word-of-mouth 
propagation in a social-political online setting takes place non-anonymously. People have a 
strong feeling to stand up for higher-order moral ideals and principles. Commenting 
anonymously is a costly, wasteful behavior, as sanctions are less credible, create less awareness, 
less support and offer few benefits. These considerations make particular sense in the usual 
setting of firestorms, namely social media where usually, weak social ties are clustered around 
ideologically like-minded networks. Such networks likely support non-anonymous aggressive 
sanctions that confirm their worldview. 
Hypothesis 4: In a social-political online setting, non-anonymous individuals, compared 
to anonymous individuals, show more online aggression.   
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As stated earlier, norm enforcement is fostered if selective incentives and intrinsically 
motivated actors are present. Consequently, if social norm theory is an appropriate theory for 
online aggression in a social-political online setting, these groups in particular should give more 
weight to the benefits of non-anonymous aggressive word-of-mouth propagation. 
Simultaneously, they give less weight to potential risky consequences such as being subject to 
deletion, banned from websites, formally convicted by the accused actor for defamation of 
character and/or damage to reputation, or informally sanctioned by social disapproval from 
online or offline individuals (Tichy 2013). 
Hypothesis 5: In a social-political online setting, in situations that offer selective 
incentives, compared to situations without selective incentives, more online aggression 
by non-anonymous individuals is observed. 
Hypothesis 6: In a social-political online setting, intrinsically motivated aggressors (i.e. 
aggressive commenters), compared to aggressors without intrinsic motivation, show 
more online non-anonymous aggression. 
2.5. Materials and Methods 
2.5.1. Sample 
We test the hypotheses with a census of a major social media platform concerned with public 
affairs. We analyze all comments on online petitions published at the German social media 
platform www.openpetition.de between May 2010, the launching of the online portal, and July 
2013 (for permission of using the data, see document 1 in the Appendix). Online petitions 
exemplarily include protests against pay-scale reform of the German society for musical 
performing and mechanical reproduction rights called GEMA (305,118 signers), against the 
enforcement to finance public service media (136,010 signers), against the closing of the 
medical faculty at the University Halle (58,577), or for the resignation of an Austrian politician 
(9,196 signers) or the Bavarian minister of justice (6,810 signers). Online petition platforms 
seem very suitable to investigate the phenomenon of negative word-of-mouth in a social-
political online media setting. First, online petitions are concerned with public actors and public 
affairs, for example, internet security, misbehavior of firms, politicians, or academics, public 
spending, tax issues, animal protection, etc., and thus provide a central location where public 
norms are negotiated. Second, online petition platforms are prototypical social media platforms: 
everybody is allowed to participate and create content for any kind of topic, and the debates 
and comments are publicly visible. Third, qualitative evidence suggests that many popular 
firestorms have been triggered or have been surrounded by online petition platforms, for 
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example the Deutsche Telekom firestorm in 2013, or the firestorm leading to the displacement 
of the German Federal President Christian Wulff in 2011. Fourth, online petition platforms are 
concerned with real-life cases. Many former studies are based on artificial laboratory 
experiments to study negative word-of-mouth behavior on the internet. Finally, online petition 
platforms cover a wide range of public issues and affairs, implying lower selection biases as 
compared to case studies about online firestorms (such as in Pfeffer et al. (2014)).  
The final dataset includes 532,197 comments on 1,612 online petitions. There were a total of 
3,858,131 signatures over the 1,612 petitions between 2010 and 2013, with detailed information 
about the wording of the comment, the commenters, the signers and the petition. The dataset 
was provided to the authors in an anonymous form by the platform owner. For each signer and 
commenter, however, the dataset indicated whether he/she had originally contributed 
anonymously (=1) or non-anonymously (=0). For this study, no approval of any ethics 
committee was sought because all data are publicly accessible on www.openpetition.de and no 
names of signers or commenters can be tracked and identified in the dataset. In order to prepare 
the dataset in accordance with our theory, we rely on a mixed-method big-data approach. For 
many variables we use a qualitative approach to arrive at meaningful quantitative 
measurements.   
The present dataset allows us to exclude two biases which, in other studies, frequently affect 
findings on relations between anonymity and aggression. First, there was no active intervention 
in the ratio of anonymous and non-anonymous aggressive comments in the dataset. In the period 
of data collection, the platform owner did not moderate the comments on his own initiative. 
However, he reacted by deleting selected inappropriate comments when the user community 
reported them. According to the platform owner, a deletion was independent of whether the 
inappropriate comment was provided anonymously or not, as he explicitly considered this 
difference as irrelevant to liability issues. Second, we may also exclude any bias stemming from 
differing legal jurisdictions: Potential legal implications for identified aggressors are the same 
across the entire study. In Germany, the jurisdiction on defamation and insult is part of the 
federal law (Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz and juris GmbH 2016), 
i.e., as the entire study pertains to the same legal jurisdiction, all defamatory or aggressive 
commenters across all German states face the same potential costs for their actions.  
2.5.2. Measurement of Variables  
We measure online aggression in the following manner. In general, inconsistency in the 
operationalization of online aggression dominates research (Joinson 2007). Operationalization 
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includes impolite statements, swearing, flirting, exclamations, expressions of personal feelings, 
use of superlatives (Kiesler, Zubrow, Moses et al. 1985) to profanity, typographic energy (e.g. 
exclamation marks), name calling, swearing, and general negative effect (Reinig and Mejias 
2004, Joinson 2007). We rely on the definition of online aggression in firestorms, i.e., large 
amounts of critique, insulting comments, and swearwords against a person, organization, or 
group formed by, and propagated via, social media platforms (Pfeffer et al. 2014). Accordingly, 
we measure online aggression by direct offenses within the comments on online petitions (e.g. 
“I hate GEMA, complete morons and exploiters”, ID469090), swearwords (e.g. “Fuck that 
Shit!”, ID477368), and expressions of disgust or contempt (e.g. “The deportation policies of 
German authorities is commonly a disgusting, repulsive and inhuman mess!”, ID418089). 
Expressions of disgust and contempt are typical responses to morally offensive behavior 
(Hutcherson and Gross 2011). Importantly, even from the outside perspective, we confidently 
evaluate these expressions to be intended as aggression. This is because we do not expect close 
relationships or shared, subcultural interactional norms between the commentator and the 
targeted actor in petitions, in contrast to profane language between friends representing covert 
closeness and not aggression (O’Sullivan and Flanagin 2003).  
To systematically collect online aggression, we compile a list of frequently used swearwords 
from synonym reference books and online databases of swearword collections (e.g. 
https://www.schimpfwoerter.de). This approach corresponds to previous studies that count 
aggressive postings by using a pre-defined set of aggressive words (such as in Cho and Kim 
(2012)). Then, we disaggregate the 532,197 comments into single words and count them. 
Frequently occurring words are manually checked and classified as online aggression if 
applicable. Subsequently, we exclude all words that can be used for different meanings, for 
example, as swearwords or as terms for animals. These steps led to a final list of 1,481 words 
that express offenses, swearwords, and disgust. Using this final list of aggressive expressions, 
we count the amount of online aggression in each comment. Subsequently we qualitatively 
check the appropriateness of our approach by comparing subsamples of comments with our 
quantitative measurement. We take the logarithm added by 1 to create an approximate normal 
distribution of the variable. 
2.5.3. Independent variables  
Anonymity is measured in the following way: Before online users sign a petition and 
subsequently formulate a voluntary comment, they are requested to provide their real names 
and addresses. In regard to public visibility, they are given the choice to allow their real name 
to be published or to remain anonymous, i.e., only the postal code is visible to other users (0 = 
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non-anonymous, 1 = anonymous). Although the theoretical possibility of using pseudonyms 
does exist, we expect that commenters’ incentive for pseudonyms is low. This is because 
anonymity complies with the hidden name option and petition organizers may classify the 
signature of pseudonyms as invalid. 
Controversy that accompanies a petition is measured by the level of debate. Each petition 
provides the opportunity to start a debate on the petition homepage, a tool used in most petitions 
by supporters and opponents. A debate is structured by denoted pro- and contra-arguments, i.e., 
by arguments that underpin or oppose the petition’s concerns. Only arguments that differ in 
their content from formerly mentioned arguments are additionally incorporated. Within the pro- 
and contra-sections, commenters are allowed to oppose arguments by adding sub-replies (pro-
reply-/contra-reply-arguments). More controversial topics lead to a higher diversity of pro-, 
contra-, pro-reply- and contra-reply-arguments. Thus, to measure controversy, we construct a 
Herfindahl index by taking the percentage of arguments within each category, i.e., pro-/contra-
/pro-reply-/contra-reply-arguments, squaring it, adding them together and subtracting the final 
result from 1. The index measures the controversy that surrounds the topics of petitions from 
no controversy (= 0) to a maximum of controversy (= 1).  
To identify scandals, we measure whether the accusation against an actor forwarded by a 
petition, for example corruption of a politician, is covered and framed as scandal by traditional 
news media (1 = yes / 0 = no). We define keywords that describe the content and concerns of 
the petition. In the database LexisNexis we search for whether these keywords are associated 
with the term “scandal” in the German-speaking media within a time period of one year before 
the starting date of each petition.  
To measure actors’ intrinsic motivation, we operationalize fairness perceptions of commenters. 
We compile a list of 579 expressions frequently used in ideological discourses that indicate 
fairness issues, for example, expressions such as “injustice” or “unfair”. In addition, we use 
synonym reference books and databases, manually check frequently occurring words within 
comments and exclude ambiguous words. For each commentator we count the amount of 
intrinsic motivation by taking the sum of fairness words in the comment. We take the logarithm, 
added by 1, to create an approximate normal distribution of the variable.  
2.5.4. Control variables 
We control for factors that influence the amount of online aggression.  
The length of comment is measured by the total number of words in a comment. Longer 
comments are more likely to entail more aggression.  
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The time period between opening a petition and submitting a comment is included because the 
time point of comment submission may influence commenters’ level of aggression. Aggression 
may either take place in the very beginning, because most signatures and comment activity in 
petitions are submitted within the first days (Hale, Margetts and Yasseri 2013), or alternatively, 
in advanced stages, in the case where a petition experiences a boost due to revived public 
debate. We measure how many minutes after petition opens that a comment has been submitted.  
The number of protesters having signed is included because larger protests are likely to attract 
more online aggression. We measure how many individuals sign a particular petition and 
consequently match this data with the comments on a certain day. The median of protesters 
amounts to 76 signers per day with a maximum of 2,926 signers per day. We take the logarithm 
of the number of protesters to create an approximate normal distribution of the variable.       
The status of the accused may also influence online aggression. Theoretically, public actors 
with a high social status may be either protected from sanctions as they have more resources to 
reply to punishments by even more painful punishments, or, to the contrary, they can attract 
sanctions because they are also more vulnerable than lower status actors (Wahrman 2010). In 
practice, high status celebrities or politicians may also refrain from suing laypersons as it is 
counterproductive to their reputation. To take these complex influences into account, we control 
for the status of the accused. As a proxy for social status of the accused public actors, we collect 
the number of Google hits for the accused’s name (1 = <1000; 2 = <10,000; 3 = <100,000; 4 = 
<500,000; 5 = <1,000,000; 6 = >1,000,000). Google hits tend to reflect social status. To 
decrease measurement errors, for example due to actors sharing the same name, we additionally 
check whether the accused is listed in the German online encyclopedia Wikipedia (0 = no entry, 
1 = entry in article’s subtitle, 2 = entry as main article). Wikipedia exclusively lists actors with 
a minimum public status. We add both variables and take the logarithm of the mean value.  
We measure also whether the accused is a natural person or a legal entity. Legal entities 
professionally monitor the internet for defamation and gather more resources to fight 
accusations than do natural persons. To avoid that commenters anticipate differing costs for 
their aggressive behavior dependent on whom the accused actor is, we control for this factor. 
Two independent coders manually check whether the target is a natural person such as a 
scientist or politician (= 1) or a legal entity such as a government or an organization (= 0). In 
4% of the petitions, the target is a natural person and not a legal entity. 
The anonymity of the social environment of commenters measures the anonymity of the 
environment in which commenters live. This may influence how much aggression is expressed 
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(Cammaerts and van Audenhove 2005). Less anonymous villages with tight social control 
likely increase sanctioning costs. As a proxy for the anonymity of commenters’ social 
environment, we measure the size, i.e., the number of inhabitants, of the city or village in which 
commenters live. The postal codes of each signer are aggregated such that individuals living in 
the same city or village are merged. The dataset includes 23,977 cities and villages. We count 
the number of signers for each city or village, and by random checking, we find that the 
correlation of the number of signers within a postcode region, and the de facto size of this 
region, is 0.92, validating our proxy. We allocate the size of residence variable to all signers 
and commenters. Bigger values indicate that commenters originate from more anonymous 
environments.  
The regional scope of a protest is measured because issues of broad public relevance may attract 
more aggression. We measure the regional diversity of a petition by constructing a Herfindahl 
index ranging from no regional diversity (= 0) to a maximum of regional diversity (= 1). Signers 
are assigned to different German federal states on the basis of residential postal codes. We take 
the percentage of signers within each federal state, square it, add them together, and subtract 
the final result from 1.  
The success of a petition is measured because successful petitions potentially deal with more 
relevant topics, which may indirectly influence the amount of online aggression. A petition is 
considered successful if the petition initiator defines the petition goals to be achieved in full or 
at least in part (1 = yes; 0 = no).  
The petition motive may influence the amount of online aggression. Using a petition’s title and 
leading text, two independent coders classify the petitions with regard to their underlying 
motives by using the classification by Reiss (2004). Five major concerns are identified, namely 
idealism/fairness (42%), income/costs (19%), security/social order (13%), autonomy/self-
determination (14%), and quality of life/competences (52%). Multiple assignments of petitions 
are possible. Idealism/ fairness serves as the reference group in the regression models.  
Similarly, the petition topic may influence anonymity considerations and the amount of 
aggression. Depending on the societal area, be it the economy, politics, or culture, accused 
actors may differ in their thresholds of wanting to sue aggressive online commenters. 
Commenters may anticipate these thresholds and the related differing costs of being aggressive. 
This in turn affects commenters’ actual behavior. Using a petition’s title and leading text, two 
independent coders classify the petitions with regard to their underlying topics using the 
functional systems of a society (Oehmer 2011). Six major topics are identified, namely society 
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(41%), arts (20%), economics (13%), politics (8%), media (8%), and environment and animal 
protection (8%). Multiple assignments of petitions are avoided. Society, including topics such 
as sport or solidarity, is the most general category and serves as reference group in the 
regression models.  
For the summary of the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations of the former variables, 
see Table 5 in the Appendix.
2.5.5. Methods 
We apply random-effects and fixed-effects models to predict online aggression in petitions.5 In 
both models the comments are grouped on the petition level. The random-effects model keeps 
within- and between-petition variation in the analysis. We assume that petitions vary not only 
within, but also between, each other, for example because some petitions have many supporters 
while other petitions have only a few supporters, or because of differences in the underlying 
goals and motives. We analyze whether online aggression within and between petitions changes 
when other variables within and between the petitions change. The fixed-effects model keeps 
only within-petition variation in the analysis. We also analyze whether the aggression within 
petitions changes when other variables change, for example the anonymity of commenters, the 
amount of intrinsic motivation or the amount of selective incentives within the petitions. Many 
variables of our dataset are time-invariant, i.e., constant petition features that do not vary on the 
petition level. In the fixed-effects model these variables are omitted. Both models have 
advantages as well as disadvantages. The fixed-effects model excludes all random noise 
between the petitions and is therefore often preferred as the golden standard. However, 
differences between the petitions, for example the number of supporters, may also be important 
in explaining negative word-of-mouth behavior within petitions. This speaks in favor of the 
random-effects model. We therefore apply both models and compare the results. We 
additionally run alternative conceivable models for the data structure, for example, logistic 
regression, Poisson regression, or negative binomial regression for panel data, as our dependent 
variable is (if not transformed) a count variable, or can be transformed into a binary variable 
that indicates whether a person is an aggressor or not. The results are similar with the results 
that follow and will therefore not be presented here. 
                                               
5 All data and syntax is available from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research: 
Rost, Katja; Stahel, Lea; Frey, Bruno S. Online Petition Data: 2010-2013 (Germany). Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2016-05-11. 
http://doi.org/10.3886/E72764V1 
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2.6. Results 
In accordance with Hypothesis 1, the data substantiate that online aggression in social media is 
a more frequent phenomenon than in the non-digital context. In the analyzed online petition 
platform, we find 197,410 aggressions according to our definition. 20.62% of all comments 
entail a minimum of one aggressive expression (Figure 2.1). In 9% of all comments we find 
two, up to fifteen, aggressive expressions. On the petition level, only 11% of all petitions 
include no aggressions. 34% include a negligible amount of aggressions from 1, up to 10. 37% 
include 11 up to 100 aggressions. 16% include 101 up to 1,000 aggressions. 2% include 1,001, 
up to 25,360, aggressions. Even if the prevailing majority of commenters make no use of 
aggressive language in social media, the numbers demonstrate that online aggression occurs 
not only in a vanishing minority of comments or petitions (compared to the observed vanishing 
minority of max 4% of bystanders aggressively sanctioning in the non-digital context (Brauer 
and Chekroun 2005). This supports the claim that in social media, aggressive sanctioning 
behavior is a relatively frequent phenomenon because it takes place in low-cost situations.  
Figure 2. 1. Observed amount of online aggression per comment 
 
We now move to the presence of selective incentives and intrinsically motivated actors in social 
media. The descriptive findings show that 47% of all petitions are accompanied by a highly 
controversial debate, 6% of the petitions are associated with a scandal in news media, and 26% 
of the commenters are motivated by fairness concerns. Social media thus indeed seem to offer 
an environment in which the second-order public good dilemma of norm enforcement can be 
overcome. Whether these conditions indeed contribute to norm enforcement is tested in Tables 
1 and 2.
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Table 1. Predicted amount of online aggression dependent on the anonymity of aggressors (random-effects regression) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Y: Amount of online aggression (log) Coef. Std.Err. z P>|z| Coef. Std.Err. z P>|z| 
Anonymity -.02 .00 -13.10 *** .00 .00 -.35  
Controversy of accusation .04 .01 4.45 *** .05 .01 4.86 *** 
Accusation is connected to a scandal .02 .01 2.16 * .03 .01 2.38 * 
Intrinsic motivation (log) .01 .00 12.17 *** .02 .00 12.15 *** 
Anonymity x Controversy     -.02 .01 -3.01 ** 
Anonymity x Scandal     -.01 .00 -3.00 ** 
Anonymity x Intrinsic motivation      -.01 .00 -3.19 ** 
Length of comment in words .00 .00 114.09 *** .00 .00 114.13 *** 
Time of comment after petition opening .00 .00 -3.31 ** .00 .00 -3.30 ** 
Number of protest participants (log) .00 .00 -.35  .00 .00 -.33  
Scope of protest .03 .01 3.38 ** .03 .01 3.39 *** 
Success of the petition .01 .01 .71  .01 .01 .70  
Status of the accused (log)  .00 .01 -.38  .00 .01 -.43  
Accused is a natural person (vs. legal entity) .05 .01 4.03 *** .05 .01 4.03 *** 
Anonymity of social environment of aggressors (log) .00 .00 -5.69 *** .00 .00 -5.68 *** 
Motives: Income/minimization of costs -.01 .01 -1.28  -.01 .01 -1.30  
Motive: Security/social order/traditional values .01 .01 1.29  .01 .01 1.29  
Motive: Independence/self-determination .00 .01 .05  .00 .01 .05  
Motive: Increasing life quality and competence -.06 .01 -8.65 *** -.06 .01 -8.69 *** 
Topic: Art/culture/education -.01 .01 -1.25  -.01 .01 -1.26  
Topic: Economics .02 .01 1.97 * .02 .01 1.98 * 
Topic: Politics .00 .01 .13  .00 .01 .15  
Topic: Media .05 .01 4.01 *** .05 .01 4.01 *** 
Topic: Environmental and animal welfare .05 .01 4.37 *** .05 .01 4.40 *** 
Constant .06 .02 3.88 *** .06 .02 3.70 *** 
Number of observations   532196    532196  
Number of groups   1568    1568  
R-square (between)   12.69%    12.70%  
Wald chi2   15031.07 ***   15066.10 *** 
Legend: †< p .1, *< p .05, **< p .01, ***< p .001 
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Table 2. Predicted amount of online aggression dependent on the anonymity of aggressors (fixed-effects regression) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Y: Amount of online aggression (log) Coef. Std.Err. z P>|z| Coef. Std.Err. z P>|z| 
Anonymity -.02 .00 -13.14 *** .00 .00 -.29  
Controversy of accusation (drop.)    (drop.)    
Accusation is connected to a scandal (drop.)    (drop.)    
Intrinsic motivation (log) .01 .00 11.79 *** .02 .00 11.82 *** 
Anonymity x Controversy     -.02 .01 -3.07 ** 
Anonymity x Scandal     -.01 .00 -3.00 ** 
Anonymity x Intrinsic motivation      -.01 .00 -3.18 ** 
Length of comment in words .00 .00 114.00 *** .00 .00 114.04 *** 
Time of comment after petition opening .00 .00 -3.63 *** .00 .00 -3.64 *** 
Number of protest participants (log) .00 .00 -.31  .00 .00 -.29  
Status of the accused (log)  (drop.)    (drop.)    
Scope of protest (drop.)    (drop.)    
Success of the petition (drop.)    (drop.)    
Accused is a natural person (vs. legal entity) (drop.)    (drop.)    
Anonymity of social environment of aggressors (log) .00 .00 -5.79 *** .00 .00 -5.77 *** 
Motives: Income/minimization of costs (drop.)    (drop.)    
Motive: Security/social order/traditional values (drop.)    (drop.)    
Motive: Independence/self-determination (drop.)    (drop.)    
Motive: Increasing life quality and competence (drop.)    (drop.)    
Topic: Art/culture/education (drop.)    (drop.)    
Topic: Economics (drop.)    (drop.)    
Topic: Politics (drop.)    (drop.)    
Topic: Media (drop.)    (drop.)    
Topic: Environmental and animal welfare (drop.)    (drop.)    
Constant .11 .00 33.16 *** .11 .00 32.90 *** 
Number of observations   532196    532196  
Number of groups   1568    1568  
R-square (within)   2.70%    2.70%  
F-value   2449.47 ***   1636.62 *** 
Legend: †< p .1, *< p .05, **< p .01, ***< p .001 
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The random-effects model in Table 1, Model 1, confirms that situations that offer selective 
incentives, i.e., a petition is accompanied by a highly controversial debate or is connected with 
a scandal in news media, significantly encourage online aggression in comments. This 
preliminarily supports Hypothesis 2 (for the size of the effects see Figures 2.2 and 2.3). The 
fixed-effect model in Table 2 entails no results for selective incentives because petition-
invariant effects are dropped. Further, the random-effects as well as the fixed-effects models in 
Tables 1 and 2, Model 1, preliminarily support Hypothesis 3: online aggression is encouraged 
by intrinsically motivated actors as compared to individuals without fairness concerns (for the 
size of the effects see Figures 2.4 and 2.5).  
Figure 2. 2. Online aggression dependent on controversy and anonymity (random-effects) 
 
Predictions of Table 1, Model 2. 
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 a
m
ou
nt
 o
f o
nli
ne
 a
gg
re
ss
ion
low controversy  high controversy
non−anon. anon. non−anon. anon.
 
 
 43 
Figure 2. 3. Online aggression dependent on scandal and anonymity (random-effects) 
 
Predictions of Table 1, Model 2. 
Figure 2. 4. Online aggression dependent on intrinsic motivation and anonymity (random-
effects) 
 
Predictions of Table 1, Model 2. 
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Figure 2. 5. Online aggression dependent on intrinsic motivation and anonymity (fixed-
effects) 
 
Predictions of Table 2, Model 2. 
Building on the view that social media today are a major channel for digital social norm 
enforcement, which until now is not rejected by the data, Hypothesis 4 assumes that online 
aggression takes place non-anonymously. Aggressive commenters have nothing to hide: they 
stand up for higher-order moral ideals and principles. The goal of norm enforcement can be 
reached most effectively if sanctions are forwarded non-anonymously because they are 
credible, create awareness, support, and offer benefits. The descriptive statistics show that only 
29.2 % of all commenters prefer to remain anonymous. Anonymity of commenters is thus a 
characteristic feature of social media; however, a vast majority still comments under their real 
names. The results in Tables 1 and 2, Model 1, show the impact of commenters’ anonymity to 
predict online aggression in comments. In line with Hypothesis 4, both the random-effects and 
fixed-effects models show that more online aggression is obtained by non-anonymous 
commenters and not by anonymous commenters.  
Exemplarily, we present three of the most aggressive comments by non-anonymous 
commenters: “Silly, fake, inhuman and degrading, racist, defamatory and ugly theses like those 
of Sarrazin (author's note: a former German politician) have no place in this world, let alone in 
the SPD (author's note: Social democratic party). Sarrazin certainly has no business in the Social 
democratic party and should try his luck with the Nazis” (ID352216); “HC Strache (author's 
note: Austrian politician) has an evil, inhuman character, he lies and tries to persuade other 
people of wrong ideas.” (ID284846); “These authorities are mostly no people, but §§§- and 
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regulatory machines! I detest authorities – with my 67 years’ life experience after all!” 
(ID418089).  
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 illustrate the size of the effect as predicted in the random- and fixed-effects 
regressions. The average effect of anonymity on aggression becomes sharper in the fixed-
effects model. The random-effects model additionally illustrates that many of the very 
aggressive commenters appear non-anonymously. Overall, the effect size is small. However, 
the data clearly show that social norm enforcement, and not as popularly assumed, the risks of 
detection, seems the major motivation for aggression in social media because persons often 
aggress under their real names.  
Figure 2. 6. Online aggression dependent on anonymity of commenters (random-effects) 
 
Predictions of Table 1, Model 1. 
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Figure 2. 7. Online aggression dependent on anonymity of commenters (fixed-effects) 
 
Predictions of Table 2, Model 1. 
If norm enforcement is indeed the major motivation for aggression in social media, the highest 
amount of non-anonymous negative word-of-mouth should be obtained in situations that offer 
selective incentives and for intrinsically motivated actors. Model 2, in Tables 1 and 2, tests this 
assumption by introducing interaction effects between the anonymity of commenters and the 
presence of selective incentives and their intrinsic motivation. The results give preliminary 
support for Hypotheses 5 and 6. The highest amount of non-anonymous aggression is observed 
if a petition is accompanied by a highly controversial debate, is connected with a scandal in 
news media, and if persons are motivated by fairness concerns. By introducing these interaction 
effects, the main effect of anonymity on online aggression becomes insignificant, and thus 
suggests that the underlying reasons for non-anonymous aggression can be indeed explained by 
social norm theory, namely by selective incentives and intrinsic motivation.  
Figures 2.2 and 2.8 illustrate the effect for the level of controversy within a debate. In the case 
of highly controversial topics, individuals clearly prefer to aggress non-anonymously, 
indicating that selective incentives are present (we code debates as highly controversial if the 
Herfindahl index is higher than 0.3, and as less controversial if the Herfindahl index is 0.3 or 
smaller). Figures 2.3 and 2.9 illustrate the effect for the connection with a scandal in news 
media. Particularly for scandalized topics, the biggest gap arises between the aggression of non-
anonymous and anonymous commenters, with the former showing more aggression. Again it 
supports that scandals offer selective incentives for norm enforcement. Finally, Figures 2.4 and 
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2.5 illustrate the effect for intrinsically motivated individuals. Intrinsically motivated 
individuals clearly prefer to aggress non-anonymously.  
Figure 2. 8. Online aggression dependent on controversy and anonymity (fixed-effects) 
 
Predictions of Table 2, Model 2. 
Figure 2. 9. Online aggression dependent on scandal and anonymity (fixed-effects) 
 
Predictions of Table 2, Model 2. 
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significantly increases for geographically dispersed protests, indicating more general relevance, 
and for natural persons. Individuals show more online aggression if they live in small villages 
and cities. We can only speculate about the reasons for this unexpected finding. One 
explanation is Putnam’s (2000) hypothesis that suggests that political participation, and thus 
also norm enforcement in social media, decrease in large, anonymous regions with a low 
amount of social capital. Petitions that deal with quality of life entail a significantly lower 
amount of aggression, whereas petitions that deal with the economy, the media, and 
environmental or animal welfare entail a significantly higher amount of aggression.  
Overall, the random-effects model predicts online aggression by 13%, suggesting that 36% of 
the variance of aggression can be explained. The fixed-effects model, in which the predictive 
power is always substantially lower, predicts online aggression by 3%, suggesting that 16% of 
the variance of aggression can be explained. The predictive power of both models seems rather 
moderate. One should, however, bear in mind that the predictions are based on objective data, 
thus implying that common-method biases (and thus systematic-error variance) are absent.  
2.7. Discussion 
In online firestorms, large amounts of critique, insulting comments, and swearwords against 
actors of public interest are propagated in social media within hours. This article begins the 
investigation on this rather new phenomenon by introducing a novel view on online aggression 
in social media. Relying on social norm theory, we proposed and demonstrated that one major 
motivation for online aggression in social media is the enforcement of social norms, be it, for 
example, the struggle for social justice by insulting greedy managers and politicians, or the 
angst about foreign infiltration by hate speeches against migrants. Norm enforcers punish actors 
of public interest who cause negative externalities for society or their sub-group by negative 
word-of-mouth. The technical conditions in social media, such as enhanced visibility and 
lowered sanctioning costs, have contributed to the expansion of bilateral and multilateral 
aggressive sanctions which can lead to firestorm-like patterns. Based on this theoretical 
conceptualization, we also underpinned that online anonymity does not promote online 
aggression in the context of online firestorms. There are no reasons for anonymity if people 
want to stand up for higher-order moral principles and if anonymity decreases the effectiveness 
of sanctions for norm enforcement.  
By showing this, we hope to make a number of valuable contributions to the field of online 
aggression in social media. First, online aggression in a social-political online setting is not 
primarily an illegitimate and irrational behavior, performed by narcissistic and impulsive actors 
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with a lack of empathy, social skills and emotional regulation problems acting out of personal 
revenge (Vandebosch and Van Cleemput 2009, Buckels et al. 2014). Online aggression in social 
media resembles a practice of sousveillance (Mann and Ferenbock 2013): it accomodates a 
growing digital civil society that actively uses the available masses of weak ties in social media 
to publicly enforce social-political norms. Social norm theory offers a theoretical foundation 
for research on online aggression, which up to now has been largely driven by the absence of 
theory or psychological interpretations of traditional bullying theory (for example Kokkinos et 
al. (2014)). Second, it is one of the first studies that has investigated the role of anonymity for 
online aggression in a social-political online setting by relying on a large dataset that is 
representative of the proposed digital civil society, i.e., commenters who actively contribute to 
a wide range of social-political norm enforcement (see also Cho and Kim (2012)). Third, we 
challenged the popular claim that negative word-of-mouth in social media is mainly caused by 
commenters’ anonymity. In contrast, the results support the idea that non-anonymous 
aggressive sanctions are more effective. Non-anonymity helps to gain recognition (Douglas and 
McGarty 2001), increases one’s persuasive power (Haines et al. 2014), and mobilizes followers 
(Andreoni and Petrie 2004). The result is also in line with public voices that observe an 
increasing social acceptance of non-anonymous digital hate speeches (Connolly 2015).  
This study also has practical implications. First, it can be expected that in the future, digital 
norm enforcement will intensify. The growing digital civil society adapts to the digital 
environment that transforms interactions. Social media offer great opportunities for individuals 
who have the intrinsic desire to enforce norms and contribute to the formation of latent interest 
groups. Second, the regularly demanded abolition of online anonymity and the introduction of 
real-name policies do not necessarily prevent online aggression in social media. Our view is in 
line with findings from a natural experiment in South Korea where the enacting of a Real Name 
Verification Law in 2007 only reduced aggressive comments for a particular user groups, but 
not for others (Cho and Kim 2012). There is, however, no doubt that the battle over online 
anonymity will intensify over time, particularly when aggressive norm enforcement by the civil 
society not only addresses low status, but increasingly high status, actors such as states or 
corporations.  
This study has several limitations that should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. 
First, the findings are only generalizable to direct, explicitly abusive online aggression but not 
to indirectly formulated aggression such as cynicism. Also, while we qualitatively checked 
comments in our large dataset, it was not feasible to identify all comments. The amount of 
aggression in some comments may be therefore wrongly classified. 
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 Second, in strict terms, the anonymity option of the petition design restricts the generalization 
of our findings to anonymity hidden from the internet community but not from the petition 
organizers. However, we consider the transferability to differing anonymity contexts as 
justified. This is because we do not refer to “true anonymity”, but to “relative anonymity”, i.e., 
exploring why spontaneous commenters decide between common options of (non-)anonymity 
offered for selection by most social media platforms. Achieving true anonymity, in contrast, is 
difficult anyway: although we recognize that there may be a minority of protesters providing 
pseudonyms and/or using Tor browsers to hide their identity from petition organizers, and their 
true anonymity, e.g. to national security agencies, may still not be granted. Consequently, we 
do not make any inferences on aggressive tendencies by “truly” anonymous commenters 
because we cannot trace true anonymity and we also expect that the greatest majority of 
commenters fall back on common (non-)anonymity options.  
Third, the results may be not completely transferable to all other types of social media such as 
criticizing Amazon on Amazon’s Facebook fan page. Preexisting norms of cooperation within 
online petition platforms may lower the expected cost of sanctions. If an aggressive 
commentator is confronted with a diffuse mass of weak but supportive social ties, he more 
likely reveals his identity compared to a setting of oppositional ties that could rebuke him, or 
strong, influential ties that could control inappropriate language. 
 Fourth, the empirical design does not allow us to draw conclusions with respect to cause-and-
effect interpretations. By alternative designs such as most suitably field experiments or 
intervention studies, it could be analyzed whether the decision to comment (non-)anonymously 
is indeed driven by social norm deliberations.  
Fifth, more information about the protesters and norm violators would be desirable, such as 
information about their motivation or their socio-demographic characteristics. Exploring 
whether aggressive protesters differ from non-aggressive protesters on particular dimensions 
would be of interest here. In regard to aggressors’ motivations, another fundamental 
problematic remains: To what proportion does firestorm-like outrage reflect genuine public 
opinion? And to what extent does it represent auto-generated propaganda of political (ro-)bots 
or astroturfers, i.e., fake commenters paid by central coordination units such as political parties? 
Particularly if public actors increasingly give in to social pressures triggered by firestorms, 
distinguishing between democratic expression of a legitimate peer-group and a swarm of bots 
or astroturfers becomes increasingly difficult. Although we perceive the occurrence of bots 
within our petition data as low (because the lists of signatures finally given to the addressee of 
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the petition had to include all names and home addresses of signers), this is a challenge that 
public actors and researchers are likewise confronted with. 
While we introduced social norm theory to understand online aggression in social media, many 
open questions remain. A largely unexplored area is the effectiveness, or offline impact, of 
digital social norm enforcement. Are there digital accusations that are systematically often ill 
founded, or mostly justified? Also, beyond knowing that aggressive norm enforcers prefer non-
anonymity, how often and under what circumstances do non-anonymous aggressive sanctions 
indeed help to mobilize other actors and to enforce social norms? Beyond this individual level 
of analysis, we also recommend focusing on the collective level. A first point is to study, in 
more detail, the role of selective incentives for (latent) group formation and aggressive acts in 
social media. Can alternative methods and applications confirm that latent groups aggress more 
often and mostly non-anonymously? Finally, we did not study the underlying dynamics of 
online firestorms. Under which circumstances, for example by enforcing which kind of norm 
and by which framing of sanctions, can online aggressors in social media mobilize other 
followers within hours?   
To conclude, within the increasing penetration of digital media into public life, online 
aggression has become an effective tool for punishing norm violations and securing public 
goods. Academia and politics cannot ignore the social-political motivation of an aggressor 
when investigating online aggression in social media. Also, in the debate on how to legally 
handle online aggression, underlying social-political motivations must be taken into account in 
the tightrope walk between securing free expression of opinion and preventing hate speech. 
And finally, from an ethical perspective, altruistic punishments of norm violations to secure 
public goods are honorable. However, the question arises whether the aggressive means of 
punishments as obtained in firestorms are justified. 
  
 
 
 52 
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Abstract 
 
Individuals increasingly use social media to judge the legitimacy of organizations. If certain 
actions are perceived as unethical, organizations can be hit by large volumes of critical, 
complaining, and indignant messages on social media, termed online firestorms. This study 
draws on the legitimacy-as-perception approach to elucidate the micro-level cognitive 
processes of individuals and their subsequent actions that aggregate to firestorms on the macro 
level. We argue that individuals use moral heuristics to judge organizational character, 
procedures, structures, and outcomes as illegitimate. This motivates them to punish 
organizations aggressively on social media. These micro effects are empirically confirmed by 
a lexicon-based, manual and automated content analysis of 45,997 comments in a firestorm 
against a German music rights organization. The study contributes to a more refined 
understanding of the micro foundations of legitimacy construction in firestorms and to a more 
sophisticated methodological approach to testing big data from the micro level. 
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3.1. Introduction 
Social media increasingly empower ordinary citizens to judge whether organizations are 
“desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995, p. 574, Etter et al. 2017). They diversify such 
judgements of legitimacy and so complicate organizations’ search for and maintenance of 
legitimacy (Whelan, Moon and Grant 2013, Etter et al. 2017). The slightest suspicion of an 
organization violating ethical, social, or moral norms can lead to organizational disruption. This 
describes a situation where the misbehavior of an organization is initially published or alleged 
in news media or social media. Subsequently, organizations can be hit by large volumes of 
critical, complaining, and indignant messages on social media platforms, a phenomenon termed 
online firestorms (Pfeffer et al. 2014, Johnen et al. 2017). Most organizations are never targeted 
by firestorms. However, some organizations suffer high-intensity firestorms, in which they are 
aggressively punished with offensive, threatening, vulgar, and pathologizing comments that 
spread rapidly and are amplified by news coverage. Such highly intense, aggressive firestorms 
may harm organizations reputationally, economically, and legally (Pfeffer et al. 2014). They 
may also polarize perceptions about organizations (Crockett 2017). Some of the most intense 
firestorms have been triggered by seemingly trivial missteps such as politically or culturally 
insensitive campaign slogans for the beer brand Bud Light or products offered by Amazon and 
Zara. Thus, it seems that highly intense, aggressive firestorms are triggered by perceptions of 
morality rather than how badly organizations actually behave (for initial discussions of morality 
in firestorms, see Einwiller et al. 2017, or Johnen et al. 2017).  
This study innovatively proposes moral heuristics to explain the formation of micro legitimacy 
judgements and subsequent aggressive actions against organizations in online firestorms. The 
legitimacy-as-perception theory (Bitektine and Haack 2015, Suddaby et al. 2017) 
conceptualizes legitimacy as a multilevel social process in which individuals perceive 
organizations, judge their legitimacy, and act upon these judgments, which ultimately produces 
macro-level effects on organizations. The theory proposes that individuals use heuristics in 
general (Kahneman and Frederick 2002, Gigerenzer 2008) to form legitimacy judgements. So 
far, though, no study drawing on the legitimacy-as-perception approach has discussed the use 
of moral heuristics in particular. Its theorization and empirical testing thus develops legitimacy 
research. In this sense, Suddaby et al. (2017) and Bitektine and Haack (2015) argue that 
exploring the cognitive mechanisms of legitimacy judgments and individuals’ consequent 
actions could shed light on the long-ignored micro foundations of legitimacy. This knowledge 
is indispensable to fully understanding the construction, maintenance, and demise of 
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legitimacy. According to Etter et al. (2017), these micro processes should be explored in social 
media in particular, as social media increasingly influences legitimacy perceptions in the public. 
However, literature on firestorms has so far only focused on micro communications in static 
settings such as laboratory experiments and not on volatile online environments (for an 
exception, see Hewett et al. 2016). This study thus explores how online users in firestorms 
arrive at judgements of organizations as morally illegitimate and how these judgements 
motivate them to adopt severe, aggressive punishments.  
We integrate moral heuristics (e.g. Bandura 1999, Sunstein 2005; also drawing on Suchman, 
1995) into the legitimacy-as-perception approach (Bitektine and Haack 2015, Suddaby et al. 
2017). We argue that the organizational disruption motivates individuals not only to be guided 
more strongly by their personal endorsement of the organization, termed propriety beliefs, but 
also to use moral heuristics. Specifically, individuals judge organizations as legitimate or 
illegitimate by up to four moral heuristics. These moral judgements motivate individuals to 
adopt online sanctions. Online sanctions refer to comments in social media that publicly 
disapprove of entities that allegedly violate social norms (Rost et al. 2016). We expect that 
individuals who judge an organization to be morally illegitimate are motivated to adopt 
particularly severe, aggressive punishments. The aggressive sanctions of individuals then 
aggregate to a firestorm on the macro level. The study empirically tests the micro effect of 
moral illegitimacy judgements on aggressive punishment using 45,982 comments from a 
firestorm against a German music rights organization. We use a lexicon-based, manual and 
automatic content analysis. This study makes two important contributions. First, by integrating 
moral heuristics into the legitimacy-as-perception approach and providing empirical evidence, 
it contributes to a more refined understanding of the formation of cognitive legitimacy 
judgements (Bitektine and Haack 2015, Suddaby et al. 2017). The second important 
contribution is its sophisticated methodological approach to micro big data. It enriches the 
literature on social media communications as a promising field for studying legitimacy 
construction  (Etter et al. 2017) and goes beyond former studies on firestorms by using field 
data from a high-volume, dynamic, and collective firestorm. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, we introduce the legitimacy-as-perception 
approach and the literature on heuristics and moral heuristics in particular. We then derive a 
hypothesis about the effect of moral legitimacy judgements on online sanctions in firestorms. 
In the second section, we discuss our empirical setting, the comment data, and variables. In the 
third section, we present our results. Finally, we discuss the results, embed them in the existing 
literature, and suggest directions for future research. 
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3.2. Legitimacy Perceptions in online firestorms  
The legitimacy-as-perception approach (Bitektine and Haack 2015, Suddaby et al. 2017) views 
legitimacy as a social construct that results from the interaction between individuals and 
organizations. Individuals are viewed as evaluators, and the socio-cognitive processes 
underlying their perceptions can be studied (Tost 2011, Bitektine and Haack 2015). The 
aggregation of perceptions and resulting actions at the micro level supports or challenges the 
macro legitimacy of organizations. Micro voices such as those found on social media are 
thereby increasingly influential, an easily accessible data source, and meet the growing interest 
in the micro foundations of legitimacy in organizational environments (Bitektine and Haack 
2015, Etter et al. 2017). Overall, this approach contrasts with others that reduce legitimacy to a 
mere asset of an entity, an aggregated evaluation of monolithic audiences, or a process 
(Suddaby et al. 2017). 
In this approach, legitimacy is constructed through three components: validity, validity beliefs, 
and propriety beliefs (Tost 2011, Bitektine and Haack 2015, Suddaby et al. 2017). Validity 
refers to a socially shared macro opinion about the appropriateness of an organization. It exists 
as an objective, social fact independent of the opinion of any individual evaluator. On the micro 
level, evaluators construct legitimacy through judgements, also termed beliefs. To form these 
beliefs, individuals first need to comprehend organizational practices (Zuckerman 1999, 
Suddaby et al. 2017). In its most basic form, comprehension means that individuals pay 
attention to or notice organizations and their practices. Comprehension occurs more likely with 
increasing organizational visibility (e.g. Rindova, Pollock and Hayward 2006). Validity beliefs 
refer to individuals’ perceptions of whether significant others perceive an organization as 
legitimate or not, independently of whether the individuals privately endorse that organization 
as legitimate. Validity beliefs result from validity cues. For example, if an organizational 
practice has a noticeable influence on the opinions and actions of surrounding actors, this is a 
cue that this practice is legitimate. However, in situations of turmoil, individuals more likely 
trust their propriety beliefs than their validity beliefs. Propriety beliefs describe individuals’ 
private endorsement of organizations and their behaviors. In situations where organizations 
struggle to maintain legitimacy, validity is weakened because there is no societal consensus on 
the organizations’ legitimacy. Thus, validity beliefs are not clear-cut. Accordingly, individuals’ 
perceptions are more strongly guided by their propriety beliefs. The legitimacy-as-perception 
approach in particular recognizes such heterogeneous judgements of individual evaluators, 
which emerge particularly in situations of turmoil (Desai 2011, Bitektine and Haack 2015).  
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The formation of legitimacy judgements may be explained by socio-cognitive heuristics. These 
are distinctive mental operations that serve as anchors for legitimacy judgments (Bitektine and 
Haack 2015, Suddaby et al. 2017). If a target is noticed, but individuals seek to minimize their 
cognitive effort when judging it, they will choose heuristic shortcuts instead of carefully 
evaluating all the information or statistics (Kahneman and Frederick 2002). The mechanism 
underlying heuristics is attribute substitution: if individuals have to make a judgement about a 
target attribute that is cognitively too complex, they instead substitute the target attribute with 
a heuristic attribute which comes more readily to mind (Kahneman and Frederick 2002: 4). For 
example, if individuals face a difficult, novel problem, they search for a more familiar, similar 
problem and transfer its solution to the more difficult problem. They select from a long list of 
heuristics, and each of these induces its own systematic bias and errors (McPherson, Smith-
Lovin and Cook 2001, Gigerenzer 2008). For example, if individuals are able to assign 
organizations to a well-defined category, their positive and negative evaluation of the 
organization will be more clear-cut and less neutral (Vergne 2012).  
Applying the legitimacy-as-perception approach to firestorms, we argue that the legitimacy of 
organizations is constructed in a social process between online users in social media. These 
individuals perceive, judge, and act through digital platforms such as social networking sites, 
online commentary sections, and online petitions. Their social environment is characterized by 
diverse collectives composed of individuals on particular online platforms and by news media 
as a powerful authority. Information technologies enable an unlimited number of individuals to 
notice, or comprehend, organizational disruptions and subsequently form beliefs. This is 
because information technologies allow any unethical organizational behaviors that occurred 
anywhere at any time to be easily unearthed, made visible, and publicly alleged (Pfeffer et al. 
2014). Such information is persistently stored and can be replicated, shared, and made 
accessible to unlimited audiences by news media and social media (Marwick and Boyd 2011). 
Cues such as the numbers of comments opposing an organization and online likes help to form 
consequent validity beliefs. In situations of organizational disruptions, however, validity will 
be weakened. This is because these situations reflect organizational turmoil where the – so far 
potentially unquestioned – collective legitimacy of the organization and its practices are 
suddenly questioned and any related validity beliefs thus less clear-cut. Individuals will thus be 
guided by their personal propriety beliefs more than usual.  
The digital context not only helps individuals to notice organizational disruptions; it is also an 
environment in which individuals readily turn to socio-cognitive heuristics to form propriety 
beliefs. Online, individuals are tempted to minimize their cognitive effort even more than usual. 
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This is because in the media-saturated, information-rich context of the Internet, individuals 
experience an overload of information while their attention is limited, so information 
consumption is constrained (Fairchild 2007). In this volatile online context, information 
diffuses rapidly and far. One example is Twitter, which obliges communication to be short and 
quick. In addition, the opportunity window to join a debate about any organizational disruption 
is small. Commonly, such online debates are in full swing before the details and background of 
the particular organizational disruption can even be published. Overall, this invites quick 
reactions rather than long inquiries, which tempts individuals to take shortcuts through 
heuristics. Lastly, while general information is abundant online, the specific, individualizing 
information that commonly inhibits the use of heuristics is scarce. For example, the digital 
context generally lacks nonverbal cues such as facial expression or physical size. This reduces 
the impact of empathy and authority typically expressed by body language, dress, and social 
setting, which encourages the use of heuristics and the projection of enemy images (Kiesler et 
al. 1984, Suler 2004, Mehari et al. 2014).  
Suchman’s (1995) classification of moral legitimacy into four dimensions, namely 
organizational character, procedures, structures, and outcomes, can be used to describe the 
socio-cognitive heuristics that individuals may use when online to categorize and stereotype 
organizations. Moral legitimacy is a heuristic commonly used as a central benchmark when 
organizational behavior is discussed in public, political-normative arenas (Palazzo and Scherer 
2006). Sunstein (2005) argued that moral heuristics are pervasively used in political and legal 
contexts to reduce the highly complex problems commonly debated in these areas. Similarly, 
organizational disruptions are commonly published, alleged, and debated in political-normative 
online arenas, so moral heuristics are likely to be commonly used. They allow individuals to 
make a judgement about an organizational disruption while avoiding immersion in the elusive 
depths of the disruption and ignoring the overwhelming information online. Inspired by 
Suchman (1995), we argue that individuals judge an organizational disruption as morally 
illegitimate, or morally legitimate. If they view an organizational disruption as immoral, they 
will form propriety beliefs that substitute the potentially complex attribute central to the 
disruption with more easily accessible, negatively connotated attributes about organizational 
character, procedures, structures, and outcomes. Accordingly, individuals may substitute an 
organization with another social category or character, such as a negatively evaluated industry, 
network, government, or world order independent of any valid comparability. Organizations 
are thus reduced to exchangeable representatives of the category instead of being recognized as 
unique actors with differentiating characteristics. Empirical studies have confirmed the 
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occurrence of such spillover (Jonsson, Greve and Fujiwara-Greve 2009, Haack, Pfarrer and 
Scherer 2014). Individuals may also use heuristics to judge organizational procedures as 
morally illegitimate, for example how organizations arrive at knowledge (e.g. pseudoscience), 
how they produce, trade, and organize working conditions (e.g. child labor or unequal waves), 
how they treat customers and design marketing campaigns, and how their management 
decisions are made (e.g. lack of transparency). Heuristics can also be used to judge 
organizational structures as illegitimate. When this happens, organizational structures are 
sweepingly accused of being incompatible with the current, socially accepted structural 
environment. For example, individuals substitute organizational structures with seemingly 
similar, but condemned, structures typically located in different times and places, such as 
Taylorism, oppressive regimes, and the Middle Ages. Finally, heuristics may be used to judge 
organizational outcomes. For example, individuals may consult their memories about similarly 
negative experiences with the organization. This includes past failures and misbehaviors.  
Individuals who use heuristics to judge organizations as morally illegitimate may well adopt 
aggressive online sanctions. Generally, online sanctions are common actions adopted by 
individuals in firestorms to put costs on organizations, to induce conformity, and ultimately, to 
secure public goods (Rost et al. 2016). Online sanctions can differ in severity (Douglas Creed, 
Hudson, Okhuysen et al. 2014, Antonetti and Maklan 2016, Crockett 2017). For example, 
individuals may publicly disapprove organizations but maintain a neutral tone in their online 
comments. We call this sober disapproval. Their commenting may also include emotional and 
scandalizing language such as emotional shaming. However, the most severe sanction is 
aggressive comments. They punish organizations by offensive, vulgar, pathologizing, and 
threatening language. We argue that using moral heuristics to judge organizational disruptions 
as morally illegitimate will encourage individuals to punish organizations aggressively. This is 
because moral heuristics introduce ideological justifications and associated emotions that 
reduce individuals’ external and internal sanctioning costs (Bandura 1999, Crandall and 
Eshleman 2003, Haslam 2006). Moral heuristics accordingly lead individuals to feel morally 
obliged to secure moral norms and to perceive an increased need for effective sanctioning.  
Aggressive punishments are particularly effective because they can be very costly for 
organizations. They are the most visible as their highly arousing emotive content has the highest 
potential to spread in social media. They are also most convincing because they signal the 
willingness of individuals to accept high sanctioning costs  (Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan 2013). In 
summary, the justifications introduced by moral heuristics change classic cost-benefit concerns 
and encourage the adoption of otherwise costly, aggressive behavior. For example, it has been 
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shown that individuals whose expectations have been confounded by organizations feel strong 
moral outrage (Antonetti and Maklan 2016), which motivates boycotts (Lindenmeier, Schleer 
and Pricl 2012), revenge (Barclay, Whiteside and Aquino 2014), and whistleblowing (Jones, 
Spraakman and Sánchez-Rodríguez 2014). We therefore hypothesize that individuals relying 
on moral heuristics to judge organizations as morally illegitimate in terms of character, 
procedures, structures, and outcomes will adopt aggressive online punishments against these 
organizations more strongly than those who do not judge organizations as morally illegitimate. 
The aggregation of aggressive online sanctions results in the macro phenomenon discernible as 
a firestorm. Firestorms may challenge the macro validity of organizations. Judgments expressed 
by individuals aggregate to construct, preserve, or challenge the macro validity of organizations 
and so drive institutional change (Bitektine and Haack 2015). Suddaby et al. (2017) propose 
both economic theory (Kuran 1997) and system justification theory (Jost, Banaji and Nosek 
2004) to explain the micro–macro translation. Both theories suggest that if legitimacy 
judgements can be observed on the micro level, the validity of these judgements also increases 
on the macro level. For example, when aggression is expressed by a majority of individuals, 
incoming individuals are encouraged to conform to this aggressive norm. This is because 
validity beliefs about how the social environment thinks and acts about the organizational 
disruption are changed. In this case, individuals expressing judgements of moral illegitimacy 
and subsequently adopting aggressive punishment expect to be cheered by others. The more 
visible aggressive sanctions are, the stronger is their impact on the macro validity of the 
organization. Visibility increases if platforms possess powerful diffusion mechanisms such as 
liking, sharing, or retweeting; these amplify information sharing, costless feedback, and 
habitual outrage expression (Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan 2013, Crockett 2017). Visibility also 
increases if news media cover the firestorm (Bitektine and Haack 2015).  Changes to macro 
validity may then impact organizations reputationally, economically, and legally. 
3.3. Data and Method 
3.3.1. Empirical setting and data 
We use 45,997 online comments submitted to a German online petition 
(https://www.openpetition.de/petition/online/gegen-die-tarifreform-2013-gema-verliert-
augenmass) against the Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische 
Vervielfältigungsrechte (Society for Musical Performing and Mechanical Reproduction Rights: 
GEMA). For permission of using the data, see document 1 in the Appendix. The petition was 
organized to protest against a licensing fee scheme planned in 2012 by GEMA. Diverse actors 
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such as club managers feared increases in fees. An event promoter launched the online petition 
in April 2012. In October 2012, 183 days later, the petition was closed with 305,122 signatures. 
The petition signatures were presented to the Federal Minister of Justice of Germany in 
December 2012. A week later, GEMA announced that it would delay the implementation of the 
tariff reform to allow further negotiations.  
This data is optimal for testing our hypothesis. First, the petition platform explicitly invites all 
petition signers to add comments describing their personal motivation for signing. Signers 
express their legitimacy judgements and their sanction verbally. Furthermore, the GEMA 
petition’s content and the online platform setting is representative for firestorms. The GEMA 
petition shares the central attributes that differentiate firestorms from other forms of online 
communication (Johnen et al. 2017). The petition has a “moral concern”: many individuals 
judge GEMA to be morally illegitimate. There is “minimal consensus”: most individuals 
condemn GEMA. Further, the petition is “hostile”: individuals are frequently aggressive against 
GEMA. It is also “disproportionate”: the petition attracts unusually large numbers of 
participants all over Germany. Finally, the petition is “volatile”: it exhibits several daily peaks, 
including one up to 2366 comments a day, as descriptive statistics of the present data set show. 
The petition was collected on a well-known social media platform where the petition signers 
cooperated to reach a common goal, the achievement of the petition objective, and publicly 
produced and consumed comments in doing so (Treem et al. 2016). The resulting chronological 
list of comments reflects one of many possible firestorm structures. Similar firestorms may 
occur on platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, and news commentary sections. The 
absence from the petition of any option for commenting back and forth also complies with the 
typically unilateral orientation of firestorms: firestorm participants commonly interact little 
with each other but predominantly sanction external entities.  
We complement this data with two additional data sources. The first is metadata on commenting 
individuals, including their degree of anonymity, time of comment submission, and postcode. 
The platform owner provided the comments and metadata to the authors on request. The second 
data source is a group of news media articles on GEMA, drawn from the Lexisnexis online 
media database. None of the data requires research ethics board approval. This is because all 
data is publicly accessible and was provided to the authors in an anonymized form. Thus, no 
individual user can be identified. 
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3.3.2. Method 
This section presents the process by which we coded our variables; the specific 
operationalization of these variables is presented in the subsequent section. To test our 
hypotheses, we processed the qualitative comments into quantitative data. We used a lexicon-
based, manual and automated context analysis (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). The first step was 
manual content analysis, also termed human hand coding. For this, 5% of the randomized 
comment corpus was selected (around 2000 comments). One coder read and classified all 
comments in this subset into the pre-defined categories (for example, into aggressive 
punishment). This process created coding rules. Coding rules are intended to guide 
classification of comments into categories. Coding rules were refined in a circular process of 
classifying and discussing with a second coder to ensure valid, unambiguous, and mutual 
exclusive categories. To validate the rules for classification, both coders classified 500 
comments (1% of the randomized corpus) into the categories. The resulting interrater-reliability 
of Cohen’s Kappa was substantial to excellent. For aggressive punishment, it was .88, for 
emotional shaming, it was .87, and across all four moral heuristics, it was ø = .77 (minimally 
.70).  
The second step was dictionary building. Dictionaries are basically word lists; dictionary 
methods use the frequency of these words to automatically classify a document, for example 
each comment in a comment corpus, into a category (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). One coder 
selected all of the comments that were classified in each of the predetermined set of categories. 
The coder then identified all words, word combinations, and punctuation marks that 
discursively embodied the category. For instance, the expression “idiots” was classified as 
aggressive punishment (all of the following text examples were translated from the original 
German text to English by the authors). All the expressions identified were transferred to one 
dictionary for each category. However, the expressions needed to be transformed into linguistic 
forms that are not misclassified by automatic classification. Misclassification occurs, for 
example, if too many false positives are counted; instances of expressions used with other 
meanings than intended. We used two tools for the linguistic transformation. The first tool is 
the part-of-speech tagging tool TreeTagger. TreeTagger differentiates word searching and 
simplifies vocabulary. It allows lemmatization, that is, using the basic form of words to detect 
an item in all its possible forms (e.g., a search for ‘good’ also searches for ‘better’ and ‘best’). 
It allows the search of expressions to be manually restricted or expanded to any desired endings, 
inflexions, and conjugations, and consecutive combinations of words to be searched for despite 
having irrelevant words in between. However, to specify the linguistic forms that optimally 
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search for expressions in the desired meanings but not in others, coders need to know the 
linguistic contexts in which expressions are used within a corpus. To this aim, we used the 
online tool Sketch Engine. It provides an overview of all the sentences in which a selected 
expression occurs.  
The third step is automated classification using Python. This displays a count value for each 
category for each comment of the whole corpus. This value describes how many expressions 
from each dictionary are found in each comment. In our corpus, the automated classification 
reliably replicated manual coding: Cohen’s Kappas between automated and manual coding for 
1% of the randomized material is substantial to excellent. For aggressive punishment, it is .89, 
for emotional shaming, it is .92, and for moral heuristics, it is ø = .82 (minimally .63). 
3.3.2. Measurements 
Aggressive punishment measures the sum of offenses (e.g. “liar”, “fraudsters”), vulgar speech 
(e.g. “fuck”, “puke”), ascribed pathology (e.g. “GEMA is insane”), and threat of violence or 
abolishment (e.g. “GEMA workers should be whipped in public”, “Your institution will burn”) 
in each comment. These four subcategories emerge from established measurements of online 
aggression. This dictionary contains 346 expressions. The variable is over-dispersed: 86% of 
the commenters use non-aggressive expressions, 11 % use one aggressive expression, and only 
3% use two to six aggressive expressions. The GEMA petition case thus represents a low-
intensity firestorm in percentage but a high-intensity firestorm in absolute numbers, with 6608 
aggressive comments overall.  
In our theory, we differentiate aggressive punishments from the less severe sanctions of 
emotional shaming and sober disapproval. For robust results, additional analyses should find 
that individuals using moral heuristics do not use less severe sanctions.  
Emotional shaming measures the sum of emotional display (e.g. NOT, !!, ?!?, L), emotional 
language (e.g. “angry”, “afraid”), and scandalization (e.g. “outrageous”, “shame on you!”) in 
each comment. The dictionary contains 76 expressions. Of all comments, 24% include 
emotional shaming.  
Sober disapproval is a binary variable created through a process of exclusion. First, each 
comment is coded according to whether it contains emotional shaming and/or aggressive 
punishments. In our study, 64% include neither. These comments are classified as sober 
disapproval because they represent the public posting of disapproval towards entities or their 
behaviors. Examples are: “I am against the reform” or “I hope that the only pub in my village 
will not have to close”. 
 
 
 63 
The following four count variables capture the moral heuristics by which individuals classify 
GEMA as morally illegitimate. 
Illegitimate character measures the sum of expressions that stereotype GEMA as a morally 
illegitimate character in each comment. In these cases, individuals follow one of three 
strategies. Firstly, they stereotype GEMA directly, for example, as representative of the “bad” 
music industry, of a monopolistic organization, or of the neoliberal world. One such comment 
is “I am against the enrichment of monopolists”. Secondly, individuals indirectly stereotype 
people working for GEMA as, for example, “civil servants”. Finally, individuals stereotype 
GEMA by drawing analogies to other stereotyped entities such as banks.  One such comment 
is “Oil companies… GEZ [fee collection service of Germany's public broadcasting institutions 
or Gebühreneinzugszentrale der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland; author’s note] … GEMA… – none of them can get enough”. The 
dictionary contains 51 expressions. Of all commentators, 5% (2278 individuals) in our study 
stereotyped GEMA as a morally illegitimate character. 
Illegitimate procedures measures the sum of expressions that judge GEMA’s procedures as 
morally illegitimate in each comment. GEMA is predominantly accused of illegitimate business 
and customer interactions and unfair procedures. Individuals criticize, for example, GEMA's 
mismanagement (“inefficient”; “not transparent”), reckless methods (“egoistic”; “arbitrary”), 
disrespect or exploitative treatment of clients (“Without any willingness for compromise”), and 
unfair acting (“This reform is unfair”). The dictionary contains 329 expressions. In our study, 
19% (9135 individuals) judged GEMA’s procedures to be morally illegitimate.  
Illegitimate structures measures the sum of expressions that judge GEMA’s structures as not 
complying with current, morally legitimate structural environments in each comment. For 
example, individuals equate GEMA' structures with commonly condemned political systems 
such as dictatorship regimes and unpopular historical ages (e.g. “We do not live in medieval 
times”). Or, they ascribe an obsolete, outdated identity that has no reason for existence (e.g. 
“GEMA is a useless and antiquated institution”). The dictionary contains 107 expressions. 
Some 2.4% (1070 individuals) judged GEMA’s structures to be morally illegitimate. 
Illegitimate outcomes measures the sum of expressions that judge GEMA to have a history of 
morally illegitimate behaviors in each comment. For example, individuals describe the present 
behavior as typical of a history of misconduct and maladministration. Or they express 
prolonged dissatisfaction with GEMA and emphasize the imperative for change. Comments 
include “Put a stop to this game finally!” and “Now, it is getting too much with GEMA ... I 
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have been annoyed for years”. The dictionary contains 91 expressions. Some 7,3% (3364 
individuals) judged GEMA’s outcomes to be morally illegitimate. 
3.3.3. Control variables 
We control for variables that may influence individuals’ adoption of online sanctions. 
Sophistication of language is a metric variable that measures the linguistic complexity of 
comments. For each comment, we use the Flesch-Kincaid-grade-level formula (Kincaid, 
Fishburne, Rogers et al. 1975) to calculate a score of how difficult it is to read: [0.39*(total 
words/ total sentences) + 11.8*(total syllables/ total words) - 15.59]. This formula has already 
been applied to measure readability of online reviews (Ghose and Ipeirotis 2011). The higher 
the score, the longer the sentences and words, and the more difficult it is to read. The measure 
is only reliable for longer texts. Therefore, we assign the lowest score to the 27% of comments 
that include less than seven words. Higher scores suggest higher literacy skills. This may 
decrease the attractiveness of aggressive punishment because the cognitive costs needed to 
formulate reflected argumentation is lower for such individuals.  
We use two proxies to control for individuals’ arousal. Arousal through spelling mistakes 
counts the number of spelling mistakes in a comment. If people are more aroused, such as 
through intense eye contact or unpleasant music, they are less able to process information. This 
reduces their performance in memory tasks and word-spelling (Conty, Russo, Loehr et al. 
2010). We expect that more strongly aroused individuals punish more aggressively because 
their cognitive costs for more reflected argumentation are higher. Arousal level of words 
measures the average arousal of words that individuals use in comments. Research (Storbeck 
and Clore 2008) suggests that if individuals are more aroused, arousing words are more 
accessible and thus more often used. It is measured by the German adaptation of the dictionary 
‘Affective Norms for English Words’ or ANEW (Schmidtke, Schröder, Jacobs et al. 2014). 
This German translation of the ANEW material lists 2902 German words and rating of how 
arousing they are. If one or more of the listed words appear in a comment, we assign the mean 
of the respective arousal rating(s) to the comment. 
Anonymity indicates whether individuals chose to allow either their real names and residence 
to be published beside their comments (0 = non-anonymous) or only their postal codes (1 = 
anonymous). A positive by-product of this procedure is that it minimizes the risk of social bots 
that could distort our results. With 41% of anonymous individuals, the petition is about average 
for user anonymity on social media platforms: for example, anonymity is higher on YouTube 
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and lower on Facebook. Non-anonymity may increase aggressiveness in social-political 
commenting (Rost et al. 2016). 
Self-reported economic dependency measures whether or not individuals self-report working in 
or owning a business that is threatened by the GEMA reform (e.g. “As a club owner I could go 
bankrupt” or “I could lose my job as DJ”). The dictionary contains 124 expressions. Of all 
individuals, 4.8% self-report being economically dependent. Self-reported economic 
dependency may either increase aggressive punishment, because the GEMA reform puts higher 
cost on these individuals, or it may decrease aggressive punishment, because publicly 
expressing personal information increases the risk of external sanctions. 
Urbanity measures the size of the city or village in which individuals live (by the approximate 
number of inhabitants per 100,000). Higher values indicate more urban places. As a socio-
structural variable, it influences life cultures and associated sanction preferences. 
We also control for the tone of the daily news media coverage on GEMA. News coverage is a 
‘validity cue’ that signals macro validity and thus influences the expected sanctioning costs of 
micro evaluators (Bitektine and Haack 2015, Einwiller et al. 2017). Using the LexisNexis media 
database, we searched for the term GEMA in the title, lead, or main text of all German-speaking 
print and online media articles on GEMA during the petition period. Then, we manually 
selected articles that are associated with the studied GEMA reform. In the resulting 789 articles, 
we first measure Negative media coverage. One coder accordingly determined whether each 
article reports predominantly negatively on GEMA: whether it gives more attention to contra 
than pro viewpoints on the reform. In total, 479 negative articles were identified and summed. 
Similarly, for Balanced media coverage, the coder determined whether each article reports in a 
predominantly balanced way on the GEMA reform: whether it gives the same attention to pro 
and contra viewpoints on the reform or contains merely descriptive news without taking up any 
arguments. In total, 234 balanced articles were identified and summed. Cohen's Kappa 
interrater reliability with a second coder for 10% of all articles was ø = .94.  
We control for two other validity cues, the number and content of previous comments. Previous 
comments (total) measures how many comments (per 1000) were submitted prior to each 
individual comment. Previous aggressive punishment measures the number of aggressive 
punishers in the ten previous comments. On this petition platform, we expect effects to be weak, 
as the platform design requires individuals to read and submit comments on separate pages, and 
this increases the costs of detecting validity cues. 
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Number of words measures the sum of words in a comment (per 100 words). More overall 
words increase the number of aggressive expressions. 
For descriptive statistics and correlations of variables, see Table 6 in the Appendix. For the 
statistical analyses, we apply regressions on the individual comment level. Negative binomial 
regressions are selected for predicting aggressive punishment and for emotional shaming. This 
suits their highly dispersed, count-data structure. Logistic regression is selected for predicting 
sober disapproval. We group the dataset for each of the 183 petition days as comments are 
expected to correlate within each petition day. The more general, robust population averaged 
estimators of generalized estimating equation (GEE) regressions are applied for all models. 
They are an alternative to fixed and random effects models. GEE models suit the present data 
best as they address unmeasured dependence in clustered data and outcomes.  
3.4. Results 
Table 3 reports the findings. The results in Model I confirm that individuals who rely on moral 
heuristics and judge GEMA as morally illegitimate indeed adopt aggressive punishments more 
strongly. The effect of morally illegitimate character on aggressive punishments is stronger by 
far than those of the remaining moral dimensions. The regression coefficients show that one 
expression of an illegitimate character leads to 0.5 additional aggressive expressions, while this 
value is 0.1 for procedures, 0.2 for structures, and 0.1 for outcomes. It indicates that moral 
mental shortcuts punish organizations much more strongly if individuals reduce organization 
to a simplified, negative character instead of considering its procedures, structures, or 
outcomes. The control variables indicate that that individuals adopt aggressive punishment 
more strongly the less sophisticated their language, they more aroused they are, if they do not 
self-report being economically dependent on the GEMA reform, if they are non-anonymous, 
the less urban they live, the more negative and the fewer balanced news media articles about 
the GEMA reform are published on the particular day, and the more words the comment 
contains. On this petition platform, the number and content of previous comments did not 
impact aggressive punishments.  
 
 
 67 
Table 3. Regression effects of moral heuristics on online sanctions 
  
 Aggressive punishments 
(negative binomial 
regression)  
Emotional shaming 
(negative binomial 
regression) 
Sober disapproval  
(logistic regression) 
  Coeff. Std.Err.   z     Coeff. Std.Err.   z     Coeff. Std.Err.   z     
Moral heuristics                         
Illegitimate character 0.53 0.03 15.53 *** 0.05 0.04 1.27  -0.36 0.04 -9.18 *** 
Illegitimate procedures  0.07 0.02 3.61 *** 0.06 0.02 3.61 *** -0.08 0.02 -4.32 *** 
Illegitimate structures  0.18 0.06 2.99 ** -0.37 0.07 -5.44 *** 0.17 0.06 2.84 ** 
Illegitimate outcomes  0.08 0.03 2.61 ** 0.04 0.03 1.68  -0.10 0.03 -3.89 *** 
Control variables                         
Sophistication of language -0.05 0.00 -22.48 *** -0.05 0.00 -27.95 *** 0.08 0.00 37.85 *** 
Arousal through spelling mistakes 0.10 0.00 22.00 *** 0.02 0.00 5.31 *** -0.07 0.01 -12.06 *** 
Arousal level of words  0.11 0.02 5.79 *** -0.08 0.02 -5.37 *** 0.01 0.02 0.94  
Anonymity -0.18 0.03 -7.13 *** -0.01 0.02 -0.47  0.11 0.02 5.43 *** 
Self-reported economic dependency  -0.70 0.08 -9.19 *** -0.11 0.05 -2.18 * 0.37 0.05 7.31 *** 
Urbanity of residence -0.05 0.01 -3.87 *** -0.05 0.01 -4.50 *** 0.06 0.01 5.81 *** 
Negative media coverage 0.01 0.00 2.42 * 0.00 0.00 0.19  0.00 0.00 -1.06   
Balanced media coverage -0.01 0.01 -2.35 * 0.00 0.01 0.56  0.00 0.00 0.42   
Previous comments (total) 0.00 0.00 0.19  0.00 0.00 0.08  0.00 0.00 0.19  
Previous aggressive commenting 0.01 0.01 0.74  0.00 0.01 0.05  0.00 0.01 -0.72  
Number of words  0.30 0.05 5.83 *** 1.02 0.04 24.91 *** -1.09 0.06 -19.52 *** 
Constant -1.90 0.08 -22.89 *** -0.74 0.07 -10.51 *** 0.20 0.07 2.85 * 
Number of observations     44,173       44,173       44,173   
Wald chi2     1751.39 ***     1418.96 ***     1882.47 *** 
Number of clusters (days)     179       179       179   
* Significant at p < .05; ** significant at p < .01; *** significant at p < .001 
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We add two robustness tests in Table 3. Model II predicts the amount of emotional shaming 
and Model III predicts the likelihood of sober disapproval. For robust findings on aggressive 
punishments in Model I, no effects should be observed for emotional shaming and opposite-
effect directions for sober disapproval. In general, this is confirmed by the data. How strongly 
individuals adopt emotional shaming is not affected by how strongly they judge GEMA’s 
character and outcomes to be morally illegitimate. Also, individuals are more likely to adopt 
sober disapproval if they do not judge GEMA’s character, procedures, or outcomes as morally 
illegitimate. We also find surprising opposite effects: individuals who judge GEMA’s structures 
as morally illegitimate are not only more likely to adopt aggressive punishment but also sober 
disapproval. Simultaneously, they are less likely to adopt emotional shaming. Additionally, 
individuals who judge GEMA’s procedures to be morally illegitimate are not only more likely 
to adopt aggressive punishment but also emotional shaming.  
 
3.5. Discussion 
Our results show that individuals more strongly adopt severe, aggressive punishments if they 
judge entities’ characters, procedures, structures, and outcomes to be morally illegitimate. 
Moral heuristics thus introduce justifications to consider aggressive punishments as ‘the right 
thing to do’ and, accordingly, change classic cost-benefit concerns. This encourages the 
adoption of adopt otherwise costly, aggressive behavior. Our study advances legitimacy 
research by shedding light on its long ignored cognitive micro foundations. The results confirm 
the presence of heuristics in micro legitimacy construction processes (Kahneman and Frederick 
2002, Gigerenzer 2008), the dependence of actions upon heuristic-based judgements (Tost 
2011, Bitektine and Haack 2015, Suddaby et al. 2017), and the effects of moral justifications 
on aggressive behaviors (Bandura 1999, Crandall and Eshleman 2003, Haslam 2006). Overall, 
the results suggest that morality and its varying manifestations play a critical role in aggressive 
firestorms. This particularly applies to stereotyping an organization as an illegitimate character. 
Ultimately, organizations may profit from this study. Organizations find difficulty in addressing 
the diversity created through social media and the dynamics involved in firestorms. However, 
aggressive firestorms seem to be driven by perceived moral illegitimacy, so organizations could 
strengthen or weaken such judgements through organizational behaviors and communication, 
particularly through social media. This may be critical,  as moral heuristics commonly induce 
systematic errors in reasoning which may harm a debate (Sunstein 2005). Further, organizations 
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are suggested to particularly look out for the four moral legitimacy dimensions in social media 
discourses to anticipate aggressive firestorms. 
The second important contribution is the sophisticated methodological approach to analyzing 
the data from a firestorm. The exceptional use of field data from firestorms increases the 
external validity of our results and goes beyond former empirical designs using fictitious 
firestorm data. The lexicon-based manual and automatic content analysis is a so-far underused 
method to study legitimacy; it thus meets the call to expand the methodological toolkit for 
studying this complex phenomenon (e.g. by Suddaby et al. 2017). Our approach performs well 
in context sensitivity and allows deep exploration of data and the simultaneous processing of a 
large text corpus instead of blindly following domain-specific, pre-coded word lists. 
Methodologically and datawise, this study thus enriches the literature that emphasizes micro 
communications on social media as a promising new data source for studying organizational 
legitimacy construction (Etter et al. 2017). Beyond, social media discourses deserve attention 
as they have a growing influence on macro legitimacy (Etter et al. 2017) and are thus a powerful 
tool for enforcing norms in the digital age (Rost et al. 2016, Crockett 2017).  
The study opens important avenues for future research. First, micro–macro interactions in 
legitimacy construction invite empirical investigation. For example, how do moral judgements 
mediate between socio-structural macro conditions and individuals’ choices of online sanction? 
Sociodemographic data on individuals collected by surveys and linked with social media data 
could help to explain why moral judgements about structures seem to polarize the sanctions 
adopted; they encourage both aggression and sober disapproval. A second empirical avenue is 
to validate the proposed effects in a larger sample of firestorms. We suggest testing the effects 
across diverse targeted organizations, societal fields, cultural settings, and platforms. This 
would add to the case in the present study, an isolated firestorm on a single online platform. 
The use of methodologies that both efficiently process big data sets and effectively detect 
dynamical legitimacy constructs such as complex linguistic analysis or machine learning (Etter 
et al. 2017) is promising. Third, controlled lab experiments may test the causal link between 
moral legitimacy judgements and online sanctions in micro processes. Social and cognitive 
suppressing factors could also be manipulated in  such studies (Suddaby et al. 2017). 
In the global village, for good or ill, the social, hierarchical, and geographical barriers to 
detecting and sanctioning organizational behaviors deemed illegitimate have fallen. The 
resulting critical online debates confront organizations with ordinary citizens’ norms, 
expectations, and normative demands that could be largely neglected in the past. This 
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diversification of judgements complicates the search for and maintenance of legitimacy. By 
exploring the moral heuristics underlying micro judgements in social media, we hope this study 
sheds early light on legitimacy construction in the progressing digital age. 
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4. “Dirty journalists, all liars!” - A social identity explanation for 
why journalists are attacked by audiences9 
 
Lea Stahel10 
  
 
Abstract 
 
Journalists are offended, threatened, and disparaged by audiences through digital and analogue 
channels. This negatively impacts journalists and democracy. It remains unclear which 
journalists are particularly frequently attacked and why. This study draws on five central 
conditions that a politicized social identity approach suggests increase threats to groups’ social 
identity and power. Journalists should be more frequently attacked if they are evaluative, 
publish on political topics, have a local focus, are powerful, and belong to outgroups that are 
hard to distinguish from the ingroup. This is because their potential to threaten the social 
identity and power of groups is greater under these conditions; they are more likely to 
‘mobilize’ group members with a pre-existing tendency to feel threatened. A Swiss online 
survey on 530 journalists confirms all five hypotheses. Results support a perspective on 
aggression against highly exposed professions in digital societies that is inspired by sociological 
social psychology.  
 
 
 
  
                                               
9 This study is submitted to the European Sociological Review. 
10 Lea Stahel, University of Zurich, Andreasstrasse 15, 8050 Zurich, Switzerland. E-Mail: lea.stahel@uzh.ch 
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4.1. Introduction 
 
With such a name, you cannot be a journalist. Get me a real journalist. 
Dirty journalists, all liars! 
You have wife and kids and we know where you live. 
 
Nowadays public professions such as journalists, politicians, celebrities, and senior executives 
are more visible and accessible than ever before. To attract such aggressive comments, 
journalists in particular need not live in a country where journalistic freedom and autonomy is 
suppressed – these attacks are also received by journalists in democratic, Western countries. 
The rise of communication technologies plays its part in this regard. The Internet allows news 
organizations to engage and inform audiences all over the world (Lee 2015) and journalists to 
gain information and networks and promote themselves through social media (Hedman and 
Djerf-Pierre 2013). They also enable readers, spectators, and listeners to provide instant, direct 
and global feedback to journalists. In the best case, this enables fruitful exchange and enhances 
journalistic quality (Ksiazek et al. 2015). 
The reality, however, often fails to attain such noble ends. The opportunities for audiences to 
scrutinize, devalue, and discredit journalists and their published output have become wide open. 
Journalists are frequently attacked by their audience: they receive vulgar, pathologizing, 
inappropriately generalizing, disparaging, offensive, and threatening feedback about 
themselves and their output. They are attacked digitally through news commentary sections, 
email, social networking sites, and – still – through letters and face-to-face attacks. This 
phenomenon demands public and scientific attention. Although aggression has always been 
part of public discourse, it “today has more outlets, can be highly public, and travels and spreads 
faster; its impact can be greater, and strategies for dealing with it are still being tested” (Meltzer 
2015: 86). Initial and highly informative reports from Germany (Preuss, Tetzlaff and Zick 
2017), Sweden (Löfgren Nilsson and Örnebring 2016), and Hungary (Tofalvy 2017) show that 
half to three quarters of journalists surveyed were attacked at least once within the year prior to 
data collection. They also show that aggression impacts journalists profoundly negatively. They 
feel fear and self-censor. Aggression also harms democratic outcomes: in experiments, 
audiences exposed to it polarize their opinions, distrust media, and think of society as more 
divided (e.g. Anderson et al. 2016).  
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Two so far open questions are which journalists are most frequently attacked by audiences, and 
why. Qualitative studies on online hate against female journalists suggest gender differences 
(e.g. Hardaker and McGlashan 2016), while purely descriptive surveys initially find differences 
between media organizations and topics (Löfgren Nilsson and Örnebring 2016, Preuss et al. 
2017). These studies are commonly atheoretical, descriptive, or case-oriented. No theoretically 
driven, systematic, multivariate empirical approach has yet shed light on this phenomenon. This 
study fills this gap by asking which characteristics of journalists influence the frequency with 
which they are attacked by audiences, and why.  
A comprehensive approach to answering this question might examine journalists’ potential to 
threaten the power of social groups. Power includes the control that groups possess over their 
own and outgroups’ outcomes and the possession of immaterial resources such as information, 
expert knowledge, status, and reputation (Simon and Klandermans 2001). Journalists may 
influence groups’ power in various ways. For example, journalists scratching at popular 
politicians’ images may also embarrass their electoral groups. Journalists tackling local 
corruption may disrupt deep-seated social group ties. Such threats may be amplified if 
published by journalists who are well-known because they commonly address a large audience. 
Members of social groups may accordingly be enraged and intervene by attacking the 
journalists they hold responsible for their anger. In a society pervaded by digital technologies, 
this is easier than ever before, because the reduced costs of communication and the ability to 
transcend geographical and temporal barriers facilitate networking and the collective action of 
social groups (Bennett 2003). Whenever social groups seem to respond to threats, social identity 
may play an important role. For example, Internet users disparage scientific findings online if 
those findings threaten their social identity (Nauroth et al. 2015), and intergroup factors lead 
politically identified people to talk uncivilly in online news fora (Rains et al. 2017). Being 
rooted in sociological social psychology, social identity not only provides a perspective that 
explains micro behavior as embedded in social structures and social groups. It also provides 
testable hypotheses. To answer our research question, thus, social identity is optimal. 
This study therefore draws on the social identity approach (Tajfel and Turner 1979, Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes et al. 1987, Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears et al. 1999) to explain behaviors 
between social groups. In addition, it draws on politicized social identity specifically (Simon 
and Klandermans 2001) to explain why these groups attack journalists. The combined 
approaches suggest five central conditions that increase threats to social identity and power: 
evaluative settings, the salience of politicized identities, disruptions of strong place identity, as 
well as evaluators that are powerful and belong to similar outgroups, i.e. other groups that are 
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hard to distinguish from the ingroup. This study applies them to journalists’ characteristics to 
predict which characteristics elicit attacks (rather than focusing on the attacking audience 
members as an alternative feasible approach). It is hypothesized that journalists are more 
frequently attacked when their potential to threaten the power of social groups is greater. This 
potential is predicted to be greater if journalists are evaluative, publish on political topics, have 
a local focus, have more power, and belong to similar outgroups. These hypotheses are tested 
by an online survey of 530 journalists in Switzerland. The study makes three contributions. 
First, it proposes a theory-driven explanation of aggression against journalists in democracies 
that is oriented at sociological social psychology and empirically validates it. Second, 
combining social identity theory and politicized social identity to explain attacks on journalists 
stimulates theorization on the relation between the public and highly exposed professions in 
digital societies. Third, the “aggression divides” identified between attacked and unattacked 
journalists inform the development of counter-measures. 
4.2. Social identity approach and politicized social identity  
The social identity approach, comprising social identity theory and self-categorization theory, 
illuminates how social relationships affect behavior through social identity. Its underlying 
identity theory roots in Mead (1934) and symbolic interactionism (Stryker 1980), positing that 
the impact of society on behaviors is mediated by identities. Social identity theory (Tajfel and 
Turner 1979) argues that, dependent on the context, people slide from having personal 
identities, in which they see themselves and others as persons with individualized and unique 
character traits or abilities, to social identities in which they see themselves and others as 
depersonalized, typical representatives of social groups. Social identity is defined as 
individuals’ awareness of their membership in a social group or groups, including the value and 
emotions attached to being members (Tajfel and Turner 1986).  Socially identified people 
perceive their own group’s members as more similar and their group as more different from 
outgroups (Hornsey 2008), and they conform to group norms, which are described as shared 
beliefs about what actions are appropriate in group-membership contexts (Bicchieri and 
Muldoon 2014). Social identities help individuals gain both intangible rewards such as 
belonging and being distinct and understood, and tangible rewards such as money. Further, they 
help groups achieve their interests and outcomes (Bicchieri and Muldoon 2014). By comparing 
their group with other groups, people thus strive to achieve and protect a positive social identity 
that depicts their group favorably and as positively distinct (Hornsey 2008).  
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If group members perceive their social identity to be threatened, they are motivated to discredit 
the threatening source. Members perceive threats if external sources such as outgroups and third 
parties decrease their group's value and esteem (Branscombe et al. 1999) and threaten group 
norms (Bicchieri and Muldoon 2014). In social identity theory, threats are not conceptualized 
as primarily objective, such as to jobs or wealth, but as subjective, such as feeling relatively 
deprived. In reality, of course, both types of threat are often linked. One strategy is to disparage 
the threatening source; group members perceive and treat the source of threat more negatively 
than their own group whenever opportunities for devaluation arise (Swann Jr and Schroeder 
1995, Ellemers, Spears and Doosje 1997, Branscombe et al. 1999, Brewer 2007). For example, 
people verbally disparage the source (Scheepers, Spears, Doosje et al. 2003) and retaliate 
aggressively against it (Fischer, Haslam and Smith 2010). Accordingly, social identity threats 
correlate positively with outgroup disparagement (meta-analysis by Riek, Mania and Gaertner 
2006) and cause it (e.g. Branscombe and Wann 1994). 
While the social identity approach primarily explains bipolar behavior between two opposing 
groups, politicized social identity, a concept building on social identity theory, additionally and 
explicitly theorizes why third parties are addressed by group members. This perspective (Simon 
and Klandermans 2001, Klandermans 2014) acknowledges that groups try to establish and 
defend particular power structures to address their long-term and short-term grievances and 
achieve certain outcome distributions. The perspective emphasizes the societal embeddedness 
of such power struggles. It conceptualizes struggles as occurring not only between antagonistic 
groups. The general public and its representatives are influenced by each of the two antagonistic 
groups because as third parties they are sources of support and power. Third parties can also be 
authorities of the political system and news media. They are addressed and instrumentalized by 
group members who seek to enlist them as allies, pressure them to take sides, and influence and 
control them (Klandermans 2014). Third parties are addressed by politicized socially identified 
group members, who hold a form of social identity that underlies group members' explicit 
motivations to engage in power struggles as activists or within a political movement (Simon 
and Klandermans 2001, Van Zomeren, Postmes and Spears 2008). For example, news media 
can be addressed by a national conservative group that experiences its values being threatened 
by immigrants and that acts in its struggle for cultural hegemony (Simon and Klandermans 
2001). Generally, any social identity may theoretically become politicized. However, this is 
more likely to occur in obvious, left-wing and right-wing ideologies and particular racial, 
ethnic, and religious groups. Occasionally, subgroups also politicize, such as feminists, and 
those identifying with specific issues, such as right-to-life on abortion (Huddy 2015). In contrast 
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to nonpoliticized social identities, such as merely identifying with one’s gender, politicized 
social identities predict collective action more strongly (meta-analysis by Van Zomeren et al. 
2008). This is because politicized social identity obliges people to participate in social activism 
more strongly (Stürmer and Simon 2004). Generally, any related actions can be conceptualized 
as collective as long as they aim at collective outcomes, even if they are perpetrated alone, as 
is commonly observed in digital environments (Postmes and Brunsting 2002). 
4.3. Aggression against journalists 
Applying politicized social identity theory to the phenomenon of aggression against journalists, 
this study assumes that journalists and audiences perceive and act in line with their social 
identities. This is for two reasons. First, if audiences read, listen, or view journalistic output in 
contexts where media reach large audiences via mass communication, audience members 
receive insufficient information about journalists to individualize them. Journalists and 
audience members do not form their relation through direct personal contact but through 
indirect analogue and digital channels such as print news articles and TV. How much 
information audiences receive about journalists varies between media channels. For example, 
TV moderators signal relatively rich verbal and nonverbal information, while authors of 
newspaper articles might reveal only their names. The overall relatively poor informational 
situation motivates audiences to perceive and treat journalists primarily in their journalistic role 
and to categorize them socially. Second, an intergroup context is obvious because journalistic 
content typically depersonalizes. Journalists publish more or less stereotype-compatible 
information on general matters and groups in society, including publications about individual 
group representatives. This content does not address each audience member personally but only 
indirectly through matters, groups, and representatives that audience members identify with. 
This motivates audiences to think and act as members of social groups instead of individuals, 
because potentially individualizing, personal contact with members of other groups seldom 
occurs in this context. 
Journalists can be perceived by members of particular groups within audiences as threats to 
their social identity and power and consequently be aggressively disparaged. Journalists are not 
only part of the intergroup context but may also actively shape power relations between groups. 
This is because they embody the “media system”, a potential third party in the wider societal 
arena, as suggested by Simon and Klandermans (2001). Journalists form groups’ public images 
by setting agendas; they select and unearth particular stories and information and present these 
to the public. It can be assumed that group members wish to see their group portrayed positively, 
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distinctly, and favorably in the media landscape. Such a portrayal ultimately increases group 
power. If members perceive journalists as threatening the social identity and power of their 
group, they may seek to address these journalists. Such members are more likely to be 
politicized socially identified members than nonpoliticized members, as their inner obligation 
makes them more likely to take collective action (Van Zomeren et al. 2008) They may 
influence, pressurize, and try to control journalistic content on behalf of their group so as to 
improve the media image of the ingroup or worsen that of an outgroup. The aim of such action 
is to regain positive social identity and power. Aggression can occur reactively when published 
output triggers sudden grievances (e.g., animal rights activists being portrayed as militant), or 
proactively when journalists possess social characteristics that are perceived to threaten social 
hierarchies (e.g. journalists’ nationality). Aggression is perpetrated by networks or by isolated 
individuals, physically such as by offending journalists face-to-face, and digitally, such as by 
posting offensive comments on social media. 
The politicized social identity approach identifies various conditions that increase social 
identity threat. Journalists increase their threatening potential by being associated with these 
conditions and thus will be more frequently attacked. This study refers to potential because 
publishing under these conditions does not automatically lead to every journalist being 
attacked; this still depends on other factors such as portraying a certain group as positive or 
negative. However, it increases the chances of being attacked as group members with a pre-
existing tendency to feel threatened are more easily ‘mobilized’. Five conditions are considered 
here: evaluation, political topics through salience of politicized identities, local focus through 
threatening place-related identity processes, power, and similar outgroups through low 
intergroup distinctness.   
Evaluation. People are more likely to feel threatened if they are evaluated. Social identity theory 
argues that group members evaluate by comparing groups with other groups (Tajfel and Turner 
1986, Hogg 2000). Comparisons may result in positively distinct social identities but may also 
threaten social identities if groups come off badly. Comparative settings thus trigger group 
members’ concerns about identity-contingent devaluation. Diverse studies experimentally 
induced identity-threatening information, for example by providing group members with 
negative feedback about their group’s performing poorly or being disliked (Swann Jr and 
Schroeder 1995, De Hoog 2013). In one experiment, Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers et al. 
(2002) threatened the prestige of a group by telling them that outgroup members had evaluated 
them negatively. Group members consequently perceived lower collective self-esteem and 
allocated fewer resources to the threatening outgroup.  
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It follows that journalists that cultivate an evaluative publishing style are more frequently 
attacked because their critiques may threaten particular social groups. Some journalists do not 
solely publish information but evaluate the state of the world; they take positions on particular 
matters such as issues, ideas, values, and the achievements of groups and their representatives. 
These can be journalists who regularly publish opinion and editorial columns, comments, and 
leading articles. In addition, they can be regular journalists who belong to a journalistic culture 
that collectively values an evaluative style. Journalistic cultures have developed along language 
and cultural borders that not only divide media markets into separate segments but also 
influence journalistic roles and practices (Bonin, Dingerkus, Dubied et al. 2017). In evaluative, 
traditionally francophone, journalistic cultures, journalists tend to identify more strongly with 
a style that sets agendas, motivates citizens, and scrutinizes power than with one driven by 
attracting and satisfying audiences. For example, Bonin et al. (2017) found that evaluative 
styles are more predominant among francophone journalists in Switzerland than their other-
language peers in the remaining language regions. These authors trace the evaluative style back 
to francophone minority identity, which has developed a sense of history distinct from the 
nationally dominant linguistic group – and a historically predominantly opinionated press.  
Overall, evaluative journalists are more likely than those publishing relatively nonevaluative 
contents to bolster the power of some groups but weaken the power of others. They thus have 
a greater potential to threaten, and thus they attract aggression. This leads us to the following 
hypotheses: 
H1.1: Journalists are more frequently attacked if they regularly publish opinionated 
articles than if they do not regularly publish opinionated articles.  
H1.2: Journalists are more frequently attacked if they are part of relatively evaluative 
journalistic cultures than if they are part of relatively audience-satisficing journalistic 
cultures. 
Political topics. The topics journalists select may make them threatening. According to self-
categorization theory (Turner et al. 1987),  group members feel threatened in situations where 
incoming information could threaten a social identity that is activated and relevant for the given 
situation. Members feel less threatened if irrelevant social identities and personal identities are 
activated (Brewer 2007). In one experiment, subjects exposed to country-threatening 
information about terror attacks felt more aggressive if national identity was activated rather 
than gender identity (Fischer et al. 2010). Generally, if particular social identities, whether 
permanently held or situationally induced, fit the situation where this identity is immediately 
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relevant, salience occurs (Turner et al. 1987, Huddy 2015). The fit increases the more the 
distinctions associated with a currently activated social identity maximize intragroup 
commonalities and intergroup differences (comparative fit) and confirm stereotypical 
expectations (normative fit). Salience can be induced experimentally, for example, by putting 
subjects in intergroup contexts and activating the appropriate social identities (Rip, Vallerand 
and Lafrenière 2012). Group members then conform more closely within the group, stereotype 
more, and respond to threats more aggressively.  
Journalists publishing on political topics are liable to be more frequently attacked because these 
topics induce a fit between the situation and audience members’ politicized social identities. 
Salience is here understood as an interaction between audiences’ politicized or nonpoliticized 
social identities and the journalists’ topics; political topics may make politicized social 
identities relevant, and non-political topics such as sports, culture, and technology make 
nonpoliticized identities relevant. If members with a politicized social identity are those that 
predominantly attack and they encounter political content, a comparative and normative fit is 
induced between this identity and its context. This is because politics is the societal topic where 
power is most proximately contested (Simon and Klandermans 2001); it is the naturally 
occurring context of politicized social identities. For example, journalists may publish on 
women from a political perspective (e.g. equal rights for women in the political section of the 
newspaper) or from a nonpolitical perspective (e.g. woman’s make up in the lifestyle section). 
The former situation creates a fit with those members holding a politicized feminist social 
identity. They might feel threatened. Their inner obligation to act makes them easily mobilized 
and aggressive. The latter situation more likely creates a fit with those members holding a 
nonpoliticized gender social identity. They might also feel threatened. However, their weak 
inner obligation to collectively act make them less likely to attack. This leads us to the following 
hypothesis: 
H2: Journalists that regularly publish on political topics are more frequently attacked 
than journalists who publish on other topics. 
Local focus. People also experience threat if place-related identity processes are disrupted. 
Social identities are not only represented by metaphorical places in society, such as those of 
housewives and politicians, but also by literal places (Dixon and Durrheim 2000). Place identity 
refers to how individuals’ sense of identity is constituted by the physical and symbolic 
properties of locations (Proshansky, Fabian and Kaminoff 1983). Place identity is compatible 
with social identity theory (Bonaiuto, Breakwell and Cano 1996, Dixon and Durrheim 2000) 
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because it suggests that people identify with places to maintain self-esteem, continuity over 
time, self-efficacy, distinctiveness, and a sense of belonging. If processes are disrupted, people 
experience identity threat (Bonaiuto et al. 1996, Devine-Wright 2009). Local attachments seem 
particularly strong. The related research stream argues that individuals value and engage more 
in what is spatially and temporally immediate because it is less psychologically distant (Milfont 
2010), more visible, tangible, and personally relevant, and it presents more opportunities to 
individuals for effective action (Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole and Whitmarsh 2007, Devine-
Wright 2013). Social identity theory suggests that, when faced with a threat, locals cannot 
simply change their local identity as they could a global identity. In the absence of alternative, 
for example social mobility, strategies, they more likely disparage (Bonaiuto et al. 1996: 162). 
This explains widespread local-place-protective action, sometimes referred to as NIMBY (Not 
In My Back Yard) and the enthusiastic engagement in local environmental problems compared 
to passivity in tackling global climate change (Devine-Wright 2009: 426). 
It follows that journalists that publish with a local focus are more frequently attacked because 
their potential to threaten strong place-related identity processes is higher. Empirical studies 
show that people expect journalistic reporting to satisfy place-identity-related needs. For 
example, Amsterdam city residents expect local media to serve social integration, local 
understanding, social cohesion, and belonging (Costera Meijer 2010). Journalists that engage 
with local topics are thus more likely to violate these expectations and pose a threat. Such strong 
local identities are likely to be found particularly in Switzerland. Swiss citizenry displays strong 
local and regional identities due to linguistic, religious, and socio-economic cleavages and 
strong traditions of local autonomy due to the highly decentralized political system (Hega 
2001). Attacking journalists that locally publish is intended to protect this place identity. 
Compare this with journalists publishing on other-located (e.g. national, continental, global) or 
nonlocatable topics. Independently of how they publish, their potential to threaten and thus be 
aggressively targeted is lower. For example, even if globally identified audience members feel 
threatened by journalistic content, acting on the threat is less likely because it is psychologically 
more distant, less tangible, and personally less relevant, and global identities can be more easily 
stripped off. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H3: Journalists that regularly publish with a local focus are more frequently attacked 
than journalists who publish on other-located or nonlocatable foci. 
Power. Journalists’ position can also trigger aggression. Generally, the more powerful the third 
parties involved in a power struggle between groups are, the more likely group members are to 
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feel threatened. Although the politicized social identity approach does not establish explicit 
hypotheses on the extent of third parties’ power to present perceived threat and attract 
disparagement, a number of researcher in this field mention its influence. For example, in 
proposing politicized social identity, Simon and Klandermans (2001: 324) suggest that group 
members seek “to win the support of third parties such as more powerful authorities” to turn 
their concerns into a matter of general interest. They seek “recognition of society or the larger 
community (e.g., the city, region, country, or European Union) as a more inclusive in-group 
membership”. Just as some groups are more powerful than others (Simon and Klandermans 
2001), so are third parties. It can be hypothesized that the more powerful third parties are, the 
better they serve groups’ need to enlarge ingroup memberships but the better they can also 
lower groups’ power by ignoring or even opposing them. For example, Bonaiuto et al. (1996) 
find that British subjects used strategies to cope with perceived threats to place identity, 
“especially if those were initially attributed by a powerful and disliked (…) institution” such as 
the EU (p. 160). 
It follows that more powerful journalists are more frequently attacked because they are more 
able to shape power structures between groups. Journalists’ power is greater if they work for 
media with large audiences. What those publishing companies and radio and television stations 
produce is read, seen, or heard by more people. Journalists are also more powerful if they are 
higher in the professional hierarchy. These journalists are not only opinion leaders but also have 
more influence about what is produced. Therefore, more powerful journalists have a greater 
threatening potential. These powerful actors should thus be more likely reached out to be 
influenced and controlled by groups. This leads us to the following hypotheses: 
H4.1: The more powerful journalists are through working at media organizations with 
a larger reach, the more frequently they are attacked. 
H4.2: The more powerful journalists are through having a high rank in the professional 
hierarchy, the more frequently they are attacked. 
Low intergroup distinctiveness. Journalists’ stable group characteristics may also trigger threat. 
Generally, group members feel more threatened if they perceive other groups to be too similar 
to their own group. The related intergroup distinctiveness describes “the perceived difference 
or dissimilarity between one’s own group and another group on a relevant dimension of 
comparison” (Jetten, Spears and Postmes 2004: 862). Being different from other groups both 
legitimizes a group’s existence and regulates the relation and interactions with other groups 
(Tajfel and Turner 1986, Jetten et al. 2004: 862). Group members thus feel threatened by other 
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groups that seem too similar to the ingroup in morals, norms, and values. Those might trigger, 
for example, cultural threats (Helbling 2011). Members then experience distinctiveness threat: 
their group’s distinctiveness and uniqueness is threatened (Branscombe et al. 1999, Riek et al. 
2006). In addition, they feel uncertain about their social identity, which otherwise provides 
relatively clear information to its members on how to think, feel, and behave (Hogg 2000: 227-
228). While it is predominantly high identifiers that feel threatened by similar outgroups, low 
identifiers rely on more explicit differences to feel threatened such as by more dissimilar 
outgroups (even in this case, though, low identifiers are not sufficiently motivated to disparage).  
To restore distinctiveness and reduce uncertainty, group members will disparage the members 
of similar outgroups.  
It follows that journalists belonging to outgroups that are very similar to the common audience 
ingroup are liable to be more frequently attacked than journalists belonging to the ingroup or 
more dissimilar outgroups. This is because they threaten the distinctiveness as perceived by the 
audience and make them uncertain about their identity. For Switzerland, this study considers 
journalists as similar if they have migration backgrounds from countries surrounding 
Switzerland. This is justified by studies distinguishing “culturally close”, or similar, countries 
to Switzerland such as Italy or Germany from “culturally far” countries such as non-West 
European countries (Stolz 2000: 46). Although journalists with German migration backgrounds 
working in the German Swiss part or French journalists in the French Swiss part might be 
particularly threatening, it is assumed here that journalists from all the surrounding countries 
may threaten audiences in all Swiss parts. This is due to their common cultural closeness to 
Switzerland compared to that of culturally distant countries. Studies support this by showing 
that Swiss-Germans who perceive German immigrants as a cultural threat dislike Germans 
more (Helbling 2011) and that citizens in German Swiss cities can have negative attitudes 
against French and Italian people too (Stolz 2000). This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
H5: Journalists that belong to similar outgroups are more frequently attacked than 
those belonging to the ingroup or more dissimilar outgroups. 
4.4. Method and Data 
This study uses data from an online survey on journalists in Switzerland conducted between 
July and October 2017. The survey examined the frequency, form, and impact of aggression 
experienced by journalists in Switzerland. The formulation of some survey questions was 
inspired by two similar surveys in other countries by Preuss et al. (2017) and Löfgren Nilsson 
and Örnebring (2016). These survey questions were provided to the author on demand.  
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A common problem in research on journalists is that the journalistic population is not well 
defined, and the demarcation of the professional field is becoming increasingly unclear (Wyss 
and Keel 2010, Bonfadelli, Keel, Marr et al. 2011). In this study, the population is defined as 
freelance and employed journalists of print and online media (newspapers, magazines, news 
agencies), TV, and radio in the German-, French-, and Italian-speaking parts of Switzerland, 
excluding those who are retired and those working predominantly in advertising and public 
relations. This study relied on journalists responding to the survey to exclude themselves if they 
met either of these conditions. The population of Swiss journalists in 2017 is estimated to be 
approximately 10’500, based on figures in Bonfadelli et al. (2011). A two-step distribution 
channel maximized the reach of the survey. First, the survey, in the three national languages, 
was sent by email to all members of the four largest Swiss professional associations for 
journalists (Impressum, Schweizer Syndikat Medienschaffender, Syndicom, Verband Schweizer 
Fachjournalisten). This comprised 7877 journalists who were members of at least one of the 
four associations. This is the most common approach to surveying journalists in Switzerland 
because membership of an association is one of the  preconditions for official registration as a 
journalist (Wyss and Keel 2010, Bonfadelli et al. 2011). The survey was also sent to all 6062 
journalists registered at renteria, one of the largest Swiss journalist databases; to the author’s 
knowledge, this is the first time this approach has been used. The two samples are assumed to 
strongly overlap, so the second step was a reminder for some association-registered journalists 
and an initial invitation for those not registered in any association.  
Eventually, 637 questionnaires were completed, a response rate of approximately 8%. This is 
between response rates of 2% in a similar study on online aggression against journalists in 
Germany (Preuss et al. 2017) and of 12% (Oesch and Graf 2007) and 30% (Bonfadelli et al. 
2011) in other-topic surveys on journalists in Switzerland. It is possible that attacked journalists 
were more likely to self-select into the survey, which would result in an overestimate of the 
prevalence of aggression.  To minimize such a nonresponse bias, the survey explicitly invited 
all journalists, i.e. also those that have never been attacked, to participate. Social desirability 
bias was avoided by anonymized participation. The final sample can be considered 
representative for journalists in Switzerland. This is indicated by comparing our sample to the 
samples of two extensive studies on journalists in Switzerland by Oesch and Graf (2007) and 
Bonfadelli et al. (2011). Table 7 in the Appendix compares the socio-demographic composition 
of the three samples. They are similar in sex, age, employment position, education, media type, 
and language region. Slight differences may be ascribed to structural transformations in the 
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media landscape within the last 10 years. The present sample thus allows statistically 
meaningful conclusions to be drawn for all journalists in Switzerland.  
Negative binomial regressions are applied in the statistical analyses to predict the frequency of 
an individual journalist being attacked (the first model includes the control variables and the 
second model adds the variables of interest). Negative binomial regressions suit the structure 
of the dependent variable, which is a count variable and has an over-dispersed negative 
binomial distribution: its variance is greater than its mean. A likelihood ratio test comparing 
the negative binomial regressions to a Poisson model strongly confirms the applicability of 
negative binomial regressions. The robustness tests applied are logit and Poisson regressions. 
They strongly confirm all results and therefore will not be further discussed. 
4.4.1. Measurements 
All variables refer to the situation within the 12 months prior to the survey, either continuously 
or at least most of the time. The questionnaire-based research design means that all the 
information acquired results from self-reports by individual journalists. The information below 
all arises from the final sample of 530 journalists. The case number of journalists is reduced as 
each journalist providing a “do not answer” on at least one variable is omitted.  
4.4.2. Variables of interest 
Frequency of being attacked is an ordinal variable indicating how often journalists were 
attacked. Journalists were asked how often they or their journalistic contents were targeted by 
“offenses, threats, aggressive, vulgar, pathologizing, or generalizing statements that are 
inappropriately disparaging, either directly such as through email, text message/phone, reader’s 
letters, or face-to-face, or indirectly such as through public online channels including social 
networking sites, news commentary sections, or discussion fora”. Some 43% of journalists were 
never attacked (= 0), 13% once (= 1), 15% once in 6 months (= 2), 16% once in 3 months (= 
3), 8% once a month (= 4), 4% once a week (= 5), and 1% once daily (= 6). This variable is 
over-dispersed. Incidentally, aggression through digital channels seems to predominate: 
journalists were attacked at least once through private (47%) or public (42%) online channels, 
or through text message/phone, letter, or face-to-face (25%).  
Evaluation by regularly publishing opinionated content is a dichotomous variable indicating 
evaluative publishing. Journalists were asked whether they “regularly published opinionated 
articles including journalistic columns, comments or leading articles”. A majority, 54%, of 
journalists self-reported doing so (= 1), 46% not doing so (= 0). 
 
 
 85 
Evaluation as part of evaluative journalistic culture is a dichotomous variable measuring 
whether journalists belong to the francophone culture in Switzerland or not. This was 
determined by allocating values of one to journalists who filled out the French survey (14%), 
and zero if not (i.e. if they filled out the Italian- or the German-speaking survey). 
Publishing on political topics is a dichotomous variable. Journalists were asked on what topic(s) 
they regularly publish. Choosing from a list of thirteen topics, 52% of journalists self-reported 
publishing on political topics (= 1) while 48% did not (= 0). 
Publishing with a local focus is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether journalists 
regularly published on local topics. Journalists were asked on what topic(s) they regularly 
publish. Choosing from the same list of thirteen topics as above, 48% of journalists self-
reported publishing on local topics (= 1) while 52% did not (= 0). 
Power by media reach of organization is an ordinal variable measuring the media reach of the 
organization journalists primarily worked for, commonly defined as the number of audience 
members. Journalists were asked how large the media’s audience is: readers per issue for print, 
listeners or viewers per day for radio and TV, and unique users per day for online media. In all, 
13% of journalists worked for an organization with a reach of 1 – 10,000 people, 21% of 10,001 
– 50,000, 15% of 50,001 – 100,000, 35% of 100,001 – 500,000, 8% of 500,001 - 1 million, and 
8% of 1 million - 5 million people.  
Power by high rank in professional hierarchy is a dichotomous variable indicating whether 
journalists hold a position as leader of a section or team, for example as chief editor, or middle 
or senior management (35%; = 1), or have a lower rank as editor, freelancer, or trainee (65%, 
= 0).  
Low intergroup distinctiveness by having migration background from surrounding countries is 
a dichotomous variable indicating whether journalists or one or more of their parents or 
grandparents immigrated from one or more of the countries surrounding Switzerland: France, 
Italy, Germany, and Austria (20%; = 1). The comparison group are journalists of more distinct 
migrant groups from nonsurrounding countries and journalists without migration background 
(80%; = 0). 
4.4.3. Control variables 
First, the study controls for socio-demographic information. The variables represent cues that 
may become the basis for social categorization, thus might trigger threat and consequently 
affect the frequency of being attacked. 
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Female is a dichotomous variable indicating whether journalists are female (35%; = 1) or male 
(65%; = 0). Research so far has provided inconsistent evidence on whether female journalists 
are either equally or more often attacked than males. 
University degree is a dichotomous variable indicating whether journalists have a university 
degree or not. Overall, 80% have a tertiary degree while 20% finished either obligatory school 
or secondary school. Being highly educated may determine professional behaviors and thus 
influence aggression received. High education may also be a cue that attracts aggression, such 
as online comments discrediting scientific findings and scientists (Nauroth et al. 2015). 
Age indicates journalists’ age (⌀ = 46). As this variable correlates strongly with the years of 
journalistic experience, we omitted the latter in the analysis despite its potential relevance 
(Preuss et al. 2017). 
Second, the study controls for media type indicating for which media type(s) journalists worked. 
Some 47% worked for subscription newspapers, 34% for (professional or news) magazines, 
12% for radio, 11% for TV, 11% for online-only media, 6% for commuter/tabloid newspapers, 
and 4% for press agencies. Media type correlates with the frequency of being attacked, as also 
found by Preuss et al. (2017). 
Third, the remaining topics(s) on which journalists regularly published are also controlled for. 
A majority, 60%, of journalists published on the topics of social affairs, culture, and 
entertainment, 41% on the economy and international affairs, 33% on science, technology, and 
the environment, 26% on crime and the judiciary, 18% on sports, and 8% on digital media and 
IT. These topic groupings emerged from factor analyses of the original topics. Topics correlate 
with the frequency of being attacked, as also found by Preuss et al. (2017) and Löfgren Nilsson 
and Örnebring (2016). 
Fourth, the study also controls for other professional information. 
Frequency of publishing is an ordinal variable indicating how often journalists published 
journalistic content. Just 1% of journalists published once in 6 months (= 1), 4% once in 3 
months (= 2), 7% once a month (= 3), 16% several times a month (= 4), 10% once a week (= 
5), 36% several times a week (= 6), 11% once daily (= 7), and 15% several times daily (= 8). 
Journalists publishing more often might be more frequently attacked as they provide more 
occasions to be perceived as threatening. 
Frequency of social media activity is an ordinal variable indicating how actively journalists 
engaged in social media. They were asked how often they posted content or participated in 
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discussions using any semipublic or public social media profile such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
blogs. Some 38% were never active on social media (=0), 4% once (=1), 5% once in 6 months 
(=2), 4% once in 3 months (=3), 15% once a month (=4), 18% once a week (=5), 8% daily (=6), 
and 7% several times daily (=8). Social media activities may increase attacks as they negatively 
influence audience perceptions of journalists’ professional roles (Lee 2015) while 
simultaneously making them more accessible. 
Publicly accessible contact information is an ordinal variable indicating whether zero (14%), 
one (20%), two (27%), or all (39%) of the following personal data on journalists were publicly 
accessible: email address, private or office address, and mobile or office phone number. The 
more personal data that is publicly exposed, the more accessible journalists are. This increases 
the chances of being attacked also by less threatened, otherwise insufficiently motivated, group 
members. 
Working full-time is a dichotomous variable indicating whether journalists worked full time as 
journalists (i.e. more than half of one’s income coming from journalistic work or more than 
half of the work time used to produce journalistic content; 93%; = 1) or worked part time (7%; 
= 0). The level of employment may be associated with professional characteristics that 
influence being attacked. 
For descriptive statistics and correlations of variables, see Table 8 in the Appendix. 
4.5. Results 
Table 4 reports the findings. The results in Model II confirm our hypotheses. Journalists are 
more frequently attacked if they are evaluative. For example, if they regularly publish 
opinionated contents, the frequency of attacks is 34% higher than for not regularly publishing 
opinionated contents (H1.1). Journalists who are part of a relatively evaluative journalistic 
culture report being attacked 47% more than those who are part of a relatively audience-serving 
journalistic culture (H1.2). Journalists are also more frequently attacked (frequency counts 45% 
higher) if they regularly publish on political topics than on other topics (H2). Further, journalists 
who regularly publish with a local focus report 35% more attacks than those publishing with 
other-located foci (e.g. national, continental, global) or nonlocatable foci (H3). Moreover, 
journalists are more frequently attacked when the reach of the media they primarily work for is 
larger (H4.1). Specifically, with every one unit increase in media reach of the organization, the 
frequency attack increases by 23%. Journalists are also more frequently attacked if they are a 
chief editor or middle or senior management (frequency counts increasing by 19%) than if they 
are an editor, freelancer, or volunteer (H4.2). However, the effect of H4.2 is only marginally 
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significant. Finally, journalists are more frequently attacked if they display low intergroup 
distinctiveness: if they have a migration background from countries surrounding Switzerland, 
compared to having no migration background or one from more distinct, nonsurrounding 
countries (H5). For this group, frequency of attacks is 29% higher. 
The control variables indicate that journalists are more frequently attacked if they work for 
online-only media or TV and if they publish on the topic of crime and the judiciary. They are 
less frequently attacked if they work for press agencies and publish on social affairs, culture, 
and entertainment topics. Being attacked seems not to be significantly influenced by socio-
demographic characteristics such as sex, education, or age. Likewise, working for radio or any 
of the magazines or newspapers does not impact the frequency of aggression. This also applies 
to the remaining topics: frequency of publishing, social media activity, the public accessibility 
of personal contact information, and working full-time. 
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Table 4. Effect of journalists' social identity threatening characteristics on their frequency 
of being attacked 
 Model I   Model II   
 IRR   z       IRR   z       
Social identity threatening characteristics             
Evaluation by regularly publishing opinionated content   1.34 2.62 ** 
Evaluation as part of evaluative journalistic culture (French)   1.47 3.25 ** 
Publishing on political topics    1.45 3.24 ** 
Publishing with a local focus    1.35 2.78 ** 
Power by media reach of organization    1.23 4.87 *** 
Power by high rank in professional hierarchy    1.19 1.74 † 
Low intergroup distinctiveness by having migration   1.29 2.24 * 
background from surrounding countries       
Control variables       
Female 0.90 -0.95  0.93 -0.71  
University degree 1.06 0.44  1.02 0.16  
Age 1.00 -0.51  1.00 -0.99  
Media type: Working for …       
Press agency 0.37 -3.02 ** 0.32 -3.52 *** 
Online-only media 1.27 1.59  1.59 3.31 ** 
Radio 0.83 -1.11  0.77 -1.64  
TV 1.48 2.30 * 1.34 1.87 † 
(Professional, news) magazine 0.75 -1.86 † 0.86 -1.07  
Commuter/tabloid newspaper 1.21 0.94  0.91 -0.45  
Subscription paper 1.16 1.06  1.03 0.22  
Section: Regularly Publishing on …       
Social/Culture/Entertainment 0.93 -0.73  0.79 -2.40 * 
Criminality/judiciary 1.37 2.73 ** 1.26 2.07 * 
Economy/international affairs 1.27 2.24 * 1.15 1.36  
Digital media/IT 1.03 0.17  1.11 0.59  
Sports 0.89 -0.83  0.88 -1.06  
Science/Environment 1.07 0.62  1.07 0.64  
Other professional characteristics       
Frequency of publishing 1.05 1.40  1.00 0.09  
Frequency of social media activity 1.03 1.22  1.00 -0.21  
Publicly accessible contact information 1.00 -0.07  0.99 -0.19  
Working full-time 1.40 1.42  1.07 0.28  
Constant 0.67 -0.90  0.41 -2.11 * 
Number of observations   530     530   
LR chi2  74.08 ***  147.55 *** 
df  20   29  
Pseudo R-square   4.18%   8.33%  
Legend: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001           
Models estimate a negative binomial regression. Effects are measured through Incidence Rate Ratio (IRR). The 
IRR represents the change in the dependent variable in terms of a percentage increase or decrease, with the 
precise percentage determined by the amount the IRR being either above or below 1. 
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4.6. Discussion 
The results show that journalists are more frequently attacked by audiences if journalists are 
evaluative, publish on political topics, have a local focus, have more power, and if they belong 
to a similar outgroup. It is argued this is because these conditions increase journalists’ potential 
to threaten the social identities of group members and the power of these groups. Evaluative 
journalists induce more comparative settings that potentially devalue groups than nonevaluative 
journalists. Journalists publishing on political topics make politicized identity salient. 
Journalists publishing with a local focus may disrupt strong place-related identity processes. 
More powerful journalists are more influential in shaping power structures between groups. 
Finally, journalists belonging to similar outgroups, compared to belonging to the ingroup or 
more dissimilar outgroups, threaten the distinctiveness and subjective certainty of the social 
identity shared by the average audience.  
The first important contribution of this study is the theoretically and methodologically more 
sophisticated approach to aggression against journalists in democracies. While journalists have 
always been attacked, digital technology and social media seem to amplify it. This is highly 
likely as younger journalists enthusiastically engage in social media and older ones avoid it 
(Hedman and Djerf-Pierre.    2013); simultaneously, younger journalists report more perceived 
aggression than older ones (Preuss et al. 2017). This study engages with this emerging problem, 
uses theory oriented at sociological social psychology to embed it into a larger societal context, 
derives social identity-based hypotheses and validates them by multivariate analysis. This goes 
beyond the few existing, commonly atheoretical, descriptive, and case-based reports about this 
topic. Specifically, these results confirm certain conditions that make journalists to attract more 
aggression, as suggested by reports (Löfgren Nilsson and Örnebring 2016, Preuss et al. 2017). 
Results, though, disconfirm the absence of any effect of journalists’ migration background in a 
former study (Preuss et al. 2017). The presence of this effect in the present study is explained 
by differentiating similar from dissimilar migration groups.  
The second important contribution is the combination of the social identity approach (Tajfel 
and Turner 1986, Turner et al. 1987) with politicized social identity (Simon and Klandermans 
2001) to theorize the relation between the public and highly exposed professions in digital 
societies. This approach seems appropriate, as the results reported here confirm central 
determinants of intergroup threat and disparagement: evaluation (e.g. Swann Jr and Schroeder 
1995), salience of social identities (Turner et al. 1987), place identity (Proshansky et al. 1983, 
Devine-Wright 2009), the power of third parties (Simon and Klandermans 2001), and 
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intergroup distinctiveness (Branscombe et al. 1999, Jetten et al. 2004). Such a socially 
embedded perspective on aggression against public actors is in line with related and 
comprehensive social-norm explanations of collective outrages against public actors in social 
media (Rost et al. 2016). Both suggest that public actors today are easily caught in the fire of 
digital citizens fighting their struggles for norms, legitimacy, power, and identity on digital 
paths rather than on the street. The democratic potential of digital technology appears to be a 
strategic tool to aggressively exclude the unwanted and include the desired. 
Ultimately, the findings suggest how to practically address aggression, or even counter it. First, 
they help to identify the most vulnerable journalistic groups. They point to aggression divides 
between frequently and rarely targeted journalistic groups. The findings suggest which 
journalist groups are most frequently targeted: evaluative, powerful journalists from similar 
outgroups publishing on local politics. Identification leads to the second point, intervention. 
Intervention aims to prevent members of such prototypical groups self-censoring, becoming 
silent, or quitting. Such understandable micro reactions may produce unintended negative 
macro outcomes. For example, if journalists individually accommodate the most aggressive 
social groups, the public media discourse may become biased in the long run. These results may 
thus inspire algorithms that estimate journalists’ individual risk of being targeted based on their 
specific characteristics. This might help to calibrate the support provided to vulnerable groups 
early. Finally, the social identity perspective taken here may also inspire the restructuring of 
interactivity with audiences with the aim of reducing threats and disparagement. For example, 
interactions could be framed using individualizing rather than social category-based features, 
or superordinate social categories encompassing diverse groups instead of exclusive group 
categories (Brewer 2007). Both should reduce aggression, as they either activate audience 
members’ personal identities or provide common group identities (Brewer 2007). These are 
alternatives to frequently used  and drastic counterstrategies such as abolishing news 
commentary sections and ignoring audience members (Hedman and Djerf-Pierre 2013). 
This study has several limitations that should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. 
First, the results can only be generalized to the population of journalists in Switzerland. 
However, the contextually sensitive social-identity perspective renders cross-national 
transferability conceivable. Second, the survey design does not allow causal conclusions to be 
drawn, but the inclusion of diverse control variables attempts to minimize the risk of potential 
confounding factors. Third, the interaction between journalists’ characteristics and group 
members’ perceptions of threat and politicized social identity was theoretically derived but not 
empirically tested. The present empirical approach is limited to directly relating journalists’ 
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characteristics to the frequency of attacks on them. Inferring the operation of threat from being 
attacked instead of directly assessing it is a common approach in the literature on social identity 
threat (Branscombe et al. 1999). 
The study opens important avenues for future research. First, future studies could test whether 
these hypotheses can be confirmed in other populations of journalists. Such efforts should 
incorporate socio-political structures, group hierarchies, and the status of journalists. Those 
structures may influence how audiences represent groups, perceive threats, and choose to 
respond. For example, while local place identity is presumably strong in Switzerland (Hega 
2001), Hungarian citizens seem more strongly attached to their continent (Laczko 2005). 
Considering journalists’ status, it is conceivable that in countries where few journalists are very 
popular, such as in the US, the aggression divide might be even deeper. While they are the 
winners-taking-it-all famewise, in terms of aggression received, they might simultaneously be 
the losers-getting-it-all. Second, the hypotheses could be tested to see whether they can predict 
aggression towards other third parties. For example, politicians have become similarly visible, 
accessible, and attacked by the public through social media such as their Facebook and Twitter 
profiles. Characteristics that make journalists vulnerable may well apply to politicians too. 
Third, alternative designs and samples could be used to analyze whether aggression against 
journalists is indeed driven by those audience members who are politically socially identified 
and feel threatened. This would acknowledge the heterogeneity within groups and confirm that 
aggression against journalists is most likely an interaction between the characteristics of 
journalists and of audience subgroups. This takes account of research suggesting that group 
members differ in how much they feel threatened, respond by disparaging, and choose hating 
and aggressive instead of peaceful collective action (Ellemers et al. 1997, Branscombe et al. 
1999, Rip et al. 2012). An optimal approach would link survey data on audience members with 
behavioral data such as online hate comments against journalists. 
To conclude, the interactivity between audiences and publicly exposed professions such as 
journalists is increasing in digital societies. This study has examined the dark side of this 
development, namely aggressive phenomena that occur in this process. The advocated 
explanatory perspective inspired by sociological social psychology hopes to initiate socially 
broader thinking while understanding, addressing, and potentially countering them. 
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6. Appendix 
Document 1. Permission for using data of the platform openpetition.de 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations 
 ID Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Amount of online aggression (log) 566052 .19 .40 .00 2.77           
2 Anonymity 566053 .30 .46 .00 1.00 -.01         
3 Intrinsic motivation (log) 566053 .28 .51 .00 3.09 .03 -.02       
4 Status of the accused (log)  554782 2.06 .32 .69 2.40 .04 .06 .02     
5 Controversy of accusation 554782 .58 .22 .00 .75 .04 .05 .05 .13   
6 Accused is a natural person (vs. legal entity) 554782 .04 .19 .00 1.00 .03 -.01 .02 -.04 .03 
7 Anonymity of social environment (log) 542900 7.88 2.61 .69 12.63 -.03 .02 .01 .00 -.02 
8 Accusation is connected to a scandal 554780 .23 .42 .00 1.00 .03 .01 .08 .20 .00 
9 Length of comment in words 566053 20.10 12.98 1.00 57.00 .11 -.01 .21 -.05 .01 
10 Number of protesters (log) 554781 4.24 1.89 .00 7.98 .05 .05 .00 .19 .15 
11 Time of comment submission after petition opening 566053 50343.15 61289.32 .00 628470.00 .05 .07 .07 .27 .21 
12 Scope of protest 554782 .70 .28 .00 1.00 .09 .05 .02 .19 .18 
13 Success of the petition 554782 .16 .36 .00 1.00 .05 .05 -.05 .19 .16 
14 Motives: Income/minimization of costs 554782 .39 .49 .00 1.00 .01 .06 -.03 .14 .20 
15 Motive: Security/social order/traditional values 554782 .09 .29 .00 1.00 .00 .00 -.05 .00 .01 
16 Motive: Independence/self-determination 554782 .26 .44 .00 1.00 .03 .05 .04 .26 .22 
17 Motive: Increasing life quality and competence 554782 .40 .49 .00 1.00 -.11 -.05 -.05 -.19 -.14 
18 Topic: Art/culture/education 554782 .23 .42 .00 1.00 -.07 -.02 -.08 -.16 -.07 
19 Topic: Economics 554782 .12 .32 .00 1.00 .01 -.01 -.08 -.10 .04 
20 Topic: Politics 554782 .08 .27 .00 1.00 -.04 .02 .06 .04 .05 
21 Topic: Media 554782 .17 .38 .00 1.00 .11 .12 -.04 .36 .21 
22 Topic: Environmental and animal welfare 554782 .08 .27 .00 1.00 .06 -.06 .02 -.10 -.01 
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 ID Variable 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
7 Anonymity of social environment (log) -.02                               
8 Accusation is connected to a scandal .06 .02                             
9 Length of comment in words .00 .00 -.03                           
10 Number of protesters (log) -.07 -.02 .20 -.02                         
11 Time of comment submission after petition opening -.07 .01 .22 -.03 -.02                       
12 Scope of protest .01 -.19 .15 -.04 .21 .18                     
13 Success of the petition -.08 .00 -.13 -.04 .24 .15 .22                   
14 Motives: Income/minimization of costs -.05 .01 -.07 .03 .29 .20 .04 .20                 
15 Motive: Security/social order/traditional values .00 -.02 .05 -.01 -.11 .02 .02 .05 -.16               
16 Motive: Independence/self-determination -.04 .01 .06 -.04 .19 .21 .19 .36 .01 -.09             
17 Motive: Increasing life quality and competence -.05 .10 -.05 .03 -.20 -.20 -.29 -.14 -.20 -.07 -.14           
18 Topic: Art/culture/education -.08 .08 -.10 .08 .05 -.21 -.16 -.17 .18 -.13 -.22 .29         
19 Topic: Economics -.04 -.10 .00 -.01 -.12 -.02 .07 .01 -.15 .22 .03 -.08 -.19       
20 Topic: Politics .09 .00 .17 -.04 .06 -.01 -.03 -.07 -.02 -.05 .11 -.09 -.16 -.10     
21 Topic: Media -.02 .02 .07 -.06 .25 .42 .31 .46 .38 -.09 .32 -.27 -.24 -.16 -.13   
22 Topic: Environmental and animal welfare .03 -.09 -.12 -.01 -.15 -.07 .13 -.05 -.23 -.07 -.17 -.14 -.16 -.11 -.09 -.13 
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations 
  Variables         Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Aggressive punishment 45,997 0.19 0.52 0.00 7.00         
2 Emotional shaming 45,985 0.29 0.52 0.00 4.00 0.05        
3 Sober disapproval 45,997 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00 -0.48 -0.75       
4 Illegitimate character 45,997 0.06 0.26 0.00 4.00 0.10 0.03 -0.06      
5 Illegitimate procedures  45,997 0.26 0.60 0.00 8.00 0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.13     
6 Illegitimate structures  45,997 0.03 0.17 0.00 4.00 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.06 0.06    
7 Illegitimate outcomes  45,997 0.10 0.38 0.00 6.00 0.03 0.03 -0.04 0.12 0.13 0.06   
8 Sophistication of language 45,985 7.76 6.22 0.00 55.50 -0.06 -0.09 0.13 0.10 0.19 0.09 0.07  
9 Arousal through spelling mistakes 45,985 1.07 2.15 0.00 55.00 0.11 0.07 -0.07 0.12 0.14 0.04 0.07 0.27 
10 Arousal level of words  45,985 4.26 0.67 2.30 8.10 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.11 
11 Anonymity 45,997 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 
12 Self-reported economic dependency  45,997 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.09 
13 Urbanity of residence 44,173 0.46 0.95 0.00 3.07 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
14 Negative media coverage 45,997 3.32 4.21 0.00 24.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
15 Balanced media coverage 45,997 1.76 2.51 0.00 14.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
16 Previous comments (total) 45,985 22.99 13.27 0.00 45.99 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 
17 Previous aggressive commenting 45,985 1.88 1.66 0.00 15.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
18 Number of words  45,985 0.22 0.26 0.01 4.75 0.06 0.10 -0.06 0.21 0.30 0.12 0.17 0.49 
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  Variables         9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
10 Arousal level of words  0.11         
11 Anonymity -0.02 0.00        
12 Self-reported economic dependency  0.02 0.00 0.00       
13 Urbanity of residence 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00      
14 Negative media coverage 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00     
15 Balanced media coverage 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.36    
16 Previous comments (total) 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.22 0.24   
17 Previous aggressive commenting 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.00  
18 Number of words  0.48 0.20 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 
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Table 7. Comparisons of socio-demographic information of the present journalist sample 
with those of former surveys (%) 
Authors   
Oesch and 
Graf  
Bonfadelli et al. Present 
study  
Survey   Online  Online / printed Online 
Year of survey   2006 2006/2007/2008 2017 
Estimated  
population (N)   10'000 10'500 10'500 
Sample (N)   1157 2509 530 
Region  German speaking 72 72 80 
 French speaking 24 26 14 
 Italian speaking 4 2 6 
   In total (%) 100 100 100 
Gender  Female 35 35 35 
 Male 65 65 65 
Age Mean Age (-) 43 46 
Education Compulsory  2 (-) 1 
 Secondary 36 (-) 19 
 Tertiary studies     74 
 Doctorate 62 56 6 
  In total (%) 100 56 100 
Media type* Television     11 
 Radio 28 31 12 
 Tabloid / free commuter newspaper   3 6 
 
(Sunday/weekly /daily) subscription  
newspapers  48   47 
 (News/specialist) magazines 17 57 34 
 News agency / media service  4 4 4 
 Exclusively online media 3 3 11 
 Other (-) 2 (-) 
  In total (%) 100 100 
(multiple 
response) 
Employment 
position* Freelance 9 18 8 
 Trainee 2 11 1 
 Editor 68 49 65 
 
Team leader, chief editor, 
management 21 40 35 
  In total (%) 100 
(multiple 
response) 
(multiple 
response) 
If studies collected and reported information on several categories in a single, broader category, the relevant 
categories are framed in black. 
*The comparability of the values in these categories is limited due to differing collection method used (single 
versus multiple response allowed) 
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Table 8. Descriptives and correlations 
  
Variables         
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Frequency of being aggressed 530 1.48 1.60 0 6            
2 Evaluation by regularly publishing opinionated content 530 0.54 0.50 0 1 0.12           
3 
Evaluation by being part of evaluative journalistic culture 
(French)  530 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.19 0.02          
4 Salience of politicized identity by publishing on politics  530 0.52 0.50 0 1 0.33 0.10 0.07         
5 Potential to disrupt local identity by publishing on local issues 530 0.48 0.50 0 1 0.21 0.03 0.04 0.30        
6 Power by media reach of organization 530 3.26 1.43 1 6 0.19 -0.23 0.06 0.16 -0.09       
7 Power by high rank in professional hierarchy 530 0.35 0.48 0 1 0.10 0.18 0.00 0.10 0.01 -0.04      
8 Low intergroup distinctiveness by having migration 530 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.08 0.07 0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.01     
 background from surrounding countries                 
9 Female 530 0.35 0.48 0 1 -0.10 -0.15 0.00 -0.21 -0.09 0.01 -0.10 0.16    
10 University degree 530 0.79 0.40 0 1 0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.09 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.09   
11 Age 530 45.90 11.39 21 74 -0.09 0.17 0.04 -0.16 -0.22 -0.16 0.20 0.02 -0.13 -0.14  
12 Press agency 530 0.04 0.20 0 1 -0.10 -0.21 0.03 0.07 -0.05 0.23 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.06 0.04 
13 Online-only media 530 0.11 0.32 0 1 0.09 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 -0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.04 
14 Radio 530 0.12 0.33 0 1 0.00 -0.18 -0.05 0.09 0.02 0.20 0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.06 
15 TV 530 0.11 0.32 0 1 0.13 -0.22 0.05 0.13 0.07 0.14 -0.04 -0.07 0.01 0.08 -0.09 
16 (Professional, news) magazine 530 0.34 0.47 0 1 -0.24 0.02 -0.08 -0.34 -0.27 -0.31 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.10 0.18 
17 Commuter/tabloid newspaper 530 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.09 -0.13 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.30 0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 
18 Subscription paper 530 0.47 0.50 0 1 0.13 0.35 0.04 0.14 0.25 -0.09 -0.05 0.03 -0.13 -0.03 -0.05 
19 Social/Culture/Entertainment 530 0.60 0.49 0 1 -0.04 -0.07 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.13 -0.02 0.04 
20 Criminality/judiciary 530 0.26 0.44 0 1 0.21 -0.13 -0.01 0.44 0.29 0.16 -0.03 -0.06 -0.12 -0.06 -0.17 
21 Economy/international affairs 530 0.41 0.49 0 1 0.14 0.03 0.01 0.31 -0.03 0.07 0.08 -0.02 -0.18 0.06 -0.05 
22 Digital media/IT 530 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.08 -0.01 -0.03 
23 Sports 530 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.09 0.17 0.06 0.00 -0.04 -0.15 -0.06 -0.11 
24 Science/Environment 530 0.33 0.47 0 1 0.02 -0.06 0.05 0.07 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.04 
25 Frequency of publishing 530 5.57 1.69 1 8 0.17 0.02 0.12 0.27 0.30 0.29 -0.15 -0.03 -0.16 -0.05 -0.22 
26 Frequency of social media activity 530 2.78 2.53 0 7 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.08 -0.05 -0.05 -0.12 
27 Publicly accessible contact information 530 1.91 1.08 0 3 -0.01 0.09 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.18 0.19 0.05 -0.07 -0.03 0.20 
28 Working full-time 530 0.93 0.25 0 1 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.05 0.18 0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.09 
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  Variables         12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
13 Online-only media -0.04                
14 Radio -0.05 0.01               
15 TV 0.05 -0.01 0.20              
16 (Professional, news) magazine -0.03 0.00 -0.16 -0.21             
17 Commuter/tabloid newspaper -0.01 0.01 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10            
18 Subscription paper -0.18 -0.06 -0.21 -0.26 -0.45 -0.06           
19 Social/Culture/Entertainment 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.13 -0.02 -0.19          
20 Criminality/judiciary 0.13 -0.05 0.06 0.13 -0.29 0.08 0.04 0.10         
21 Economy/international affairs 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.08 -0.10 0.00 -0.07 0.05 0.12        
22 Digital media/IT 0.08 0.07 0.13 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.10 0.09 0.07 0.22       
23 Sports 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.08 -0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.12      
24 Science/Environment 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.13 0.11 -0.06 -0.21 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.09     
25 Frequency of publishing 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.02 -0.42 0.16 0.18 -0.07 0.27 0.09 0.16 0.21 -0.05    
26 Frequency of social media activity -0.05 0.17 0.03 -0.02 -0.15 -0.01 0.14 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.22 0.04 0.02 0.14   
27 Publicly accessible contact information -0.11 0.04 0.03 -0.08 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.04 -0.09 -0.08  
28 Working full-time 0.06 -0.07 0.01 0.05 -0.15 0.00 0.11 -0.03 0.12 0.07 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.26 0.04 -0.01 
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